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Empirical evidence shows that foreign military interventions in civil conflicts on the 
side of the government or opposition are frequent and they have significant political 
and economic impacts on both the intervening states and the target states. While 
many recent quantitative studies have examined the impact of foreign military 
interventions on the dynamics and outcomes of civil conflicts, similar attention has 
not been paid to the factors that motivate foreign powers to intervene in intrastate 
disputes. Most of the theoretical insight on the causes of military intervention comes 
from earlier qualitative studies that analyze the foreign policy decision making of 
interveners in detail. In contrast, the small amount of quantitative research conducted 
on this topic focuses more on the attributes of the civil conflict that attract foreign 
military intervention. The purpose of this study is to analyze the causes of military 
interventions from a foreign policy decision making perspective which has been 
neglected in current quantitative studies. In order to identify the factors that motivate 
  
state leaders to use military intervention as a foreign policy instrument, this 
dissertation examines the international and domestic sources of foreign policy 
decision making through a modified realist framework. Hypotheses are tested against 
a novel dataset that includes both actual and potential interveners in all civil conflicts 
between 1946 and 2002. Sub-sample analyses are also conducted for major powers, 
democracies and autocracies to understand the relative importance of international, 
domestic and contextual factors on the intervention decisions of different types of 
states. The empirical findings show that the strategic significance of the conflict state, 
interventions by rivals or allies, and domestic considerations of leaders play a more 
critical role than the attributes of the civil conflict when foreign powers are deciding 
whether and on whose side to intervene in a civil conflict. While these empirical 
findings provide an improved understanding of the rationale behind foreign military 
interventions in civil conflicts, this dissertation also contributes theoretically to the 
current literature by bringing back the much needed foreign policy decision making 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Significance of Foreign Military Interventions 
Although sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other 
states are fundamental principles of the international system, external states 
frequently intervene militarily on the side of government or rebels during civil 
conflicts. A brief look at the major intervention data collection projects reveals the 
frequency of foreign military interventions since the end of World War II. According 
to the International Military Intervention Dataset, approximately 650 military 
interventions were undertaken by major and minor powers during the Cold War 
period. Between 1990 and 2005, close to 350 foreign military interventions took place 
which actually indicates that intervention rates increased during the post-Cold War 
period (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). Of the 138 civil conflicts identified by Regan 
for the post-World War II period, 85 of them experienced approximately 180 foreign 
military interventions on behalf of government or opposition forces (Regan 1996).  
As several international relations scholars have pointed out, foreign military 
intervention dates all the way back to the Peloponnesian Wars when Athens and 
Sparta intervened in the internal conflicts of other city states and supported opposing 
domestic factions (Jentleson and Levite 1992; Young 1968). Morgenthau describes 
intervention as an “ancient and well-established instrument of foreign policy” (1967, 
p. 425) while Young underlines that intervention in the domestic affairs of other 




177). Foreign military interventions, particularly during periods of domestic 
instability, have been a persistent feature of world politics. The continuing practice of 
military interventions by major and minor powers alike in the current international 
system despite the existence of stronger norms of state sovereignty demands a closer 
look at the rationale behind this foreign policy behavior.  
In addition to their persistency and frequency as a foreign policy instrument, 
military interventions usually have significant political, economic and social impacts 
on both the intervening states and the target states. Even though some military 
interventions can last only weeks such as the U.S. military interventions in Guatemala 
(1954) and the Dominican Republic (1965), others can last for years. The U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Cuban intervention in 
Angola and Syrian intervention in Lebanon are examples of protracted military 
interventions that had serious political, economic consequences and high human costs 
for the parties involved. Military interventions are risky policies and they can make 
civil conflicts longer, more violent and more difficult to resolve. The domestic and 
international impacts of military interventions for both the intervening state and the 
conflict state also require a thorough understanding of this phenomenon. 
Another pressing reason for analyzing foreign military interventions during 
periods of domestic turbulence has to do with the salience of civil conflicts in the 
world. Since the end of World War II, intrastate conflicts rather than interstate 




according to major conflict datasets in the literature.
1
 The end of the Cold War and 
superpower rivalry along with the outbreak of civil wars with devastating human 
costs in Bosnia, Burundi and Rwanda generated particular interest from international 
relations scholars and the foreign policy community towards the study of civil 
conflicts in the early 1990s. In the past 20 years, there has been a significant increase 
in the number of academic studies examining the causes and dynamics of civil 
conflicts which are crucial for conflict prevention and conflict resolution purposes. 
Since external states intervene frequently on the side of either government or 
opposition during civil conflicts as observed by Regan and other scholars, 
understanding the impact of third party intervention on the dynamics, escalation and 
termination of civil conflicts has become even more compelling in the literature. 
A critical part of understanding the effect of foreign military interventions on 
civil conflicts lies in examining the causes of this phenomenon by analyzing 
interveners’ rationale for choosing this course of action and supporting one of the 
domestic disputants against the other. Unfortunately, the last two decades of 
quantitative research has examined this important foreign policy behavior mostly in 
an indirect fashion. By putting the civil conflict at the center of analysis, the majority 
of recent empirical research studied the attributes of civil conflicts that may or may 
not attract foreign military interventions. In other words, the recent literature 
neglected the decision making calculus of the intervener and focused more on the 
contextual and structural factors related to the civil conflict phenomenon that 
motivate interveners.  
                                                 
1
 Correlates of War Project and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data both show that the number 
of civil conflicts is dramatically higher than interstate wars. Intrastate disputes constitute 




In order to explore the rationale behind military interventions, one has to 
make the potential intervener the theoretical focus and examine why some states 
decide to intervene militarily in other states’ civil conflicts by looking closely at the 
critical factors that influence potential intervener’s decision making process. 
Examining international and domestic considerations of state leaders lies at the core 
of foreign policy analysis. Of course, foreign policy decisions are also influenced by 
contextual factors including the attributes of the target country and the civil conflict, 
but putting these attributes at the center of study especially at the expense of 
international and domestic concerns of potential interveners is problematic. It is the 
goal of this study to examine the reasons behind foreign military interventions by 
applying a theoretical framework that puts the potential intervener at the center of 
analysis while paying due attention to the civil conflict phenomenon foreign policy 
decision makers are reacting to.   
The past two decades saw a dramatic increase in the number of quantitative 
studies that examine various aspects of civil conflicts including the impact of foreign 
military interventions on the dynamics and outcomes of civil conflicts. However, the 
relative paucity of quantitative research on the causes of foreign military 
interventions is problematic. On the other hand, there are a number of comparative 
and single case studies conducted by international relations scholars between the 
1970s and early 1990s that provide an in-depth analysis of the intervention decisions 
of foreign powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, in civil 
conflicts around the world. The important theoretical insights provided by these 




at some generalizations regarding the rationale behind foreign military intervention. 
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the factors that motivate 
foreign powers to intervene militarily in civil conflicts on behalf of government or 
opposition in a large-N study. By putting the intervener at the center of theoretical 
and empirical analysis and bringing the attention back to the foreign policy decision 
making calculus of the intervener, this dissertation aims to fill an important vacuum 
in the current quantitative research on interventions.  
Overview of Study 
This research investigates the rationale behind foreign military interventions 
and identifies the critical factors that motivate states to intervene militarily on the side 
of government or opposition in another state’s civil conflict. The conceptual 
definition of foreign military intervention used in this study is the one developed by 
Rosenau. Military intervention is defined as “convention-breaking” military activities 
in the internal affairs of a foreign country directed at “changing or preserving the 
structure of political authority in the target state” and these activities must be finite 
and transitory; an action  is not considered intervention if it becomes a permanent 
feature of the relationship (Rosenau 1969, pp. 161-162). Neutral military 
interventions conducted by third parties, including the ones by international or 
regional organizations or coalitions of states, are excluded from this definition. 
Neutral interventions can be described as conflict resolution efforts aimed at ending 
the civil conflict and bringing peace without supporting one domestic disputant 
militarily against the other. Biased military interventions, on the other hand, are 




underlying theoretical question driving this study is: why do some states prefer to 
intervene and pick one side against the other and consequently become a party to the 
conflict? In essence, this dissertation argues that the decision to intervene and the 
decision to choose one side over the other are closely linked.  In order to understand 
the rationale behind biased military interventions, one has to analyze the linkage 
between the decision to intervene and the side to support. These two decisions are 
generally intertwined and the relationship between them has to be accounted for both 
theoretically and methodologically.  
This dissertation aims to contribute to the international relations literature on 
foreign military interventions by building a much needed theoretical bridge between 
current quantitative research on interventions in civil conflicts and earlier qualitative 
studies that analyze military interventions from a foreign policy decision making 
perspective. While recent studies have been ambitious in providing generalizations 
about various aspects of civil conflicts that attract foreign military intervention, they 
have moved away from an actor-centric theoretical framework and examined the 
causes of interventions indirectly. This research uses a theoretical framework that 
puts the potential intervener at the center of study by analyzing the international and 
domestic factors that affect the foreign policy decision making calculus of state 
leaders. If one assumes that state leaders are rational actors who make cost-benefit 
analyses and compare the expected utility of different foreign policy options before 
choosing a particular course of action, then the theoretical task is to examine the 




intervention; but this task has not been done adequately within contemporary 
empirical research.  
Prominent scholars of foreign policy have called for the need to open up the 
‘black box’ and argued that domestic factors are critical in shaping foreign policy 
behavior (Wilkenfeld et al. 1980, Putnam 1988). Putnam persuasively argued that 
state leaders are concerned with domestic and international pressures simultaneously 
(1988). Since then many foreign policy scholars have used theoretical frameworks 
that combine structural and strategic factors from international and domestic levels of 
analysis to study foreign policy behavior. This type of theoretical rigor is not 
adequately applied in current quantitative studies of foreign military interventions. 
Therefore, this study applies a theoretical framework that examines both international 
and domestic sources of foreign policy behavior. It then derives theoretical arguments 
about the critical domestic and international factors that influence the cost-benefit 
calculation of leaders which consequently produces the foreign policy decision about 
whether or not to intervene militarily on the side of the government or opposition in a 
civil conflict. The first major contribution of this dissertation is bringing back the 
much needed theoretical framework of foreign policy analysis into the study of 
military interventions and identifying empirical patterns through a more suitable 
theoretical perspective.  
Second, this theoretical framework is also useful for exploring how 
international and domestic sources of foreign policy influence intervention behavior 
of different types of states. Although empirical evidence shows that both major and 




interventions in civil conflicts, it might be wrong to assume that they are all 
motivated by the same set of factors in a similar manner. The actor-centric theoretical 
framework used in this study can help identify whether certain critical international 
and domestic factors have the same effect on foreign policy choices of different types 
of states. While it is desirable to arrive at some generalizations regarding the rationale 
behind foreign military interventions, one also needs to check the robustness of such 
generalizations. Analyzing sub-samples of potential interveners that might be 
classified in the same group due to some important shared characteristic is an 
effective way to check how robust such generalizations are. Thus, the hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical framework will first be tested against all states in the 
international system to uncover universal patterns. Then, these hypotheses will be 
tested against three important sub-samples: major powers, democracies and 
autocracies. These sub-samples are chosen based on international relations scholars’ 
particular interest in understanding the relationship between conflict involvement and 
power status as well as regime type of states. The purpose of examining these sub-
samples is threefold. The first purpose is to check the robustness of findings from all 
states and determine the level of generalizability about the causes of foreign military 
interventions. The second purpose is to examine whether and to what extent major 
powers, democracies and autocracies are motivated by the same set of international 
and domestic factors when they intervene militarily. Finally, analyzing the similarities 
and differences between different types of states is useful for assessing the utility of 




The hypotheses will be tested in a dataset that includes all potential 
interveners in all civil conflicts between 1946 and 2002. Potential interveners include 
all states in the international system except the conflict state. Civil conflicts are drawn 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Each 
observation is a pair of potential intervener and conflict state. Both potential 
interveners and conflict states are observed from the year the civil conflict starts until 
the year it ends. Hence, the data structure is time-series cross-sectional which makes 
it a dynamic analysis instead of a static one capturing the changes in the potential 
intervener’s international and domestic situation.  
Both of the dependent variables analyzed in this study are dichotomous. The 
first dependent variable measures whether or not the potential intervener has actually 
intervened militarily in any year during the life of the civil conflict. If military 
intervention has taken place, then the second dependent variable looks at whether the 
foreign state intervened on the side of the government or rebels. Military 
interventions are operationalized as the supply of troops, military equipment, 
intelligence and logistical support, air or naval support to one of the sides in civil 
conflict. The data on military interventions are compiled from six different 
intervention datasets in the literature. Thus, the military intervention data used in this 
study is a synthesis of different datasets and can be described as an updated collection 
of military intervention data which have also been cross-checked and supplemented 
by multiple sources to study foreign military interventions as thoroughly as possible. 
As mentioned above, this dissertation argues that the decision to intervene and 




this study claims that these two decisions are closely linked and their interdependence 
is important for understanding the rationale behind military interventions; applying 
the right methodology not only can account for this relationship, but it can also test if 
this relationship really exists. Choosing the right method to test all aspects of the 
theory is crucial for empirical studies. This dissertation uses a selection model which 
can test the interdependence between the two dependent variables and account for its 
effects if it exists. Given that both dependent variables are binary, the most suitable 
statistical technique for this study is censored probit. As a type of selection model, 
censored probit can test if outcomes of interest are linked. If they are found to be 
linked, then censored probit takes into account the level of interdependence when 
examining the substantive impact of independent variables on the outcome. The first 
part of the censored probit analysis, which is called the selection stage, will test 
hypotheses related to the first dependent variable. The second part of the censored 
probit analysis, which is called the outcome stage, will test hypotheses related to the 
second dependent variable.  
  The research design of this study has several advantages over the majority of 
the large-N studies on military interventions in civil conflicts. First, the time-series 
cross-sectional data structure of this research makes the analysis a dynamic one which 
is superior to static analyses because it enables one to analyze the impact of changing 
conditions over time. Second, this research design avoids the selection bias problem 
that some of the quantitative studies in the intervention literature suffer from. Aside 
from a number of recent quantitative studies, the majority of these studies have 




way due to selecting on the dependent variable. In other words, by testing hypotheses 
only against cases of intervention these studies have arrived at biased results. The 
selection bias problem can only be avoided by testing hypotheses against cases of 
intervention by actual interveners and cases of non-intervention by potential 
interveners. Including actual interveners as well as potential interveners in the 
research design solves the problem of selection bias and provides more accurate 
results. Finally, a censored probit model makes this research design fully equipped to 
analyze both the decision to intervene and on whose side to intervene while also 
examining the interdependence between these two outcomes of interest. Selection 
models have rarely been utilized in the intervention literature, therefore the use of a 
censored probit model makes this a more comprehensive study of foreign military 
interventions. 
The significance of foreign military interventions in world politics is 
demonstrated by their frequency, persistency as well as their impact on both 
intervening states and conflict states. This dissertation aims to make theoretical and 
methodological contributions to the study of foreign military interventions in civil 
conflicts and advance the current state of knowledge about this critical foreign policy 
behavior.  
Outline of Chapters 
This study will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
literature on foreign military interventions by summarizing its major contributions as 
well as its theoretical and methodological limitations. Chapter 3 discusses the 




external military interventions. Hypotheses about the international and domestic 
factors that shape foreign policy decisions of state leaders are derived from these 
theoretical arguments. Chapter 4 describes the data collected for this research project 
and explains the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Operationalization of 
variables is also discussed in this chapter. Chapters 5 and 6 present the results of the 
quantitative analyses and discuss the findings in light of theoretical arguments made 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 7 summarizes key findings and their implications for theory and 















This chapter provides an overview of the literature on foreign military 
interventions in civil conflicts. The first part of the chapter discusses some of the 
influential works in the early literature while the second part reviews the significant 
works in contemporary literature. In addition to surveying the historical evolution of 
the literature, the chapter also groups these influential works according to the major 
question driving research and the theoretical and methodological approaches being 
used. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to review the major theoretical and 
empirical contributions of the literature as well as its limitations to determine the 
areas where progress in needed.  
Early Literature on Foreign Military Interventions 
Significant international events have always shaped research interests of 
international relations scholars. In the case of intervention literature, it was the 
increasing political ramifications of the Vietnam War in the early 1960s that triggered 
an academic interest in understanding the relationship between foreign intervention 
and dynamics of civil conflict. 
The emergence of the literature on military interventions in civil conflicts can 
be traced back to an influential volume published in 1964 which was a collection of 
essays on international aspects of civil conflicts written by prominent foreign policy 
scholars. This volume discussed the internal attributes of civil conflicts to understand 




impact of domestic conflicts on international politics, some of the essays drew 
attention to the subject of foreign interventions. Rosenau argued that international 
repercussions, including foreign military interventions, of civil conflicts vary 
according to the scope, duration and type of civil conflict (1964, pp. 61-80). Modelski 
hypothesized that military intervention is most likely to occur during periods of 
extreme polarization between domestic disputants because that is when internal 
parties perceive their survival to be at stake and hence make appeals for external 
assistance to change the balance of power (1964, pp. 14-44). Finally, Kaplan reflected 
on the relationship between the type of international system and the likelihood of 
foreign intervention in civil conflicts, essentially looking at the issue from the 
potential intervener’s perspective. He argued that bipolar international systems create 
more incentives for states to intervene than balance-of-power systems (1964, pp. 92-
121). 
As the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War escalated in the late 1960s, a 
number of scholars started to examine the rationale behind military interventions and 
focus directly on the foreign policy decision making of the intervener. Morgenthau 
argued that the logic behind interventions remains rooted in the pursuit of national 
interest and interventions by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in domestic conflicts of 
weaker states could be conceived as competition for influence on particular 
governments. Rather than “confronting each other openly and directly’, the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. were competing with each other indirectly through interventions 
(Morgenthau 1967, p. 428). Morgenthau’s view of interventions as decisions guided 




scientific explanation of interventions, because national interest was a vague term that 
did not specify the conditions causing states to intervene (Rosenau 1969, pp. 157-
158). 
According to Rosenau, “the factors that foster, precipitate, sustain, channel, 
constrain, and/or curb intervention” had not been explored scientifically and the ‘lack 
of definitional clarity” in the literature regarding the concept of intervention was 
partly responsible for impeding the scientific analysis of this empirical phenomenon 
(1969, pp. 150, 154). Rosenau argued that by defining intervention as “any action 
whereby one state has an impact upon the affairs of another”, many scholars were not 
distinguishing between intervention and other types of influence processes (1969, p. 
153). Hence, the first step was to identify the characteristics of intervention that 
distinguish it from other forms of state interactions and develop an operational 
definition in order to study this empirical phenomenon scientifically. He posited three 
criteria that classify state behavior as an intervention: it had to be “convention-
breaking”, “authority-oriented” and “finite and temporary” (1969, pp. 161-162). 
Thus, according to Rosenau, an intervention takes place when the intervening state 
makes a sharp break with the prevailing manner of relating to the target state and 
directs its behavior at changing or preserving the authority structure of the target 
state. However, the “study of intervention is the study of the unconventional in 
international politics and, since unconventionality becomes conventional the longer it 
persists”, interventions have to be finite and temporary (1969, p. 162). These criteria, 
Rosenau claimed, distinguish intervention from other types of influence processes 




definition of intervention. Accordingly, he then focused on building a “theory of 
intervention” (1969, p. 165). 
In order to accomplish his goal of theory building, Rosenau took a methodical 
approach and questioned the relative importance of individual, bureaucratic, 
governmental, societal and systemic variables in explaining intervention. He quickly 
eliminated societal variables arguing that although public opinion can sometimes 
constrain foreign policy behavior, in the case of intervention the public is rarely 
concerned about foreign authority structures or “organized” enough to press for 
unconventional modes of foreign policy behavior (1969, p. 166). Roseanu also 
discarded government structure as a source of intervention because both democracies 
and autocracies had carried out interventions since the end of World War II. Given 
the small, if any, role played by societal and governmental variables, Rosenau argued 
that intervention decisions result mainly from the “perceptions, calculations, and 
decisions” of state leaders and “dynamics of bureaucratic structures (1969, p. 166). 
Although the decision making calculus of top leaders and their bureaucratic staff was 
important for explaining interventions, one had to also take into account the 
international context since intervention decisions were not taken in a vacuum. Thus, 
Rosenau claimed that the structure of the international system, the level of ideological 
rivalry and the stability of nations within the system were three crucial systemic 
variables that affect the probability of intervention. He hypothesized that both 
bipolarity and intense ideological rivalry in the international system increased the 
likelihood of foreign interventions. Finally, he asserted that state leaders were 




governments decreased, state leaders would be more likely to resort to 
unconventional modes of foreign behavior to avoid threats or to seize opportunities 
from unstable situations (1969, pp. 165-169). In short, Rosenau claimed that 
intervention behavior was a function of international systemic variables and the 
decision making calculus of top leaders. 
Rosenau never conducted an empirical analysis of his theoretical arguments, 
yet his conceptual and theoretical insights influenced the evolution of intervention 
literature significantly. A number of scholars have used his operational definition of 
intervention in their theoretical and empirical analyses. In fact, this dissertation also 
uses Roseanu’s definition. Others have built on his theoretical insights and tested 
some of his hypotheses empirically. Thus, the conceptual and theoretical beginnings 
of the intervention literature can be traced back to Rosenau’s influential work. By 
emphasizing the importance of conceptual clarity and scientific inquiry, Rosenau’s 
work provided the early foundation for systematic and scientific analysis of 
interventions in contemporary international relations literature. 
Mitchell’s study was another important early theoretical work which 
examined the factors that increase the probability of intervention in civil conflicts 
(Mitchell 1970). Following Rosenau’s advice on systematic inquiry, Mitchell argued 
that a theoretical framework for investigating foreign interventions had to look at four 
major categories of factors: factors within the conflict state, factors within the 
intervening state, factors within the international system and linkages between the 
intervening state and conflict state. He claimed that previous studies on intervention, 




between the intervening state and the conflict state. Therefore, Mitchell focused on 
analyzing the nature of linkages that increase the probability of interventions. He 
identified two types of linkages: transactional and affective. The first type included 
economic, military, educational and political linkages between the intervener and 
target country, while the second one involved ideological, religious and ethnic ties. 
He argued that a third party intervening in a civil conflict “is already committed, in 
some quite significant way, to an elite, a class, a social group, or a set of values held 
by such groups within the disrupted state” and intervention can be viewed as “an 
extension of an already existing commitment” (1970, pp. 186-187). He then 
hypothesized that the probability of intervention increases as these linkages become 
stronger and more important. Similar to Rosenau, Mitchell also did not test his 
hypotheses empirically. However, his theoretical arguments influenced the 
intervention literature in three critical ways. First, by emphasizing transnational 
factors, he prompted future scholars to study the impact of affective factors, 
particularly ethnic ties. Second, he drew attention to the dyadic linkages between the 
intervening state and conflict state which led future works to examine the role of 
dyadic relations as a source of intervention behavior. Third, he encouraged scholars to 
look at domestic factors within the intervening state, unlike Rosenau who excluded 
societal factors from his theory of interventions.  
The academic interest in understanding the causes of foreign military 
intervention was becoming particularly apparent in the increasing number of case 
studies. Some of these case studies adhered to a historical approach. Others aimed at 




empirical analysis of a particular case and hence fulfilled Rosenau’s wish for 
scientific inquiry to some extent. Regardless of whether they took a diplomatic 
history approach or a case-study approach for the purpose of developing testable 
hypotheses, this growing intellectual desire to understand foreign military 
interventions was partly caused by international political events. Intervention was 
rapidly becoming a key concept for understanding superpower competition and the 
Cold War order. For example, Hoffman argued that the stability of nuclear deterrence 
left superpowers “ample room for interventions aimed at changing the international 
milieu by affecting the domestic political make-up of other countries” (Hoffman 
1984, p. 18).  
Qualitative studies looking at superpower interventions such as the U.S. 
interventions in Indonesia (James and Sheil-Small 1971), the Dominican Republic 
(Lowenthal 1972), Vietnam (Gurtov 1974; Blaufarb 1977; Karnow 1983; Cable 1986; 
Dietz 1986), El Salvador (Baloyra 1982), Thailand (Girling 1981), Cambodia 
(Vickery 1984) and Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan (Paul 1971; 
Schmid 1985) emphasized the role of different factors including bipolarity, rivalry, 
ideology, credibility, prestige as well as strategic and military considerations among 
others. Superpowers were not the only ones intervening in civil conflicts during the 
Cold War. European powers also displayed a diverse history of interventions during 
this period. Some of these interventions could not be fully explained in terms of Cold 
War politics and bipolarity because they were also related to the process of 
decolonization and efforts to redefine metropolitan relations with former colonies. 




Wingen and Tillema 1980), France (Corbett 1972; Cronje 1972; Nweke 1976; 
Stremlau 1977), Belgium (Helmreich 1976) and other European powers. There were 
also interventions conducted by smaller powers that scholars examined in detailed 
case studies such as interventions by Syria in Lebanon (Rabinovich 1979; Dawisha 
1980; Deeb 1980), Uganda and Libya in Sudan (Howell 1978), and Cuba in Angola 
and Ethiopia (Durch 1978; Valenta 1978). 
Compared to the fast accumulation of qualitative works, the development of 
quantitative literature on interventions was slower in the 70s and 80s. This was partly 
due to the lack of comprehensive datasets on military interventions in the literature. 
However, a number of quantitative studies during this period stand out as early 
attempts to identify empirical patterns related to foreign military interventions in civil 
conflicts. 
Analyzing a dataset that included both violent and nonviolent domestic 
conflicts between 1960 and 1967, Pearson found that violent conflicts were more 
likely than nonviolent conflicts to attract foreign military interventions, especially 
interventions on behalf of the government (Pearson 1974a). He also concluded that 
military interventions, including pro-government ones, prolong the conflict and 
increase the intensity of violence which was also observed by Gurr and Duvall in 
their study on civil conflicts (Gurr and Duvall 1973). Hence, Pearson claimed that 
military intervention is a foreign policy instrument used by both “large and small 
powers interested in preserving rather than destroying a target government”, which 




In another study, Pearson examined the relationship between military 
interventions and geographic proximity using a dataset which included all foreign 
military interventions between 1948 and 1967 (Pearson 1974b). This dataset included 
military interventions during civil conflicts as well as in their absence, because 
Pearson’s goal was to analyze the monadic use force. He defined military intervention 
as the movement of troops or military forces of one country across the border of 
another independent country; thus, military interventions in civil conflicts were only a 
subset of his dataset. Pearson’s study had some interesting findings regarding 
geography and military interventions. Large powers were more likely to intervene in 
distant countries than in nearby countries and the majority of those distant 
interventions were pro-government. Small and middle powers, on the other hand, 
were more likely to intervene close by and these interventions were generally hostile 
to the government, except during civil conflicts. Power disadvantage did not 
necessarily deter friendly or hostile interventions in nearby states as well. Finally, his 
data did not show a strong relationship between contiguity and probability of military 
intervention, especially during civil conflicts. In other words, proximity and being in 
the same region had a more significant impact on the likelihood of military 
interventions than contiguity (Pearson 1974b).  
Even though Pearson’s main motivation was to analyze the monadic use of 
force by states and examining interventions during civil conflicts was only a part of 
his research agenda, his studies are some of the earliest examples of quantitative 
research on interventions in civil conflicts. In fact, Pearson directed his efforts into 




interventions in the literature. The ‘International Military Intervention (IMI) Dataset’ 
includes all military interventions in the world between 1946 and 1988 (Pearson and 
Baumann 1993). Using this new dataset, Pearson and his colleagues described some 
of the patterns in military intervention behavior of states between 1946 and 1988. For 
instance, they found that small powers carried out more interventions during this 
period than superpowers and major powers combined. The majority of the 
interventions during this period were hostile to the target government, but there was a 
contrast between small and major powers in terms of the side they support. Most 
small power interventions were hostile to the target government, while most major 
power interventions were pro-government (Pearson, Baumann and Pickering 1994). 
Even though this was mostly a descriptive empirical study which did not employ 
rigorous statistical techniques utilizing the dataset, Pearson’s dataset is used quite 
frequently in contemporary quantitative intervention literature. In fact, the IMI dataset 
has been updated and now covers military interventions between 1989 and 2005 as 
well (Kisangani and Pickering 2008).  
An important quantitative study that set out to test Modelski’s and Mitchell’s 
hypotheses on interventions was Rasler’s longitudinal study of Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon (Rasler 1983). The variations in Syrian foreign policy during the Lebanese 
civil war enabled Rasler to apply a time-series analysis. Regarding Modelski’s 
hypothesis on extreme polarization between domestic disputants, she found that the 
timing of Syrian interventions was not associated with extreme levels of polarization 
in the Lebanese conflict. She also did not find strong cooperative ties between 




linkages and intervention. Although this was not a broad cross-national analysis, 
Rasler’s longitudinal study was one of the first quantitative studies to test some of the 
earlier hypotheses on intervention.  
Duner’s study was an empirical analysis of 62 military interventions in seven 
civil wars that occurred in the 1970s (Duner 1983). By distinguishing between levels 
of military intervention, he was able to add some interesting results to Pearson’s 
earlier findings. Duner examined both high level military intervention such as troop 
movement and combat involvement and low level military intervention such as 
military training and arms supply, in contrast to Pearson who only looked at high 
level military intervention. Similar to Pearson, Duner found that the majority of 
external interventions were carried out by less developed countries rather than 
industrialized countries and they were also more likely to intervene at high levels. 
Vicinity was another important factor, as more than half of the interveners were 
neighboring states. Duner also observed that if one side was supported from outside, 
the other side also received external military support. Finally, Duner found that low 
levels of military interventions, especially arms supply, were more frequently used 
than high levels of military intervention; but when several states intervened on 
opposing sides in a civil war, the level of intervention escalated from low to high. 
Even though Duner’s analysis consisted of 62 interventions and he described the lack 
of comprehensive datasets on military interventions as an obstacle to quantitative 
research, his study was quite significant because he drew attention to the strategic 





Tillema’s study reinforced Pearson’s and Duner’s observations about how 
diffuse the practice of military intervention is by using a new dataset that included 
591 foreign military interventions in both interstate and intrastate conflicts between 
1945 and 1985 (Tillema 1989). He claimed that traditional theories of power politics 
would expect that intervention would be mostly used by great powers since they are 
disproportionately powerful and can resort to intervention more often than less 
powerful states. However, he found that even though great powers have each 
intervened more frequently than other states, as a group they were responsible for a 
small portion of interventions. Tillema’s dataset was an important contribution to the 
intervention literature which was developing very slowly in terms of conducting 
large-N cross-national research. The two intervention datasets developed by Pearson 
and Tillema helped change that in the 90s, but during the 70s and 80s the literature 
was dominated by case studies. 
As the Cold War was ending, the literature on military interventions in civil 
conflicts had made the following progress after Rosenau’s call for a systematic and 
scientific study of intervention. First, qualitative research was the dominant 
methodology. Single case studies as well as comparative case studies provided 
detailed explanations of many foreign interventions carried out by superpowers, great 
powers as well as minor powers. Second, these in-depth studies frequently traced the 
causes of interventions to the international system, geopolitics and decision making 
calculus of top leadership within states similar to what Rosenau hypothesized. The 
specific factors described as affecting intervention decisions included bipolarity, 




economic gains, credibility, resolve, colonial ties and proximity. In many respects, the 
study of interventions remained rooted in the realist school of thought. Although 
ideological motivations (promotion of democracy versus promotion of communism) 
could be categorized as normative considerations, ideology was generally mixed in 
with realist concerns of power and security and was subordinated to strategic factors. 
Third, societal and institutional factors were not examined adequately. For instance, 
the impact of regime type and institutional constraints on intervention behavior of 
states were rarely analyzed. Despite Mitchell’s theoretical arguments about 
transnational linkages, affective ties between the intervener and target state were also 
neglected by most scholars, except a few who paid attention to the relationship 
between ethnic ties and external involvement in civil conflicts (Suhrke and Noble, 
1977; Rothschild 1981). Thus, the dominant theoretical approach among qualitative 
studies was realist and it was frequently combined with rational actor assumption to 
analyze factors conducive to intervention such as opportunities, threats, incentives 
and capabilities from the perspective of the intervener. 
Despite their theoretical insights and detailed descriptions of specific 
interventions, case studies have limitations when it comes to providing 
generalizations. The systematic and scientific inquiry into interventions is constrained 
by their limited generalizability. However, as discussed above, the development of 
quantitative literature was slow mainly due to a lack of comprehensive datasets. 
Moreover, scholars did not use sophisticated statistical techniques and generally 
revealed descriptive patterns about the intervention behavior of large and small 




enumeration” of foreign military interventions “raises as many questions as it 
answers” because observing such empirical patterns still cannot explain “what 
accounts for widespread willingness and ability to resort to military force?” (1989, p. 
187). Hence, he argued that military interventions required further systematic study 
because the common characteristics among large and small interveners were still 
unknown (1989). Nevertheless, these quantitative works inspired a number of 
scholars who were determined to study interventions using more rigorous techniques 
in the 90s. 
Contemporary Literature on Foreign Military Interventions 
The end of the Cold War and the rise in the number of intrastate conflicts in 
the early 90s (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2010) led to increasing academic 
interest in civil conflicts. As intrastate conflicts rose to the forefront of the 
international agenda, more scholars also started to focus on the role of third party 
interventions in civil conflicts. It is useful to review the last two decades of literature 
on interventions by categorizing studies according to the two major themes that have 
shaped research since the end of the Cold War. The first group of studies examines 
the impact of third party interventions on the dynamics and outcomes of civil 
conflicts, while the second group focuses on the conditions for third party 
interventions. Even though these two research agendas are linked and both are 
necessary for a comprehensive understanding of interventions, contemporary studies 
tend to examine the causes and consequences of external interventions in civil 




research question they are answering and evaluate the accomplishments and 
shortcomings of the current literature accordingly.  
It should be noted here that the following sections do not review studies on 
neutral third party interventions. Even though a number of studies have analyzed the 
role of neutral third party interventions in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold 
War, they are not included here because of this dissertation’s focus on biased military 
interventions.   
The Effects of Foreign Military Interventions on Civil Conflicts 
One of the scholars who looked at the impact of foreign interventions on 
conflict outcomes in the 90s was Regan and his works have influenced the current 
intervention literature significantly. First and foremost, the two research questions he 
analyzed in his 1996 and 1998 articles were quite influential in shaping the 
contemporary research agenda. His first article analyzed the impact of interventions 
on conflict outcomes, while the second one examined the conditions that lead to 
external military interventions (Regan 1996, 1998). These two research questions 
Regan analyzed had a big impact on shaping the two branches of the contemporary 
quantitative research that aim to understand the causes and consequences of military 
interventions. Second, Regan used a new dataset that he constructed and this dataset 
on interventions in civil conflicts has become one of the most frequently used datasets 
in the literature. Third, despite their major contributions to the literature, both of these 
studies also had important shortcomings and raised as many questions as they 
answered. Hence, Regan’s early works triggered an important dialogue among 




This section only discusses Regan’s 1996 article because his second article falls 
within the group of studies that analyze the causes of interventions, therefore it will 
be reviewed in that section.  
Using an original dataset that included foreign military as well as economic 
interventions in civil conflicts between 1944 and 1994, Regan examined the 
conditions under which biased interventions were successful (Regan 1996). He 
operationalized success as the cessation of military hostilities for at least 6 months, 
because he argued that the goal of intervention was to stop the fighting. Regan did not 
deny that states could have various goals when they intervene in civil conflicts, but he 
argued that the first step in achieving those other goals was to stop the fighting. 
Hence, Regan’s study analyzed the impact of biased interventions on civil conflict 
outcomes but the particular outcome he was interested in was the cessation of 
hostilities (Regan 1996). 
Regan found that interventions that include a mix of military and economic 
strategies were more effective than either alone. In other words, the probability of 
success increases when an external state carries out both military and economic 
interventions. Compared to the use of military or economic interventions alone, 
mixed interventions also had the highest probability of ending hostilities regardless of 
the identity of the intervener. Both major and minor powers were more likely to stop 
the fighting in civil conflicts when they used mixed interventions. Regan’s results 
also showed that supporting the government over the opposition increases the chances 
of success. However, regardless of the side they support, biased interveners increased 




characteristics of the dispute, such as its intensity or type, influence the cessation of 
hostilities significantly; Regan concluded that the characteristics of the intervention 
were more critical in stopping the fighting. In short, mixed interventions that combine 
military and economic strategies and interventions on the side of the government 
increased the likelihood of success significantly according to his results (Regan 
1996).  
Regan’s new dataset as well as his findings regarding the impact of biased 
interventions on the cessation of hostilities in civil conflicts attracted a lot of 
scholarly attention and motivated others to examine the effect of interventions on 
conflict dynamics. However, his article also stimulated an important debate among 
scholars about the goals of interveners. By defining success as the cessation of 
hostilities, Regan assumed that states intervene to end the fighting as soon as possible 
and that they measure success in such terms. Thus, he argued that the main goal of 
intervention is to stop the fighting. Regan’s argument about the goal of biased 
interventions has been challenged by many scholars. Some were against such a 
generalization and claimed that biased interventions can have other goals instead of 
ending the fighting. Others criticized his formulation of success as the cessation of 
hostilities and suggested that success should be defined as the fulfillment of particular 
goals set by the intervener and the analyst should first identify those goals in order to 
measure success. Finally, some scholars argued that the goals of intervention depend 
on the reasons that lead a state to intervene in the first place; hence it is premature or 
even misleading to make an assumption about goals before analyzing the causes of 




about the goal of biased interventions which in turn influenced the theoretical 
approaches some scholars took in analyzing the impact of interventions on civil war 
dynamics as well as in examining the causes of interventions.  
Regan’s study also raised serious methodological questions as a result of 
sampling on instances of intervention. Regan tested his hypotheses about success 
against data that only included actual interveners. Since the decision to intervene 
might be due to intervener’s expectation of success; when data on potential 
interveners is left out, the analyst is essentially examining the determinants of success 
by sampling on interveners who might have expected to be successful in the first 
place. The decision to intervene imposes a selection bias problem on studies that 
measure the effectiveness of interventions on ending civil conflicts or on achieving 
some other outcome, such as negotiated settlements, specified by the analyst. If states 
choose not to intervene because they expect to be ineffective or unsuccessful in 
achieving that outcome, then the analyst is practically testing his hypotheses against 
cases that might have expected to be successful and effective. Regan’s study was one 
of the first in the literature to demonstrate this selection bias problem. Even though 
Regan fixed this problem in a future study (Lemke and Regan 2004); there are still 
plenty of studies that suffer from a selection bias problem in the intervention 
literature. Moreover, this selection bias problem shows up in different forms 
depending on the research question and the way it is examined. In majority of the 
cases, selection bias problem can be easily fixed by including potential interveners 




Regan’s study that led some scholars to take the selection bias problem seriously and 
use the appropriate methodology.  
Since the late 1990s, an increasing number of studies have explored the effect 
of foreign military interventions on the duration and intensity of civil conflicts, while 
others have examined whether biased military interventions lead to negotiated 
settlements or military victory by one side. Some have combined both dimensions 
and analyzed the effect of interventions on conflict duration and outcome 
simultaneously.  
The majority of studies that examine the relationship between military 
interventions and duration have arrived at similar conclusions. For instance, Elbadawi 
and Sambanis (2000) and Regan (2002) found that external military interventions 
increase civil war duration regardless of the side they support. Likewise, the results of 
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline’s study (2000) showed that one-sided or biased 
interventions increase conflict duration but balanced interventions, in which multiple 
external states intervene to support each side, lead to even longer conflicts by creating 
stalemates and making it harder for one side to win. Cunningham’s study (2006) 
supported the finding that civil conflicts with multiple interveners have longer 
durations but also showed that they are more difficult to resolve through negotiations. 
Analyzing the effect of interventions based on the identity of interveners, 
Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) found that military interventions by rival states 
lead to prolonged fighting, while interventions by nonrivals are associated with 
shorter wars. Moreover, the probability of negotiated settlement is also lower when a 




different conclusion was by Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004). Their research 
indicated that military interventions on the side of rebels can shorten civil conflicts, 
while pro-government interventions have no significant effect on duration. Most 
studies, however, seem to agree that biased military interventions, particularly 
countering interventions, tend to prolong civil conflicts. 
There is less empirical consensus in the literature regarding the impact of 
biased military interventions on conflict outcomes. For example; Mason, Weingarten 
and Fett (1999) found that biased military interventions lead to an increased 
probability of military victory by the supported side and a decreased probability of a 
negotiated outcome. Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008), on the other hand, 
described the effect of biased interventions on conflict outcomes as somewhat 
unclear. According to their study, biased military interventions can shorten conflict 
duration by decreasing the time until the supported group achieves military victory; 
but they can also decrease conflict duration by increasing the probability of 
negotiated settlements. Balanced or countering military interventions, on the other 
hand, prolong conflicts and decrease the likelihood of a negotiated settlement while 
increasing the probability of government victory. In Gent’s study, the results were 
also quite different. His study indicated that rebel-biased interventions increase the 
probability of rebel victory as well as the probability that a conflict ends in a 
negotiated settlement, regardless of whether or not there is a countering intervention 
on the government side. In contrast, government-biased interventions do not have a 




surprising finding since external states are more likely to intervene when rebels are 
stronger (Gent 2008). 
The assumption at the core of Gent’s theoretical approach was different than 
the assumption Regan made about biased military interventions and Gent’s study 
demonstrated how different assumptions can affect theory building. He disagreed 
with Regan that external states intervene to end the fighting as soon as possible. 
Instead, Gent argued that the main goal of third parties is to influence civil conflict 
outcomes and a theoretical approach based on this assumption leads to an improved 
understanding of the effects of military interventions. Since the main goal of potential 
interveners is to influence the conflict outcome, Gent posited that the probability of 
military intervention both on the side of government and on the side of rebels 
increases when rebels are stronger. Pro-government military interventions are more 
likely because stronger rebel groups pose a legitimate threat to the government. 
Governments can generally defeat weaker rebel groups without outside support, so 
external states are more likely to intervene to shift the outcome of the conflict towards 
government victory when there is a stronger rebel group. Since the main effect of 
biased military intervention is to change the balance of power in favor of the 
supported side, Gent expects that third parties would use interventions for that 
purpose. Similar logic applies to military interventions on the side of rebels. External 
states biased towards rebels are more likely to intervene when rebels are stronger and 
have a greater chance at defeating government forces. Given that biased interventions 
on both sides are more likely when rebels are strong, pro-government interventions 




biased third parties intervene in the “toughest cases”, while rebel-biased third parties 
intervene in the “most favorable cases” which explains the different results in Gent’s 
statistical analysis (2008, p. 730).  
Another scholar who questioned the assumptions being made in existing 
studies about the goals of biased military interventions was Cunningham (2010). He 
argued that the relative lack of empirical consensus regarding the impact of 
interventions on the termination of civil conflicts was partly caused by the 
assumptions scholars made. According to Cunningham, existing studies assumed that 
external states intervene either to help one side achieve a military victory or to 
contribute to the resolution of the conflict through a negotiated settlement. He argued 
that external states can also intervene to pursue objectives other than ending the 
conflict. In other words, when external states become involved in civil conflicts, they 
can have an independent agenda which is separate from the goals of domestic 
disputants. The results of Cunningham’s study indicated that when third parties 
intervene in a civil conflict not to end the conflict but to pursue an independent 
agenda, they make civil conflicts much longer and more difficult to resolve 
(Cunningham 2010). Thus, according to Cunningham, the findings in the literature 
that external military interventions prolong civil conflicts were caused by the subset 
of military interventions in which the intervener had an independent agenda. By 
showing that external states can intervene to advance their specific objectives, not 
necessarily to resolve the conflict or to help one side win; Cunningham’s study also 




understanding the effect of biased interventions on civil conflict dynamics and 
outcomes.  
As the studies reviewed above demonstrate, the literature has made some 
progress in terms of analyzing the impact of military interventions on civil conflict 
dynamics and outcomes. However, not all scholars seem to agree on the goals of 
biased interveners when they are theorizing about the effects of military interventions 
on conflict dynamics and termination. Some of the contradictory findings in the 
literature are partly caused by different assumptions scholars make about intervener’s 
goals. Yet, findings such as biased military interventions by rival states or by external 
states that have an independent agenda leading to substantially longer civil conflicts 
imply that examining the causes of interventions is quite critical for understanding the 
consequences of interventions. Studies conducted by Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 
(2005), Gent (2008) and Cunningham (2010) demonstrate the need to look at the 
goals of interveners more closely.  
If the goals of interveners affect the consequences of intervention as some 
scholars argue, then one has to carefully examine the reasons that motivate a state to 
intervene in the first place. The final section of this chapter will review studies that 
focus on the causes of intervention. Since the purpose of this dissertation is to 
understand why foreign powers intervene in civil conflicts and how they choose 
sides, the next section is particularly important for situating this study in the 





The Causes of Foreign Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts 
As mentioned in the previous pages, the second branch of the contemporary 
intervention literature aims to understand the causes of and conditions for third party 
interventions in civil conflicts. Scholars have examined the factors that motivate 
external states to intervene in civil conflicts from three different theoretical 
perspectives. The first one views intervention as a response to civil conflict 
conditions and explores the attributes of the conflict that increase the likelihood of 
external involvement. The second approach views intervention as a foreign policy 
instrument and analyzes state level and international level factors that cause potential 
interveners to use this foreign policy tool in civil conflicts. The third approach can be 
described as the combination of the first two, because it examines both the 
characteristics of the potential intervener and the civil conflict as well as the 
interactions between the two.  
These three approaches can be distinguished from each other by identifying 
what the study puts the main theoretical and empirical emphasis on. The first 
approach, conflict-oriented approach, puts the theoretical and empirical emphasis on 
the civil conflict whereas the second one, actor-oriented approach, puts the 
intervener at the center of theoretical and empirical study. The third approach, 
combination approach, makes the intervener theoretically central similar to the 
second approach but pays more attention to the attributes of the civil conflict during 
the theory building phase. The third approach is still at a nascent stage within the 
current literature and there are only a handful of studies that can be categorized as 




shortcomings of the conflict-oriented approach. It is also an attempt by scholars, who 
are critical of the conflict-oriented approach, to incorporate the strengths of the actor-
oriented research into a new analytical approach for studying the causes of 
interventions quantitatively. 
While not all studies are entirely pure examples of each approach, the 
dominant perspective used by the scholar can still be identified based on the 
theoretical and empirical focus of the study. Thus, it is a useful way to review the 
studies in this section and evaluate their contributions.  
Many empirical studies in contemporary literature have applied the first 
theoretical approach, which this dissertation describes as the conflict-oriented 
approach, to study foreign military interventions in civil conflicts. These studies 
analyze the conditions under which civil conflicts experience interventions. 
Investigating various contextual and structural factors related to the civil conflict 
and/or conflict state is common within this approach. By examining the 
characteristics of the civil conflict that increase the probability of foreign military 
interventions, these studies are essentially interested in understanding “what happens 
to” the civil conflict (Findley and Teo 2006, p. 828). In other words, the primary 
theoretical focus is on the civil conflict and/or civil conflict state rather than the 
intervener. Nevertheless, studies using the conflict-oriented approach have provided 
useful insights about some of the factors that motivate foreign powers to intervene in 
civil conflicts and discovered some important empirical patterns about intervention 




One of the best examples of the conflict-oriented approach is Regan’s 1998 
study which looks at the conditions that motivate third parties to intervene in civil 
conflicts. As mentioned previously, this is the other early study conducted by Regan 
which influenced subsequent quantitative works on intervention due to its strengths as 
well as its weaknesses.  
Regan (1998) argues that hypotheses about conditions that increase the 
probability of intervention in civil conflicts can be derived from two dominant 
theories in international relations, realism and idealism. First, he hypothesizes that the 
greater the number of countries bordering the conflict state, the greater the probability 
of intervention. Conflicts in contiguous states increase threat to national security due 
to spillover effects while proximity decreases the costs of intervention according to 
Regan. Second, the probability of intervention decreases as the intensity of civil 
conflict increases because violent conflicts require greater and costlier military 
commitment to end the fighting which Regan claims is the goal of interveners. Third, 
he posits that the likelihood of intervention increases when there is a humanitarian 
crisis involving large numbers of refugees because it generates humanitarian 
concerns. Regan’s final hypothesis is that interventions in civil conflicts should be 
more likely during the Cold War than post-Cold War period because incentives to 
intervene for geostrategic reasons decrease as the system becomes less polarized 
(Regan 1998). The hypotheses on contiguity, intensity of the conflict and Cold War 
capture realist motives according to Regan while the hypothesis on humanitarian 




These hypotheses are tested against the original dataset from Regan’s 1996 
study which includes military and economic interventions in 138 civil conflicts 
between 1944 and 1994. Regan finds that an increase in the intensity of the conflict 
and in the number of contiguous countries decreases the probability of military 
intervention; while Cold War and the existence of a humanitarian crisis increase the 
likelihood of intervention (Regan 1998). This study is an important step towards 
finding some empirical patterns about intervention behavior and Regan contributes to 
systematic and scientific progress of the field, as Rosenau hoped for, by testing his 
hypotheses against a large number of civil conflicts over a long period of time. 
However, similar to his 1996 study, this research also suffers from some serious 
theoretical and methodological problems.  
First, looking at the findings of his study Regan concludes that neither realism 
nor idealism is able to explain interventions adequately. The problem with this 
conclusion is that the four hypotheses Regan derives are not capable of testing the 
explanatory power of idealism and realism entirely. These hypotheses are simply 
inadequate to do such a big task because they leave out many other strategic or moral 
concerns of states that can be identified as realist or idealist. Hence, Regan’s 
conclusion about the explanatory power of dominant theories regarding intervention 
should be questioned. Second, and more importantly, instead of examining the 
motives of interveners, Regan analyzes the civil conflict conditions that increase the 
probability of intervention. He completely neglects the characteristics of the 
intervener by framing his research question from the perspective of the civil conflict 




intervention. His analytical framework is ill-suited to answer why external states 
intervene in civil conflicts, because it essentially asks under what conditions civil 
conflicts experience military interventions. As a result, his methodological approach 
is also inappropriate to examine why external states intervene because the unit of 
analysis in his study is civil conflict. As Regan himself admits, the theoretical and 
empirical focus of the study shifts from the intervener to the civil conflict when the 
latter is the unit of analysis (Regan 1998, p. 768). Finally, similar to his previous 
work, this study also suffers from selection bias problem due to the exclusion of 
potential interveners from the analysis.  
Regan’s study is an example of the conflict-oriented approach that contributes 
indirectly to the study of the causes of military interventions. There are many other 
scholars who hypothesize about the types of conflicts that attract foreign interventions 
and shed light on some of the factors that motivate interveners. One particularly 
important theoretical argument about interveners’ motivation comes from scholars of 
ethnic conflict. 
Scholars interested in the role of ethnicity in international relations have 
shown that ethnic affinities can motivate external states to intervene in conflicts with 
an ethnic component (i.e. Heraclides 1990; Gurr 1992; Roy 1997). In several different 
studies, Carment and James and their colleagues argue that ethnic conflicts make 
third party involvement, including biased military interventions, more probable when 
ethnic ties exist between external states and the target state (Carment and James 1995; 
Carment, James and Rowlands 1997; Carment et al. 2006). These arguments are 




targets. However, these scholars are theoretically and substantively interested in 
ethnic conflicts and they argue that ethnic conflicts are prone to experiencing 
interventions because of their ethnic component.  
Given that the primary theoretical and empirical goal is to understand the 
impact of ethnicity on international and domestic politics, third party intervention is a 
good example to test their hypotheses on ethnicity. Several studies demonstrate the 
theoretical and empirical purpose of examining interventions particularly well. For 
instance, Saideman argues that ethnic composition within states influences their 
foreign policies toward ethnic conflicts in other states and intervention policies 
generally demonstrate this influence. Since politicians care about gaining and 
maintaining office, state leaders pay attention to their constituents’ preferences and 
ethnic identities can shape those preferences. If ethnic ties with an outside group 
determine foreign policy preferences of constituents, then those ethnic ties will also 
influence state leaders’ foreign policy decisions. Thus, domestic politics plays an 
important role in the ethnic ties argument because leaders seeking support at home 
take into account the ethnic composition of the population and their constituents’ 
ethnic ties when formulating policies, such as intervention, toward an ethnic conflict 
(Saideman 1997, 2002).   
Similarly, Carment and James show how leaders often choose to intervene in 
ethnic conflicts on behalf of combatants that share ethnic ties with their constituents 
in order to maintain domestic political support (Carment and James 1996). However, 
leaders also consider the costs of intervention when choosing the type of intervention 




outside ethnic group and to appease their domestic constituents, state leaders can use 
diplomatic interventions which are less costly than military interventions. In fact, the 
authors claim that leaders opt for military interventions when costs and benefits are 
highly concentrated which is more likely to happen in authoritarian states where one 
ethnic group is dominant or alternatively when the cost of military intervention is 
relatively low. For example, it is less costly to intervene militarily on behalf of 
stronger ethnic groups. Since the cost of intervention depends partly on the strength 
of the group supported, stronger ethnic groups are more likely to receive external 
military support according to Cetinyan as well (2002). Finally, Carment and James 
argue that military interventions in ethnic conflicts are also more likely when ethnic 
affinities are backed by instrumental motives such as international and regional 
strategic considerations of leaders (Carment and James 1996).  
Another scholar analyzing what types of third party intervention ethnic 
conflicts attract is Khosla (1999). She focuses particularly on ethnic conflicts in 
developing countries and uses MAR data which contains information about various 
types of third party support to minority groups involved in ethnic conflicts between 
1990 and 1998. Khosla finds that military interventions were the most common type 
of third party involvement followed by diplomatic and economic interventions in 
these ethnic conflicts. The majority of these military interventions were undertaken 
by contiguous states and regional powers. Neighbors and regional powers intervened 
militarily in support of ethnic groups in sixty percent of their interventions. In 




Khosla’s study does not analyze the impact of ethnic ties on third party intervention; 
instead, she is interested in examining who intervenes in ethnic conflicts and how.  
Ethnic conflicts have attracted a lot of attention from scholars who aim to 
understand how ethnicity influences domestic and international politics. However, 
their studies have also contributed to the intervention literature by demonstrating how 
ethnic ties can influence the decision making of potential interveners. In fact, one can 
argue that their studies put the potential intervener more at the forefront of analysis 
than Regan does by paying attention to the domestic politics of potential interveners. 
However, these studies are still limited in providing a complete understanding of the 
rationale behind military interventions. First, external states also intervene in non-
ethnic civil conflicts. Second and more importantly, these scholars do not examine the 
impact of other factors that originate from different international, dyadic and state 
level sources on intervention behavior of states. As Carment and James admit, there 
are other motives besides ethnic ties that lead to military interventions (Carment and 
James 1996).  
Another recent important study that focuses mainly on the attributes of the 
conflict to analyze intervention behavior of states is Koga’s. Although she uses a 
conflict-oriented approach, her study pays attention to the regime type of potential 
interveners. She examines whether certain characteristics of the civil conflict affect 
military interventions by democracies and autocracies differently (Koga 2011). 
Hence, Koga’s study is theoretically more refined than Regan’s because she argues 
that various attributes of the conflict affect the probability of intervention by 




her analysis, Koga’s study avoids selection bias problem faced by Regan and 
provides more reliable results. 
Koga argues that democracies are more likely to intervene when there is 
public support for the decision because democratic leaders rely on reelection to stay 
in power. Additionally, democratic leaders are more concerned about the success or 
failure of military interventions than autocratic leaders because they are afraid of 
losing their jobs due to policy failure. Thus, democratic leaders are more selective 
when they intervene and pay more attention to the likelihood of success than 
autocratic leaders who can maintain their positions by satisfying members of their 
winning coalition with private goods (Koga 2011).  
After drawing these theoretical arguments from the ‘selectorate theory’ 
developed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004), Koga hypothesizes that the existence 
of ethnic ties   increases the probability of military intervention by democracies but 
not by autocracies. She also expects that the existence of lootable natural resources, 
such as secondary diamonds, in a civil conflict state increases the likelihood of 
military intervention by autocracies because autocratic leaders can exploit these 
resources to provide private goods. On the other hand, lootable resources in conflict 
state do not affect the probability of military intervention by democracies. She also 
posits that in order to increase their likelihood of success, democracies are more 
likely to intervene on the side of rebels when they are stronger. This last hypothesis is 
based on Gent’s study which argues that stronger rebels increase the probability of 
military intervention on both government and rebel side (Gent 2008). However, Koga 




rebels are stronger because pro-government interventions are more likely to fail under 
such circumstances. Yet, democracies are also unwilling to intervene when rebels are 
weaker because governments can defeat weaker rebels without external help. Hence, 
she cannot make a prediction about when democracies are more likely to intervene on 
the side of governments which is problematic. Based on her argument about 
democracies’ concern for success, Koga’s theoretical framework expects democracies 
either to intervene on the side of rebels when they are stronger or not intervene at all 
when rebels are weak. Thus, her theoretical framework is not able to explain why 
democracies intervene on the side of governments. This is both a function of her 
conflict-oriented theoretical approach which limits factors shaping the intervention 
decision to the attributes of the conflict and also a result of her attempt to measure 
probability of success in a rather one-dimensional way. 
Koga tests her hypotheses using Regan’s military intervention data in civil 
conflicts between 1945 and 1999. The results show support for all three hypotheses. 
Lootable resources only increase the probability of military intervention by 
autocracies while ethnic ties only make it more likely for democracies to intervene. 
She also finds that stronger rebels increase the likelihood of intervention by 
democracies on the rebel side but has no significant impact on pro-government 
interventions. As mentioned above, her study cannot conclude much about pro-
government interventions. Koga’s statistical results are more reliable than Regan’s 
because she includes all potential interveners in her analysis. Her theoretical approach 
is also more nuanced because she distinguishes between democracies and autocracies. 




decisions, she still views intervention as a response to civil war conditions and 
excludes many critical international factors that affect potential interveners’ decision 
making calculus.  
Koga’s study demonstrates clearly that not all studies using the conflict-
oriented approach neglect the intervener completely. Scholars studying ethnic 
conflicts pay attention to ethnic politics within the intervener state while others like 
Koga pay attention to intervener’s regime type. Inclusion of one or two attributes of 
the intervener, however, does not change the fact that civil conflict conditions drive 
their analytical approach.  
Some studies, on the other hand, put the intervener at the center of theoretical 
and empirical analysis and view intervention as a foreign policy instrument. This 
second approach, which focuses on the decision making calculus of the intervener, 
can be described as the actor-oriented approach. Studies applying an actor-oriented 
approach analyze state level and international level factors that cause potential 
interveners to use this foreign policy tool in civil conflicts. Similar to the case studies 
conducted in early intervention literature, these contemporary studies make the 
intervener’s decision theoretically and methodologically central. In fact, some of the 
best examples of this approach are still found among qualitative works. In a 
comparative study of superpower interventions in the Middle East and Africa during 
the Cold War, Feste argues that American and Soviet military interventions in civil 
conflicts were driven by bipolarity, rivalry and geopolitical security pursuit. Other 
factors that motivated superpower interventions included location, alliance 




(Feste 1992). Scott also uses a comparative case study method and examines U.S. 
interventions in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Nicaragua during Reagan’s 
presidency (Scott 1996). The Reagan administration “authored a policy initiative to 
take advantage of the rise of several anti-Soviet insurgencies around the world and 
provide the rebels with American assistance” which “became known as the Reagan 
Doctrine” (Scott 1996, p. 14). According to Scott, the “primary concern with the 
targets of [intervention] strategy” in the Third World did not originate from “the 
issues or events inside” the civil conflict state; instead the Reagan doctrine used 
interventions to confront the Soviet Union and to challenge Soviet advances (Scott 
1996, p. 225). Both of these actor-oriented studies draw attention to the strategic 
nature of intervention decisions and demonstrate with comparative case studies how 
interventions were taken as reactive responses to each other. Such strategic 
interactions between potential interveners have not been analyzed adequately in the 
quantitative intervention literature.  
An actor-oriented approach is used less frequently in current quantitative 
literature. One of the best quantitative works using this approach is by Yoon who 
examines the causes of U.S. military and nonmilitary interventions in third world civil 
conflicts between 1945 and 1989 (Yoon 1997). Since Yoon uses an actor-oriented 
approach, his study focuses on strategic, economic and domestic factors that motivate 
the U.S. to intervene in these intrastate conflicts. Strategic factors that increase the 
likelihood of U.S. intervention include intervention by the U.S.S.R or its allies, 
proximity of the conflict country and its strategic importance measured by the amount 




intervention probability are measured by U.S. foreign investment in the conflict 
country and the level of trade between the two countries. In terms of the domestic 
context, Yoon hypothesizes that the U.S. is less likely to intervene during an election 
year. Moreover, based on the arguments of diversionary theory, he expects that the 
U.S. should be more likely intervene when it is experiencing domestic economic 
difficulties measured as the sum of unemployment and inflation rates (Yoon 1997). 
The factors analyzed by Yoon include some of the same critical factors emphasized in 
the comparative case studies of Feste and Scott.  
The results of Yoon’s study show that intervention by a Soviet ally and the 
existence of a communist domestic opponent in a civil conflict increase the 
probability of U.S. intervention substantially. In contrast, other strategic interests such 
as proximity of the conflict country or its importance measured by the extent of U.S. 
military assistance have only a small impact. There is also no support that Soviet 
intervention leads to U.S. intervention. Yoon also finds that the U.S. is less likely to 
intervene in an election year and when its economy is worsening. Finally, economic 
interests seem to have no impact on the U.S. decision to intervene. According to 
Yoon, the findings indicate that strategic issues such as intervention by Soviet allies, 
ideology and rivalry are compelling factors behind U.S. interventions while domestic 
issues are the constraining factors (Yoon 1997). These empirical results demonstrate 
the importance of understanding the strategic interests of interveners as well as the 
strategic interactions between potential interveners which is only possible by giving 




By using an actor-oriented approach and putting the intervener at the center of 
study, all three scholars draw attention to the strategic issues that affect intervener’s 
decision making. Unlike the conflict-oriented approach that provides only suggestive 
evidence about the motivations of interveners, the second approach uses a foreign 
policy perspective and analyzes the causes of intervention more directly. Therefore, 
this approach is able to provide more insight about the rationale behind military 
interventions.  
The actor-oriented approach views the intervention decision as originating 
from international influences, strategic issues and domestic constraints. Even though 
international and domestic level factors should be central to the analysis of 
intervention decision, scholars still need to take into account how contextual 
conditions of the civil conflict shape interveners’ decision making. Civil conflicts are 
dynamic processes and “potential interveners undertake evaluations of the changing 
civil war context” (Findley and Teo 2006, p. 829). Contextual factors such as 
duration, intensity, military capabilities of domestic opponents can affect interveners’ 
decisions. As Findley and Teo also argue, neither the actor-oriented nor the conflict-
oriented approach is “complete on its own” (2006, p. 829).  Combination of the two 
provides a better understanding of the rationale behind interventions. However, one 
should be careful while integrating these two approaches in a theoretical framework 
to study interventions. The potential intervener should still be theoretically and 
methodologically central as in the case of actor-oriented studies, but the capacity of 
the theoretical framework to analyze intervention decisions should be enhanced by 




Only a few recent quantitative studies have applied what this dissertation 
describes as the ‘combination approach’ and the first application of this approach 
comes from Regan again. In an attempt to address some of the theoretical and 
methodological criticisms he received, Regan re-examined the conditions that 
increase the success of foreign interventions using the same intervention dataset from 
his 1996 study (Lemke and Regan 2004). In order to fix the selection bias problem 
Regan faced in his previous study, the authors included potential interveners in their 
empirical analysis in addition to the actual interveners in 138 civil conflicts examined 
in the dataset. They also used a selection model which is the most suitable method to 
study the success of actual interveners. The first equation of their selection model 
examined the factors that increase the probability of intervention in a dataset that 
includes both actual and potential interveners. Then, in the second equation of the 
model, the authors analyzed the variables that increase the probability of success after 
potential interveners are censored. The use of a censored probit model with all 
potential interveners included in the first stage of analysis enabled the authors to 
avoid selection bias problem and provide more reliable findings in the second stage of 
their statistical analysis on the determinants of success. However, it is the first stage 
of their selection model analyzing the conditions for intervention that is critical for 
this literature review. The analytical framework Lemke and Regan used to examine 
the factors that increase the probability of intervention contained components of both 
the actor-oriented and conflict-oriented approach. Therefore, this study can be 





Similar to what Yoon did in his actor-oriented study, Lemke and Regan 
(2004) tried to evaluate the strategic importance of the conflict country for potential 
interveners and found that contiguity, alliances and colonial ties increase the 
probability of intervention. They also included power status and regime type of 
potential interveners in their analysis. The results showed that major powers were 
more likely to intervene in civil conflicts than minor powers but regime type had no 
significant impact on intervention behavior. In terms of the attributes of the civil 
conflict, the authors found that high numbers of casualties and refugees increased the 
probability of intervention. Although their theoretical framework was not as 
sophisticated as Yoon’s, Lemke and Regan paid attention to the regime type of 
external states and to some dyadic factors that increase the strategic significance of 
the conflict country for the potential intervener. As a result of incorporating some 
elements of the actor-oriented approach, this study affected several important 
quantitative studies that came after it. These later works have further improved the 
theoretical application of the combination approach.  
The first quantitative study to integrate actor-oriented and conflict-oriented 
approaches in a theoretically refined manner is conducted by Findley and Teo (2006). 
Their theoretical framework resembles the one used by actor-oriented studies in two 
ways. First, they adopt an interest-based explanation of intervention similar to 
scholars like Feste and Yoon who rely on realist school of thought to determine the 
key interests of potential interveners. Second, Findley and Teo pay attention to the 
strategic environment in which potential interveners observe each other’s behavior 




potential interveners are central to actor-oriented studies. Thus, the authors examine 
whether an external state is more likely to intervene militarily when its ally or rival 
intervenes in a civil conflict. The findings show that military intervention by a rival 
state supporting one side in a civil conflict increases an external state’s probability of 
intervention on the opposite side. Military intervention by an ally, on the other hand, 
does not seem to increase the probability of intervention by an external state on the 
same side. In fact, external states are more likely to intervene on government side 
when an ally intervenes on the side of opposition (Findley and Teo 2006).  
In order to gauge the interests of the potential intervener in the civil conflict 
state, Findley and Teo look at alliance ties and rivalry relations between these two 
states as well. They find that an external state is more likely to intervene on the 
opposition side when the conflict state is a rival. However, alliance ties with the 
conflict state increases the probability of military intervention on both sides (Findley 
and Teo 2006). Although the relationship between alliance ties and military 
intervention is somewhat unclear, especially compared to the results regarding 
rivalry; this is the only quantitative study that takes into account such strategic 
relations between potential interveners and civil conflict states as well as between 
third parties themselves. It is also one of the few studies which uses these strategic 
relations to predict on whose side intervention will take place. 
Findley and Teo also argue that dyadic relations between the external state 
and the conflict state affect the probability of military intervention. Similar to Lemke 
and Regan (2004), they find that colonial ties and contiguity increase the probability 




combination approach, the authors also examine how various attributes of the civil 
conflict influence the likelihood of military interventions. The results show that 
intervention is positively associated with increasing casualty and refugee levels. 
However, the relationship between type of civil conflict and military intervention is 
ambiguous because both types of civil conflicts they analyze, ethnic and ideological, 
appear to increase the probability of biased military interventions (Findley and Teo 
2006).  
Findley and Teo deserve credit for applying a unified theoretical framework 
and making the potential intervener theoretically and methodologically central to their 
study. However, their study has some weaknesses. Despite their claim to use an 
interest-based explanation, they still fall short on measuring the strategic significance 
of the civil conflict state from the perspective of the potential intervener. Rivalry and 
alliance relations are extremely important but there are additional strategic reasons 
which are worth investigating. Second, Findley and Teo do not examine the domestic 
sources of the intervention decision adequately. Even though they view intervention 
as a foreign policy tool, they do not analyze the impact of critical domestic factors on 
foreign policy decision making. Finally, this is one of the few studies that distinguish 
between interventions for or against the government while examining the causes of 
intervention. While this is an important contribution of this study, the authors only 
make a theoretical distinction between pro-government and pro-rebel interventions in 
the context of alliance and rivalry relations. Unfortunately, they do not theorize about 
how other factors included in their analysis affect interveners’ decision on which side 




Another scholar who combines actor-oriented and conflict-oriented 
approaches is Kathman (2010, 2011). In two different recent studies, Kathman 
examines the relationship between geography and potential interveners’ decision 
making. His first study examines the causes of biased military interventions in civil 
conflicts by neighboring countries. According to Kathman, it is important to study the 
causes of these interventions separately because neighbors are responsible for a 
disproportionately large number of biased interventions in civil conflicts. He argues 
that neighbors are mostly concerned about the contagion effects of civil conflicts as a 
result of which the probability of intervention by contiguous states increases as their 
“risk of hostility infection” from the civil conflict increases (Kathman 2010, p. 996).  
To test this hypothesis, Kathman first measures the infection risk score of 
each neighboring country. The infection risk score is made up of two major 
components. The first component measures the intensity of the civil conflict while the 
second component examines several factors (i.e. regime type, ethnic heterogeneity, 
GDP per capita) that predict domestic instability within the neighboring country 
(Kathman 2010, p. 996). After combining these two major components, Kathman 
predicts an infection risk score for each neighboring country and includes this as the 
main explanatory variable in his analysis. He also includes alliance ties and capability 
ratio between the civil conflict state and neighbors in his statistical analysis as well as 
various attributes of the conflict similar to the empirical analyses of Lemke and 
Regan (2004) and Findley and Teo (2006). The results indicate that infection risk 




Developing an infection risk score is certainly a useful way to evaluate the 
possibility of contagion for each neighboring state. However, Kathman does not 
provide a satisfactory theoretical explanation for why higher infection scores lead to 
biased military interventions. Neighboring countries which are vulnerable due to high 
infection scores may prefer neutral interventions such as mediation or other conflict 
resolution efforts without getting involved militarily. Even if neighbors do intervene 
militarily, infection risk score cannot explain on whose side (government or 
opposition) they choose to intervene. Kathman’s study is successful in putting the 
theoretical emphasis on potential interveners, which are neighbors in this particular 
study; but he fails to explain theoretically how infection risk score translates into pro-
government or pro-rebel military interventions.  
Kathman’s second study examines the causes of military interventions by all 
potential interveners, not just neighbors, using a similar but much broader infection 
risk analysis (Kathman 2011). Like his previous study, Kathman develops an 
infection risk score for each state neighboring the civil conflict state. However, the 
purpose of this particular study is to understand how regional concerns of potential 
interveners influence their probability of intervention in a civil conflict; so he uses 
infection risk scores to calculate contagion risk scores for the entire region 
surrounding the civil conflict. After that, Kathman measures the value of a particular 
region for each potential intervener. In other words, not all regions have the same 
value for each potential intervener; therefore, the probability of intervention depends 
not only on the regional contagion risk but also on the value of the region. The value 




alliance and trade ties with the states located in that region. Kathman combines 
regional contagion scores with three regional value scores (regional alliance score, 
regional trade score, regional proximity score) for each potential intervener and 
constructs three different independent variables. Similar to his first study on 
neighboring interventions, Kathman finds that these new composite variables 
measuring regional concerns of potential interveners have the most substantial effect 
on increasing the probability of military intervention (Kathman 2011).  
Kathman’s second study is even more original than his first one. It is probably 
the only quantitative study that includes regional motivations of external states in a 
statistical analysis by using a sophisticated method to measure regional scores for 
each potential intervener. However, these regional scores still cannot explain how 
potential interveners choose sides or why they prefer biased interventions to neutral 
ones. In fact, the existence of regional concerns can make it more likely to resort to 
neutral conflict resolution efforts such as regional or international peacekeeping 
operations. Kathman’s study fails to address these theoretical concerns. Finally, both 
of his studies do not take into account other critical strategic issues within the civil 
conflict environment that affect potential intervener’s decision making. Even though 
Kathman is correct in arguing that dyadic relations between external states and civil 
conflict states can be inadequate for understanding regional concerns of potential 
interveners; he fails to include critical strategic factors, such as rivalry, that might be 
more useful for understanding why states resort to biased military interventions in the 
first place. In other words, the additional explanatory power gained by regional 




By combining actor-oriented and conflict-oriented approaches in a way that 
puts the potential intervener at the center of theoretical and methodological analysis, 
Kathman, Findley and Teo make significant contributions to the literature. These 
recent studies demonstrate that the most promising way to study the rationale behind 
military interventions is by making potential interveners the primary focus of study 
while paying due attention to the civil conflict phenomenon they are reacting to. 
Despite the contributions made by these three recent studies, there are still a lot of 
theoretical and methodological improvements to make within the quantitative 
literature. The scientific and systematic study of interventions calls for more progress 
in order to understand the causes of foreign military interventions. 
Where is Progress Needed? 
In 1969, Rosenau argued that “the factors that foster, precipitate, sustain, 
channel, constrain, and curb intervention” had not been explored scientifically (1969, 
p. 150). Due to an increase in the number of quantitative studies on interventions, the 
scientific and systematic study of interventions has particularly improved in the past 
two decades. Scholars analyzing the causes and consequences of intervention have 
made more progress particularly with respect to the latter. There are several key 
reasons why less progress is made towards understanding the causes of foreign 
military interventions.  
First and foremost, the number of quantitative studies analyzing the causes of 
military interventions is smaller compared to the amount of research on the 
consequences of interventions. The dearth of quantitative studies analyzing the causes 




causes of intervention is important for studying its consequences as exemplified by 
disagreements on interveners’ goals. More quantitative research is simply needed to 
discover empirical patterns regarding the rationale behind military interventions. 
Second, the two main approaches used to analyze the causes of interventions need to 
be synthesized to provide a better theoretical understanding of this phenomenon. As 
Rosenau said, theory-building is critical for systematic and scientific study of 
interventions. However, one should be careful while integrating these two approaches 
into one theoretical framework. The potential intervener should still be theoretically 
and methodologically central as in the case of actor-oriented studies, but the capacity 
of the theoretical framework to analyze intervention decision should be enhanced by 
including the critical contextual factors related to the civil conflict. A handful of 
recent studies have demonstrated that synthesis is possible and offers promising 
results, but their shortcomings also indicate that more work is still needed on that 
front. Third, it is problematic that studies analyzing the causes of biased interventions 
tend to bypass the question of how interveners choose sides. On whose side external 
states intervene is closely related to why they intervene. Only a few studies have 
looked at this relationship, but not in a systematic or consistent way. At the very least, 
it is an empirical question that needs to be analyzed to understand the rationale behind 
military interventions. The lack of systematic research by intervention scholars on 
this issue hampers theoretical and empirical progress as well.  
In the following chapters, this study aims to address the theoretical and 










It is the purpose of this chapter to present a unified theoretical framework that 
combines actor-oriented and conflict-oriented approaches. A synthesis of these two 
dominant approaches used in the literature offers a promising way to make theoretical 
and empirical progress towards an improved understanding of the rationale behind 
foreign military interventions in civil conflicts. However, the synthesis should be 
carried out in a certain way. Since military intervention is a foreign policy instrument, 
this unified theoretical framework should be able to conduct a foreign policy analysis 
which requires looking at the international and domestic sources of foreign policy 
decision making. This would enable the analyst to examine the critical international 
and domestic factors that produce the intervention decision and determine the factors 
that motivate state leaders to intervene militarily on government or opposition side in 
some civil conflicts but not in others. This unified model should also pay attention to 
the civil conflict phenomenon foreign policy decision makers are reacting to. The 
attributes of the civil conflict state and the contextual factors related to the changing 
civil conflict environment should be incorporated into the theoretical framework as 
they relate to the decision making calculus of the intervener.  
“Modified Realist Framework” for Foreign Policy Analysis 
Any foreign policy analysis should start with identifying the main concerns of 
state leaders who make these foreign policy decisions. The underlying assumption of 




in power. Therefore, state leaders want to pursue foreign policies which benefit their 
own position in the domestic setting as well as their countries’ position in the 
international realm. As Putnam (1988) argues, leaders are concerned with domestic 
and international pressures simultaneously while making foreign policy decisions. 
Although leaders want to pursue foreign policies which are advantageous to their 
country’s international standing, they also want to avoid foreign policies which would 
threaten their own domestic standing since their primary objective is to stay in power. 
As rational actors who compare the expected utility of different foreign policy options 
before choosing one, state leaders consider the costs and benefits of any foreign 
policy decision in both domestic and international terms. In other words, both 
domestic and international conditions affect the cost-benefit analysis of state leaders 
with respect to different foreign policy options. That is why scholars studying foreign 
policy decisions advocate examining both international and domestic sources of 
foreign policy behavior (i.e. Putnam 1988; Fearon 1994; Kapstein 1995; Stam 1996).  
Given that state leaders are rational actors who want to stay in power and their 
foreign policy behavior originates from domestic and international sources; the 
theoretical task is to examine the critical international and domestic factors affecting 
cost-benefit calculation of leaders and identify which ones lead to positive expected 
utility from military intervention and cause leaders to choose this course of action. In 
order to accomplish this task, this dissertation employs a theoretical framework called 
“modified realism” developed by Huth (1998) because it is consistent with the 




As rational actors, state leaders want to pursue foreign policies that are 
advantageous to their countries’ political, military and economic standing in the 
international system. According to the realist school of thought which interprets 
national interest in terms of security and power, foreign policy decisions are shaped 
by international security and power considerations of states. This study posits that 
realism is particularly relevant for analyzing foreign policy decisions involving the 
use of military force. In fact, many studies discussed in the literature review chapter 
have used a realist framework while explaining intervention decisions (i.e. Feste 
1992, Scott 1996, Findley and Teo 2006). Although this study finds realism useful for 
analyzing interventions, it also recognizes the theoretical weakness of realism in 
accounting for domestic sources of foreign policy behavior. Huth’s “modified 
realism” attempts to address this weakness and offers a promising way to incorporate 
domestic politics into realism (1998).  
In Huth’s modified realist framework, state leaders are “concerned with 
promoting the international security of their country” but as rational actors they are 
also “careful to pursue security policies that do not undermine their domestic political 
position” (1998, p. 746). Huth argues that realism “can be strengthened by theorizing 
about how domestic political concerns of state leaders may have systematic and 
consequential effects on their foreign policy decisions” (1998, p.745) and he outlines 
a modified realist framework in which “both domestic political concerns and 
international power considerations determine foreign policy choices” (1998, p. 746).  
According to Huth’s modified realist framework, domestic politics can be 




decisions in three specific ways. First, leaders need to “balance the pursuit of security 
interests abroad with the domestic politics of building … political support behind” 
foreign policy decisions (1998, p. 746). In other words; while deciding among foreign 
policy options, leaders have to consider which of these options would receive support 
from important domestic constituents and also enable them to confront domestic 
opposition effectively. Second, “a leader’s desire to hold onto power can create 
incentives to pursue foreign policies that the leader believes will enhance his 
domestic political position” (1998, p. 746). Third, “the simultaneous pursuit by state 
leaders of domestic political and international security may create potential trade-offs 
between the resources available … to support both sets of goals” and may constrain 
leaders’ foreign policy options because of the “high priority attached by leaders to 
domestic political survival” (1998, p. 747). By specifying these three systematic 
linkages between international and domestic considerations of leaders, Huth’s 
modified realist framework describes how domestic politics can affect the cost-
benefit analysis of leaders with respect to different foreign policy options.  
Compared to traditional realism, modified realism is much more capable of 
accomplishing the task of identifying critical factors that affect leaders’ cost-benefit 
analysis in both domestic and international settings. As Huth puts it, “what seems like 
a rational decision” in international politics from a realist perspective may not be 
domestically feasible from a modified realist perspective (1998, p. 745). The 
systematic linkages between domestic and international politics described by 
modified realism make it a more suitable theoretical approach for foreign policy 




critical domestic and international factors that motivate leaders to intervene militarily 
in civil conflicts and relies on modified realist arguments about the linkages between 
domestic and international concerns of leaders to explain the hypothesized 
relationship. 
At this point, the study is equipped with a theoretical framework which can 
account for domestic and international sources of foreign policy behavior. However, 
before hypothesizing about the international and domestic factors that affect leaders’ 
decision on whether and on whose side to intervene in civil conflicts, one must also 
consider the role of civil conflicts in international politics. What makes civil conflicts 
significant in international relations and how do foreign leaders perceive civil 
conflicts in other states?  
Why are Civil Conflicts Significant to Other States? 
Civil conflicts, especially when they escalate to civil wars, can have 
devastating human costs. The tragic humanitarian consequences of civil conflicts 
make them dire events for the international community. However, the significance of 
civil conflicts for state leaders elsewhere comes from their potential impact on 
international politics. According to Rosenau, foreign leaders are “constantly alert to 
any sudden changes that may alter the personnel and orientations of foreign 
governments” because “changes in authority structures” can create “radical 
transformations in the international system” (1969, p. 168). Due to their potential to 
affect international security and power considerations of other states, civil conflicts 




As Rosenau argues, “top officials everywhere” are “sensitive to the stability of 
foreign governments” and consequently pay attention to civil conflicts in the world 
(1969, pp. 168-169), but that does not mean that civil conflicts influence international 
security interests of all states similarly. For some external states, a civil conflict might 
pose a direct or indirect threat to their security interests while for others it might offer 
an opportunity to improve their position in the international system. In other words, 
civil conflicts can affect security interests and/or relative power calculations of 
external states in different ways by creating threats and opportunities due to their 
direct and indirect repercussions on international politics.  
Although all foreign leaders pay attention to the civil conflicts in the 
international system, only some of them choose to devise a foreign policy response to 
a particular civil conflict. Since foreign policy behavior has international and 
domestic sources, foreign leaders who decide to intervene militarily on the 
government or rebel side may perceive the threats or opportunities posed by the civil 
conflict not only in international terms but also in domestic terms. Thus, modified 
realism is a more suitable theoretical framework to examine the intervention decision 
of leaders because realism only explains how leaders perceive the threats and 
opportunities posed by the civil conflict with respect to international security and 
power interests. Scholars using the actor-oriented approach as well as the 
combination approach (i.e. Findley and Teo 2006) have derived interveners’ interests 
from realism which interprets costs and benefits only in international terms. Modified 
realism can also account for leaders’ perception of the civil conflict in terms of their 




As mentioned before, this study argues that combining actor-oriented and 
conflict-oriented approaches provides an improved understanding of the rationale 
behind military interventions in civil conflicts. Similar to actor-oriented studies, this 
study will focus on the potential intervener and it will hypothesize about the critical 
international and domestic factors that motivate some states to intervene on the 
government or rebel side in a civil conflict. Then, it will hypothesize about the key 
attributes of the civil conflict which also affect foreign leaders’ decision making. All 
of these hypotheses will be derived from a modified realist framework which adapts 
well to a combination approach that makes potential intervener and its decision 
making theoretically central.  
International Sources of Military Intervention 
This section examines the critical international factors that are likely to affect 
leaders’ decision making regarding whether and on whose side to intervene militarily 
in a civil conflict. Although all of these factors originate from international sources 
such as dyadic relations with the conflict state or relations with other interveners 
involved in the civil conflict; hypothesized relationships derived from modified 
realism will facilitate a discussion of how these international factors affect the cost-
benefit analysis of leaders in terms of their international and domestic concerns. Since 
this dissertation also argues that on whose side external states intervene is closely 





Strategic Significance of the Conflict State 
Foreign leaders are particularly attentive to civil conflicts unfolding in 
countries that have strategic significance for their own country, because the “strategic 
value” of the conflict state is “critical in determining whether important security 
interests are at stake” (Huth 1998, p. 750). In other words, leaders’ perception of the 
threats and opportunities created by the civil conflict situation is closely related to the 
strategic significance of the conflict state. Political, military and economic relations 
with the conflict state and the existence of perceived strategic interests in that country 
determine the strategic value of the conflict state for leaders. 
The strategic value of the conflict state is crucial for leaders’ cost-benefit 
analysis regarding whether and on whose side to intervene in the civil conflict. Since 
leaders want to pursue foreign policies which are advantageous for their own position 
in the domestic setting as well as their countries’ position in the international realm, 
military intervention can have important international and domestic benefits when the 
conflict state is strategically significant. The strategic value of the conflict state also 
makes it easier for leaders to justify the domestic and international costs of military 
intervention. As Huth argues, leaders “should be in a stronger domestic political 
position to build a coalition in support of” military intervention when important 
domestic and international security interests are at stake (Huth 1998, p. 750). Military 
interventions to reduce threats or to seize opportunities from unstable civil conflict 
situations are more likely to receive domestic support when expected domestic and 




Having domestic support for military intervention decisions, especially from 
key constituencies, is important regardless of the regime type of the state because 
even in the most dictatorial regimes leaders do not rule alone. As a result of 
competitive elections, political leaders’ survival depends on the majority of the 
selectorate in democracies. An autocratic leader’s political survival, on the other 
hand, depends on the support of a smaller portion of society which generally consists 
of political and military elites. Compared to democracies, autocracies are considered 
to have a much smaller winning coalition whose support the leader has to obtain to 
remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Thus, despite the difference in the 
size of their winning coalitions, both democratic and autocratic leaders need domestic 
approval for their foreign policy decisions.  
Since both democratic and autocratic leaders pay attention to the strategic 
value of the conflict state when deciding whether and on whose side to intervene, 
international factors that determine strategic significance of the conflict state for 
foreign leaders will be discussed one by one.   
Rivalry with Conflict State: 
States engaged in interstate rivalry with the conflict country have a particular 
interest in manipulating the civil conflict to their advantage. Salehyan argues that 
external states may even instigate rebellion and instability in a rival state to 
undermine governments (2007). Hence, a civil conflict that is already unfolding in a 





States want to enhance their own position in the international system 
especially with respect to their rivals (Snidal 1993). When a state is experiencing a 
civil conflict, its external rival is likely to support rebels because pro-rebel military 
intervention offers an opportunity to further destabilize or remove a rival government 
and to change regional or international power balance in its favor. Given the potential 
security benefits of military intervention, it is easier for leaders to justify the costs and 
to receive domestic support for their foreign policy decision. Both the public and the 
elites tend to have a negative image of the rival state and should be more likely to 
support their leaders in order to receive the potential domestic and international 
security benefits of military intervention. In fact, for external states interested in 
destabilizing or removing a rival government, pro-rebel military intervention might 
even be a less costly foreign policy option than interstate war. Since rivalry affects 
leaders’ decision on both whether and on whose side to intervene, two hypotheses are 
formulated.  
H1a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases when the 
conflict state is a rival. 
H1b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels when the 
conflict state is a rival. 
Involvement in a Militarized Interstate Dispute with Conflict State: 
Rivalry partially accounts for hostile relations between states in the 
international system. States can have enmity towards each other even though their 
relationship does not meet the criteria of interstate rivalry. If states are engaged in 




order to protect their own security interests. Therefore, leaders are alert to civil 
conflicts in states with which they have military disputes. An external state is more 
likely to provide military support to rebels if it is involved in a military dispute with 
the government of the conflict state. Similar to the rivalry situation described above, 
leaders are more likely to find domestic support for their foreign policy decision to 
intervene because of the potential international and domestic security benefits of 
weakening or removing a hostile government. Hence, the following hypotheses are 
proposed.  
H2a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if it is 
involved in a militarized interstate dispute with the conflict state. 
H2b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels when it is 
involved in a militarized interstate dispute with the conflict state. 
Alliance Ties with Conflict State: 
Civil conflicts in countries with friendly governments can threaten security 
interests of external states as well, especially when there are alliance ties. Military 
intervention becomes a plausible option for leaders who want to prevent the removal 
of an ally and to protect their diplomatic and military interests in the target state that 
can come with formal alliance ties. When civil conflicts threaten the stability and/or 
survival of allied governments, external states may also be concerned about 
international audience costs of non-intervention. Since allies and adversaries are 
important audiences due to credibility concerns; by intervening, an external state may 




Leaders can justify a pro-government military intervention from both 
international and domestic politics perspective. Defense of allies, prevention of 
adverse strategic changes due to overthrow of allied governments, protection of 
diplomatic interests and credibility concerns are some of the strategic considerations 
that help leaders present a strong case to the public to justify the need for military 
intervention.   
H3a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases when 
there are alliance ties with the conflict state. 
H3b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the side of the government 
when there are alliance ties with the conflict state. 
Historical Ties with Conflict State: 
Historical ties between countries are also critical when leaders are deciding 
whether and on whose side to intervene in a civil conflict. Former colonial powers 
interact frequently with their former colonies and continue to maintain political and 
economic interests in those countries. Colonial ties are often included in international 
studies to capture the political relations between certain pairs of states; however they 
are not the only type of historical relationship states can have with each other. 
Disintegration of states due to secession also causes newly formed states to have 
historical ties with each other that shape their political, economic and societal 
relations. Thus, foreign leaders may attach strategic significance to a conflict country 
due to their continued political and social interactions with the government, elites or 
communal groups in the target state which can originate from different types of 




support behind military intervention decisions, especially given that some segments 
of public might be willing to help societies they have historical ties with. When 
historical ties exist, leaders are more likely to support the government side because 
they would prefer maintaining the historically hard-won relations with the target 
government instead of jeopardizing the status quo by supporting the rebels. Since the 
public is also more likely to favor supporting the government and protecting the 
current status quo, leaders are more likely to intervene militarily to help the 
government. 
H4a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases when 
there are historical ties with the conflict state. 
H4b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the side of the government 
when there are historical ties with the conflict state. 
Geographic Proximity to Conflict State: 
As discussed in the literature review, empirical evidence shows that states 
intervene frequently in their neighbors’ civil conflicts and there are numerous reasons 
for neighboring interventions that have been discussed by scholars. Essentially, all 
neighboring countries are strategically significant for leaders because of their 
proximity. The potential for conflict spillover across territorial borders, threat to 
stability in border regions and the possibility of refugees create serious problems for 
leaders who are concerned about domestic and international security of their own 
countries. Dangers of conflict spillover can motivate leaders to intervene militarily in 
neighboring civil conflicts and leaders are likely to receive domestic support for their 




Although contiguity increases the probability of military intervention, its 
effect on which side leaders choose to support in the civil conflict is not so 
straightforward. As conflict scholars have argued, neighbors frequently interact with 
each other but greater interaction between contiguous states also increases the 
likelihood of interstate conflict (Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Gleditsch and Singer 
1975). In other words, neighbors can have friendly or hostile relations with each other 
due to their frequent interactions. Therefore, leaders’ decision regarding which side to 
support in the civil conflict depends on whether they have friendly or hostile relations 
with the neighboring government. For instance, if the neighboring state is an 
interstate rival, then leaders are more likely to intervene on the side of rebels. 
Alliance ties or strong trade relations with the neighboring state, on the other hand, 
would motivate leaders to intervene on the side of government. Consequently, only 
one hypothesis is proposed in the case of contiguous states.  
H5: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if it is 
contiguous to the conflict state. 
Proximity is another geographic factor that increases the strategic value of the 
conflict state for foreign leaders. States that are in the same geographic region with 
the conflict state are generally concerned about regional spillover effects of the civil 
conflict as Kathman argues (2011). Regional instability caused by the civil conflict 
and potential future changes in the regional balance of power due to change of 
governments can also affect national security and relative power concerns of external 
states. In short, being in the same region with the conflict state also increases an 




military intervention to domestic audience based on these regional security and power 
interests.  
Similar to contiguity, the impact of geographic proximity on leaders’ decision 
regarding which side to support in the civil conflict is not so clear-cut. Leaders can 
intervene on the side of government if they have friendly relations or alliance ties 
with the conflict state. They can also intervene on the government side if their goal is 
to prevent the rise of a new radical government that can disrupt the regional status 
quo. On the other hand, civil conflicts nearby also offer an opportunity to leaders who 
want to weaken or remove a hostile regime. In such cases, leaders would be more 
likely to side with the rebels. Thus, only one hypothesis is formulated. 
H6: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if it is in 
the same region with the conflict state. 
Resource Wealth of Conflict State: 
Foreign leaders may attach strategic significance to a conflict country due to 
its resource wealth. Qualitative studies have shown that resource wealth of a conflict 
country can attract third party military intervention because foreign powers are more 
likely to intervene in order to gain access to the natural resources. Resource looting in 
the conflict country can also decrease the costs of military intervention (Dashwood 
2000; Ross 2004a, 2004b). For instance, Ross argues that Liberia intervened on the 
side of the rebels during Sierra Leone’s civil war to gain access to the diamond fields 
(Ross 2004a). Although there is some empirical evidence from qualitative studies, the 
relationship between resource wealth and military intervention has not been tested 




One can argue that since resource wealth of a conflict country increases the 
tangible benefits of military intervention, external states who want to exploit these 
natural resources are more likely to intervene in the civil conflict and leaders can 
justify the domestic costs of intervention with those tangible benefits. However, 
resource wealth of a country can be lootable or non-lootable depending on the type of 
natural resources found in the country. Lootable resources, such as secondary 
diamonds, can easily be exploited or smuggled. Non-lootable resources, on the other 
hand, are very difficult to exploit because they require expensive equipment, financial 
investment, long-term access to a conflict state’s territory in order to receive the 
tangible benefits (Lujala et al. 2005). Thus, the type of natural resources in a conflict 
country should factor into the cost-benefit analysis of external states who want to 
benefit from these resources as a result of military intervention.  
If an external state’s goal is to make a profit from lootable resources such as 
secondary diamonds, then it is more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels as in 
the case of Liberia. During the military intervention, interveners’ forces can loot and 
smuggle such resources easily. If an external state’s goal is to make a profit from non-
lootable resources such as oil and gas, then it is more likely to intervene on the 
government side because governments tend to have control over non-lootable 
resources. The probability of receiving economic benefits from non-lootable 
resources both during and after the civil conflict is higher when the external state 
intervenes militarily on the side of the government. To sum up, even though the 
resource wealth of the conflict country might motivate external states to intervene, on 




H7a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if the 
conflict state has lootable resources. 
H7b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels when the 
conflict state has lootable resources. 
H8a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if the 
conflict state has non-lootable resources. 
H8b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the side of the government 
when the conflict state has non-lootable resources. 
Trade Ties with Conflict State: 
Strong trade ties with the conflict state also increase its strategic value for 
foreign leaders. Trade is a good indicator of the extent of economic interdependence 
between pairs of states. Moreover, economic interdependence is positively associated 
with compatibility and peaceful relations between states in the conflict literature 
(Gleditsch 2007). Therefore, external states which have strong trade relations with the 
conflict state would be more likely to intervene on the side of government in order to 
protect their economic interests and trade relations. To receive domestic approval for 
their decision, leaders can build a domestic coalition from the key constituent groups 
whose economic interests are likely to be affected due to ongoing instability or 
potential for regime change in the conflict state.  
H9a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases as trade 
ties with the conflict state increase. 
H9b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the side of the government as 




Strategic Significance of the Civil Conflict 
Other international factors besides the strategic value of the conflict country 
can motivate foreign leaders to intervene in civil conflicts as well. Leaders’ 
perception of the threats and opportunities created by the civil conflict may not 
necessarily be a function of the strategic value of the conflict state but it may also be 
related to the strategic significance of the civil conflict environment. Foreign powers 
sometimes become militarily involved in a civil conflict in response to another state’s 
military intervention. In other words, military intervention can be used as a strategic 
foreign policy instrument to destroy, balance or enhance another state’s influence in 
the civil conflict environment. In fact, civil conflicts are often multiparty 
environments. Empirical evidence shows that more than half of the civil conflicts in 
the post-WWII period involved multiple interveners (Findley and Teo 2006, p. 829). 
Therefore, it is important to understand how previous interventions by other states 
affect leaders’ perception of the strategic significance of the civil conflict and factor 
into the cost-benefit calculation of leaders when deciding whether and on whose side 
to intervene.  
Some scholars argue that during the Cold War, the U.S. sometimes intervened 
in civil conflicts as a reaction to the Soviet intervention rather than due to the 
strategic value of the conflict country. For instance, according to Scott, the U.S. had 
“little or no strategic” interest in Afghanistan until the late 1970s, but the Soviet 
intervention in 1978 “triggered a change in the U.S. assessment” (Scott 1996, p. 40-
41). President Carter commented that the Soviet intervention “placed the Soviet 




threatened a strategically located country, Pakistan; and it posed the prospect of 
increased Soviet pressure on Iran and on other nations of the Middle East” (1996, p. 
43). He warned that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America” (1996, p. 43). Hence, the U.S. decision to intervene militarily on the side of 
the Afghan rebels was purely a reaction to the Soviet intervention which had made 
the conflict in Afghanistan strategically significant for the United States.  
Reactionary military interventions are neither unique to superpowers nor to 
the bipolar international system of the Cold War. As mentioned above, empirical 
evidence shows that many civil conflicts experience multiple interventions. States 
generally observe each other’s behavior and may resort to reactionary interventions to 
strengthen or reduce each other’s influence on civil conflict dynamics or outcomes. In 
fact, one of the early empirical studies has noted that if one domestic disputant is 
supported by an outside state, the other side tends to receive external military support 
as well (Duner 1983). Despite this early observation of the interdependent aspect of 
interventions, there have actually been few attempts to model the strategic context of 
civil conflicts. Findley and Teo (2006) show that states balance the role of their rivals 
in civil wars by intervening on the opposite side, but alliances do not always lead to 
interventions on the same side. Gent (2007) suggests that major powers usually 
undertake opposing interventions in civil wars in order to affect the course of events 
in their favor. 
To sum up, foreign leaders who attach strategic value to a conflict country are 




conflict and factor those into their decision making. However, a civil conflict can also 
gain strategic significance because of its potential to affect international security 
interests of an external state due to other countries’ interventions in the civil conflict. 
Under such circumstances, an external state’s decision on whether and on whose side 
to intervene depends on the relations it has with other interveners in the civil conflict. 
Specifically, leaders’ perception of whether they have divergent or convergent 
strategic interests with the other interveners is likely to affect their decision making 
most.  
Rivalry with Previous Intervener: 
Rivals closely observe each other in the international system and are often 
suspicious of the other’s intentions and actions. Since rivals generally perceive their 
interests as opposing, they try to reduce each other’s influence on international 
political events and shape them in line with their own strategic preferences. Civil 
conflicts are one of those international events where rivals might engage in opposing 
interventions.  
Goertz and Diehl (1995) argue that rivals continue a conflictual relationship 
over a long period of time without a clear-cut victory or defeat. Therefore, 
incremental changes in power can change the stalemate between rivals and create 
opportunities to supersede the other. Intervention in a civil conflict can be an attempt 
by rivals to expand their influence because it might provide them with an advantage 
to disrupt the status quo in the future. Thus, it can be argued that states are more 
likely to intervene in civil conflicts in which their rival has previously intervened and 




When leaders perceive a conflict state to be strategically significant, military 
intervention by a rival state poses a direct threat to their domestic and international 
interests. The logical response would be to intervene on the opposing side to destroy 
their rival’s influence on the civil conflict environment and try to prevent an outcome 
that would risk their national security or damage their strategic interests in the 
conflict state. As demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan, states can also intervene 
militarily in reaction to a rival’s intervention. In such cases, states want to shape the 
conflict dynamics in their own favor and prevent their rival from achieving its 
preferred outcome which might potentially threaten their security and have adverse 
effects on the status quo. Military intervention can also be used strategically to 
weaken a rival state indirectly through the destruction of the domestic opponent 
supported by the rival intervener in the civil conflict. In short, strategic considerations 
might necessitate siding with whichever domestic party best supports the potential 
intervener’s divergent interests with its rival. Two hypotheses are proposed. 
H10a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if its 
rival has already intervened in the civil conflict. 
H10b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the opposite side that its rival 
intervened on. 
Alliance with Previous Intervener:  
Civil conflicts can become strategically significant for external states not only 
based on divergent interests, but also due to the convergent interests they hold with 
previous interveners. While two states with divergent interests want to influence the 




convergent interests may want to cooperate and increase the probability of securing a 
preferred outcome that serves their common interests. In some ways, this is similar to 
the idea of bandwagoning in the international relations literature.  
States are most likely to hold convergent interests with their allies in the 
international system. Hence, military interventions by allies can affect leaders’ 
decision making on whether and on whose side to intervene in a civil conflict. Since 
alliances reflect common interests as well as responsibilities to protect each other 
against threats, foreign leaders may intervene in a civil conflict on the same side that 
their ally intervened on. By providing military support to the same domestic party, an 
external state may want to multiply the impact of its ally’s efforts and achieve a 
mutually beneficial outcome. However, an external state might also intervene 
militarily to protect an ally whose security is threatened by a civil conflict nearby. 
Kathman (2011) claims that third parties can intervene in a civil conflict to protect 
their allies from the contagion effect of the civil conflict. This study’s argument is 
slightly different than Kathman’s claim because it expects states to intervene in a civil 
conflict only if their ally has already intervened on one side to protect their national 
security and strategic interests. In other words, external states intervene to provide 
additional military support to the domestic side their ally has already intervened on. 
Thus, external states can intervene alongside their allies in a civil conflict either to 
protect their allies and themselves from direct and indirect threats, respectively, or to 
seize advantages from civil conflicts that their ally has already become involved in by 




H11a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if its ally 
has already intervened in the civil conflict. 
H11b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the same side its ally 
intervened on. 
Control Variables 
Strategic value of the conflict state and the strategic significance of the civil 
conflict are major factors affecting leaders’ cost-benefit analysis regarding whether 
and on whose side to intervene in a civil conflict. However, there are several other 
international factors that are likely to influence state leaders’ decision making. 
Involvement in an Interstate War:  
When a state is already involved in an international conflict, it has less 
military capabilities and resources to allocate to other conflicts. Military involvement 
in additional conflicts becomes more costly and risky under such situations. Domestic 
and international security concerns of leaders force them to refrain from military 
interventions in civil conflicts.  
H12: The probability of military intervention by an external state decreases if it is 
involved in an interstate war.  
Power Status:  
The power status of a state influences its ability and willingness to intervene. 
Major powers have a higher probability of intervening in civil conflicts because they 
have more military resources to commit and they can extend their military influence 




be more willing to intervene in civil conflicts because of their vested interests in 
different parts of the world.  
H13: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if it is a 
major power.  
Relative Capabilities: 
Not only the power status of potential interveners, but also the power 
differentials between states can affect the likelihood of military intervention. Realists 
argue that the ratio of capabilities factor into states’ decision making calculus when 
using military force. Moreover, states can also attempt to increase the probability of 
achieving their preferred outcome by employing force mainly against weaker conflict 
states. Leaders may also avoid interventions in stronger conflict states due to military 
setbacks because that might hurt their own domestic position. Therefore, it can be 
expected that leaders are less likely to undertake military interventions as relative 
capabilities start to favor the conflict state.  
H14: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases as the 
ratio of capabilities with the conflict state increases. 
International System: 
The structure of the international system can also affect the probability of 
military interventions. Starting with the earliest works in the intervention literature, 
many studies have argued that interventions in civil conflicts should be more frequent 
in bipolar systems than in balance-of-power systems because bipolarity creates more 
incentives for intervention (i.e. Kaplan 1964, Rosenau 1969, Regan 1998, Kathman 




War, both superpowers and their allies intervened in civil conflicts to keep the 
adversary from gaining additional influence. The zero-sum environment of the Cold 
War increased incentives to intervene for strategic purposes. With the end of the Cold 
War and bipolar competition, some of these geostrategic incentives disappeared. 
Therefore in the post-Cold War international setting, the probability of military 
intervention in civil conflicts is expected to be lower.  
H15: The probability of military intervention by an external state is higher during the 
Cold War compared to the post-Cold War period.  
Domestic Sources of Military Intervention 
This section examines the critical domestic factors that are likely to affect 
leaders’ decision making regarding whether and on whose side to intervene militarily 
in a civil conflict. Although all of these factors originate from domestic sources, 
modified realism facilitates an analysis of how these domestic factors affect the cost-
benefit analysis of leaders by articulating the linkages between international and 
domestic concerns.  
Regime Type:  
State leaders want to pursue foreign policies which are advantageous to their 
country’s international standing but also want to avoid those which would threaten 
their domestic standing since their primary objective is to stay in power. As argued 
before, having domestic support for military intervention decisions is important 
regardless of the regime type. However, institutional differences in democracies and 
autocracies determine the size of the winning coalition whose support leaders need to 




depends on a large segment of the population in democratic states. An autocratic 
leader’s political survival, on the other hand, depends on the support of a smaller 
portion of society which generally consists of political and military elites. Thus, 
autocracies have a much smaller winning coalition compared to democracies (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003).  
Democratic leaders aim to pursue foreign policies which are supported by a 
large number of citizens because they rely on re-election to remain in power. 
Democratic leaders are also more concerned about the success of their policies since 
they can lose their jobs in the case of policy failure. Hence, military intervention in 
civil conflicts by democracies is more likely when it is consistent with the preferences 
of a significant portion of the public and its outcome is likely to satisfy them. Due to 
the larger size of their winning coalition compared to autocracies, democracies are 
likely to be more selective when deciding to intervene.  
Autocracies, on the other hand, are less likely to be selective when intervening 
in civil conflicts because political survival of autocratic leaders depends on a much 
smaller segment of public. Autocratic leaders can remain in power as long as they 
have the support of their small winning coalition which they typically maintain by 
providing private goods. Even after a policy failure, autocratic leaders can satisfy the 
members of their winning coalition with private goods to retain their domestic 
position. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 





Although democratic leaders are more likely to be selective when they 
intervene in civil conflicts, it is important to analyze whether democracies have a 
stronger tendency to support the government side over the rebels when they decide to 
intervene. Some of the earlier studies suggest that democracies may be more 
interested in preserving governments rather than challenging them (Pearson 1974a, 
1974b). Hence, the following hypothesis will also be tested: 
H16b: Democracies are more likely to intervene on the government side than are 
autocracies. 
Regime Similarity:  
Regime similarity can also affect leaders’ foreign policy decision making. 
Scholars have argued that democracies form a security community and positively 
identify their national security with each other (i.e. Doyle 1983a, 1983b, 1986; 
Russett 1993; Owen 1994). In fact, Hermann and Kegley claim that democracies used 
interventions in interstate and intrastate conflicts “primarily for defensive purposes to 
ensure that countries did not slip from the democratic camp” (Hermann and Kegley 
2001, p. 242). Lemke and Regan (2004), on the other hand, find that jointly 
democratic dyads are no more or less likely than other dyads to experience 
interventions during civil conflicts. Although there are mixed findings regarding 
intervention behavior of democracies towards their counterparts in civil conflicts; 
empirical studies show that while democracies do not feel compelled to militarily 
assist other democracies in interstate disputes, they almost never enter the conflict on 





The impact of regime similarity on states’ foreign policy behavior can be 
noticed not only in democracies, but also in autocracies. Huth argues that leaders of 
states with similar regimes “are less likely to view one another as security threats 
because they share common interests in preserving political stability at home that, in 
turn, should lead these states to adopt less conflictual foreign policies toward one 
another. The legitimacy and survival of regimes at home can be enhanced by political 
allies abroad supporting one another” (Huth 1998, p. 751). Due to their shared interest 
in protecting domestic norms of governance, leaders can intervene militarily on the 
government side in a civil conflict to help a counterpart keep its regime intact. If the 
conflict state has a different political system, then leaders would be more likely to 
intervene on the side of rebels to undermine a government with a different regime 
type. Two hypotheses are proposed.  
H17a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if it has 
the same regime type as the conflict state.  
H17b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the government side if it has 
the same regime type as the conflict state.  
Ethnic Ties with Conflict State: 
As discussed in the literature review, scholars have argued that ethnic ties 
with a conflict state can also motivate leaders to intervene in civil conflicts. For 
instance, Saideman (1997, 2002) asserts that if ethnic ties with an outside group 
determine foreign policy preferences of important constituents, then those ethnic ties 
will also influence leaders’ foreign policy decisions because they want to stay in 




policymakers”, leaders take into account important constituents’ ethnic ties to outside 
groups when formulating policies, such as intervention in a civil conflict (Saideman 
2002, p. 32).   
Based on the existing research, it can be argued that leaders are more likely to 
intervene militarily when their key constituents share ethnic ties with the majority of 
the population in the conflict state. Since democratic leaders’ survival depends on a 
large segment of the population, the key constituents for democratic leaders are likely 
to be the dominant ethnic group and the second largest ethnic group in the country. 
While an autocratic leader’s political survival depends on the support of a smaller 
portion of society which generally consists of political and military elites, it is highly 
likely that at least some members of his winning coalition will be from the dominant 
ethnic group or the second largest ethnic group in society. Heger and Salehyan argue 
that “ethnic nepotism heavily shapes the contours of the winning coalition” in both 
democracies and autocracies (2007, p. 391).  
Thus, it can be expected that if the two largest ethnic groups in society have 
ties to the majority of the population in the conflict state, then leaders’ decision 
making regarding military intervention will be affected by the existence of these 
affective linkages. The following hypotheses are proposed regarding the intervention 
decision.  
H18a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if it has 




H18b: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if its 
dominant ethnic group is the second largest ethnic group in the conflict state and its 
second largest ethnic group is the dominant ethnic group in the conflict state. 
These hypotheses do not address leaders’ decision on whose side to intervene 
because data are not available in the literature to analyze that. However, given the 
previous empirical findings on the role of ethnic ties in foreign policy making, it is a 
critical domestic variable to include in the theoretical model. Two additional 
theoretical arguments can also be made about its particular significance for the 
intervention decision. First, since leaders are interested in satisfying their domestic 
constituents’ policy preferences, by intervening leaders want to convey to the public 
that they care about protecting ethnic kins abroad who are threatened by a civil 
conflict. As Huth argues, “a leader’s desire to hold onto power can create incentives 
to pursue foreign policies that the leader believes will enhance his domestic political 
position” (1998, p. 746). Leaders would most likely side with the domestic disputant 
that is favored by their ethnic kins in the conflict country. Therefore, the ethnic ties 
argument is more significant for the intervention decision because if it is found to 
influence leaders’ decision to intervene, then they are expected to intervene militarily 
on the side favored by their ethnic kins instead of supporting the domestic party 
which threatens them. Second, these hypotheses will be tested against all types of 
civil conflicts, not just ethnic conflicts. If the security of ethnic kins is threatened due 
to an ideological conflict, then interveners are expected to side with the domestic 
party which is supported by their ethnic kins. In other words, these hypotheses do not 




ethnic identity of largest groups in the conflict state. Hence, the hypotheses aim to test 
whether leaders have a higher likelihood of intervening to protect ethnic kins abroad 
threatened by any type of conflict, regardless of whether they are a party to the 
conflict or not. Based on these theoretical justifications, it is critical and necessary to 
analyze the impact of ethnic ties on leaders’ decision to intervene.  
Domestic Unrest: 
The systematic linkages described by modified realism between domestic 
politics and foreign policy decision making help identify another critical domestic 
variable that can affect leaders’ cost-benefit analysis regarding intervention. As 
mentioned above, Huth argues that “the simultaneous pursuit by state leaders of 
domestic political and international security may create potential trade-offs between 
the resources available … to support both sets of goals” and may constrain leaders’ 
foreign policy options because of the “high priority attached by leaders to domestic 
political survival” (1998, p. 747). When there is domestic unrest and instability, 
leaders are more likely to be constrained in their foreign policy options. Domestic 
crises such as coup attempts, strikes or anti-government demonstrations can force 
national leaders to concentrate on domestic issues, instead of international events, in 
order to eliminate threats to their domestic political survival. Additionally, leaders are 
more likely to direct the resources of the state to suppressing domestic challenges 
instead of using them in foreign military interventions. Thus, it can be argued that 
leaders are less likely to intervene in civil conflicts elsewhere when they are faced 
with domestic unrest in their own country because leaders would direct their efforts 




Diversionary theory, on the other hand, argues that both democratic and 
autocratic leaders can attempt to draw attention away from domestic problems by 
using low levels of military force internationally (Levy 1989, Gelpi 1997, DeRouen 
2000). With the goal of influencing domestic politics, a state leader can use the 
international employment of military force to rally the fractious public around his 
leadership. Hence, leaders can strategically resort to foreign policy behavior that 
involves the use of military force to divert the public’s attention away from domestic 
problems and focus it on international issues that require national unity. Based on the 
logic of diversionary theory, one can also argue that leaders would be more likely to 
intervene militarily in a civil conflict as a diversionary foreign policy behavior.  
However, the literature on diversionary theory remains divided. In cross-
national studies, Gelpi (1997) and Davies (2002) conclude that democracies are more 
likely to divert than autocracies, while the findings by Miller (1999) and Enterline 
and Gleditsch (2000) demonstrate the opposite. Another disagreement in the literature 
is over whose attention leaders are trying to divert from domestic crises. Morgan and 
Bickers (1992) argue that elites, not the public, are the only domestic group that can 
cause democratic leaders to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior. 
Kisangani and Pickering (2007) find that elite unrest compels leaders both in 
democracies and mixed regimes to resort to diversionary behavior. Moreover, studies 
frequently assume that “diversionary force tends to be hostile in intent and is typically 
launched over high politics issues” but Kisangani and Pickering’s empirical results 
suggest that leaders generally use “benevolent missions launched for low politics 




diversionary purposes (2007, pp. 281, 295). “Belligerent operations launched for high 
politics reasons” including “intervention to take side in a domestic dispute” or “to 
change political regime in the target country” and issues that involve “regional power 
balances, stability” are excluded from diversionary foreign policy behavior of leaders 
(Kisangani and Pickering 2007, pp. 281, 284-285, 295). Kisangani and Pickering also 
conclude that while democracies and mixed regimes use diversionary force for 
benevolent missions, autocracies do not seem to “externalize their domestic 
problems” at all (2007, p. 295). These are not the only contradictory findings in the 
literature on diversionary behavior, but they are the most relevant ones for this study.  
Given the important theoretical arguments and mixed empirical findings 
regarding the impact of regime type on the diversionary use of force, this study 
expects elite unrest to have a different effect on the intervention behavior of 
democracies and autocracies. Mass unrest, on the other hand, is expected to have 
similar effects on democratic and autocratic leaders. Since the literature suggests that 
democratic leaders might respond to elite unrest by using diversionary force, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H19a: The probability of military intervention by a democratic state increases if it is 
experiencing elite unrest domestically. 
H19b: The probability of military intervention by an autocratic state decreases if it is 
experiencing elite unrest domestically. 
Based on the systematic linkage identified by modified realism which argues 
that domestic problems may constrain leaders’ foreign policy options by threatening 




leaders are less likely to intervene when they are faced with mass unrest. The 
following hypothesis is proposed in the case of mass unrest: 
H20: The probability of military intervention by an external state decreases if it is 
experiencing mass unrest domestically. 
Although the impact of elite and mass unrest will also be analyzed on all 
states in the full sample, the sub-sample analyses conducted for democratic and 
autocratic states will be more appropriate for testing these hypotheses and 
understanding how elite and mass unrest affect the intervention decisions of 
democratic and autocratic leaders specifically. Thus, in addition to providing a 
robustness check, sub-sample analyses are useful for comparing the impact of critical 
international and domestic factors on the intervention behavior of different types of 
states. 
Contextual Sources of Military Intervention 
This study argues that combining actor-oriented and conflict-oriented 
approaches provides an improved understanding of the rationale behind military 
interventions in civil conflicts; therefore, this final section examines the impact of 
contextual factors originating from the civil conflict environment on foreign leaders’ 
decision making. As Findley and Teo also argue, “conceptualizing the civil [conflict] 
itself as context integrates the foreign policy aspect of intervention with 
considerations for relevant ground conditions” (2006, p. 829). Hypotheses about 
critical contextual conditions which are most likely to factor into foreign leaders’ 
cost-benefit analysis regarding whether and on whose side to intervene are presented 




Regime Type of Conflict State:  
The first contextual factor is the regime type of the conflict state. It has 
already been hypothesized in the previous section that an external state is more likely 
to intervene on the government side if it has the same regime type as the conflict 
state. However, it is still important to analyze if democracies are more or less likely to 
attract military interventions than autocracies because there are contradictory findings 
in the literature. Hermann and Kegley (1995, 1996) find that the targets of 
intervention are disproportionately autocracies. Democracies are less likely to be the 
targets of military intervention irrespective of the political system of the intervener. 
These results are also supported by Kathman’s study (2011). On the other hand, 
Lemke and Regan (2004) observe that democracies involved in civil conflicts are 
more likely to experience foreign intervention. In short, intervention studies seem to 
diverge on the impact of the conflict state’s regime type on foreign military 
interventions. Since it is critical to understand whether external states, irrespective of 
their regime type, are less likely to interfere in the domestic affairs of democracies; it 
is necessary to include the regime type of the conflict state in the model. The 
inclusion of this contextual factor will also complement the findings from previous 
hypotheses because it will provide a thorough understanding of the relationship 
between military intervention and regime type by analyzing whether democracies are 
more resistant to interventions than autocracies and if this resistance decreases the 
likelihood of interventions on the government side as suggested by Hermann and 




H21a: The probability of military intervention by an external state decreases if the 
conflict state is a democracy. 
H21b: An external state is less likely to intervene on the government side if the 
conflict state is a democracy. 
Type of Civil Conflict:  
The second contextual factor that is likely to affect leaders’ decision making is 
the type of civil conflict. It can be argued that certain types of civil conflicts are more 
salient to potential interveners than others and are more likely to attract military 
interventions. As discussed in the literature review chapter, studies that examine the 
role of ethnic politics in international relations argue that ethnic conflicts are 
particularly prone to interventions. However, findings from recent studies indicate 
that ethnic conflicts are not more likely to attract military interventions than other 
conflicts. Using Regan’s dataset that distinguishes between ethnic and ideological 
conflicts, three important intervention studies conclude that both types of conflicts 
appear to increase the probability of biased military interventions (Lemke and Regan 
2004, Findley and Teo 2006, Gent 2008). However, Gent (2008) also adds that 
government-biased intervention is more likely in ideological conflicts than in identity 
conflicts whereas rebel-biased intervention is equally likely in both types of conflicts. 
Since recent findings could not find much difference in the intervention behavior of 
states towards ethnic and ideological conflicts, this study aims to shed light on how 
type of conflict can affect intervention likelihood by distinguishing between civil 
conflicts fought over government or territory which has not been analyzed adequately 




more promising for arriving at conclusive results because ethnic conflicts can be 
related to governmental and/or territorial issues; therefore, the typology used in this 
study is more accurate.  
This study argues that governmental conflicts are more prone to foreign 
military interventions than territorial conflicts because foreign leaders are much more 
sensitive to the possibility of government change or regime change in other states as 
Rosecrance (1963) and Rosenau (1969) have argued. Since both democratic and 
autocratic leaders would be more alert to the possibility of a government change in a 
country, they would be more likely to intervene in governmental conflicts than in 
territorial conflicts. It can also be hypothesized that these interventions are more 
likely to happen on the government side because generally more states are interested 
in the stability of nations in the international system and want to maintain the status 
quo rather than facing unsettling changes. This prediction is also in line with Gent’s 
finding regarding ideological conflicts.  
H22a: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases if the 
civil conflict is fought over government. 
H22b: An external state is more likely to intervene on the government side when the 
civil conflict is fought over government. 
Conflict Intensity: 
In addition to the contextual factors discussed above, there are also changing 
contextual conditions of the civil conflict that affect foreign leaders’ decision making. 
Intensity of a conflict is one those changing contextual conditions that potential 




leaders are more likely to be alarmed by the situation. Worsening conditions pose 
bigger and more credible threats to other states, especially to those which have 
strategic interests in the conflict state. Growing intensity of the conflict may also 
trigger interventions that motivate reactionary interventions by additional states. To 
sum up, this study argues that as the intensity of a conflict increases, leaders are more 
likely to perceive the situation as posing threats or opportunities and consequently 
they would be more likely to intervene. However, conflict intensity can increase the 
probability of foreign military intervention on either side. Therefore, conflict intensity 
is not expected to have a discernible impact on whose side an external state 
intervenes. The only hypothesis that can be formulated is the following: 
H23: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases as the 
intensity of the civil conflict increases.  
Refugees: 
Another changing contextual condition related to the civil conflict is the 
number of refugees. A growing number of refugees creates social and economic 
problems for neighboring countries but it also indicates that the civil conflict is 
becoming more violent and destructive. In addition to the number of battle deaths 
caused by the civil conflict, foreign leaders are also concerned about the increasing 
number of refugees because it is another sign that the civil conflict is escalating. 
Therefore, as the number of refugees originating from the conflict country increases, 
external states are more likely to intervene. Similar to the situation with conflict 




military intervention on either side. Hence, it is not expected to have a discernable 
impact on whose side an external state intervenes. Only one hypothesis is proposed. 
H24: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases as the 
number of refugees resulting from the civil conflict increases.  
Relative Capabilities of Opposition:  
The last contextual factor that is likely to affect foreign leaders’ decision 
making is the military capabilities of the opposition relative to the government in the 
civil conflict. Since foreign military intervention changes the balance of capabilities 
between domestic disputants, leaders pay attention to this contextual factor while 
deciding whether and on whose side to intervene. Gent (2008) argues that external 
states are more likely to become involved in civil conflicts when military intervention 
has the greatest marginal effect on producing the outcome preferred by the third 
party. Based on this logic, government and rebel biased interventions should be more 
likely when the government is facing a stronger opposition.  
When there is a weak rebel group, the government is likely to win the conflict 
without foreign military support. However, strong rebel groups provide a credible 
threat to the survival of the government. External states that are sympathetic towards 
the government are more likely to intervene militarily to help the government when it 
is fighting a stronger rebel group. On the other hand, external states that are biased in 
favor of rebels should also be more likely to intervene when the rebel group is 
stronger because they would want to increase the probability of rebel victory. 
Following Gent’s argument, this study expects the probability of foreign military 




capabilities of the opposition increase. Since stronger opposition increases 
intervention probability on both sides, only the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H25: The probability of military intervention by an external state increases as rebels’ 
fighting capacity against the government increases.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to present a unified theoretical framework 
that combines actor-oriented and conflict-oriented approaches in the intervention 
literature. Since military intervention is a foreign policy instrument, the synthesis has 
been conducted by making potential intervener’s foreign policy decision making 
theoretically central to the study. Hypotheses on international and domestic factors 
that are likely to affect leaders’ intervention decision have been derived from 
modified realism because the modified realist framework is able to account for both 
international and domestic sources of foreign policy decisions as well as the 
systematic linkages between them. Attention has also been paid to the contextual 
conditions related to the civil conflict that influence foreign leaders’ intervention 
decision. Hypotheses were formulated about the contextual factors that are most 
likely to be relevant for leaders’ decision making calculus a result of using a unified 
theoretical approach.  
The hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework in this chapter will be 
tested against all states in the international system to uncover universal patterns about 
the rationale behind foreign military interventions. Then, these hypotheses will be 




autocracies to understand the relative importance of critical factors for each group of 
state and to check the robustness of empirical results.  
Research design of this study and the methods used to test the hypotheses are 










The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research design of this study. The 
first part of the chapter will discuss the cases included in the dataset, data collection 
and coding procedures, as well as the operationalization of the dependent and 
independent variables. After presenting the data, this chapter will explain the 
statistical models employed to test the hypotheses. Other important methodological 
issues related to the research design will also be covered in the second part of the 
chapter.  
Dataset 
The dataset used in this study includes actual and potential interveners in all 
civil conflicts between 1946 and 2002. Potential interveners consist of all states in the 
international system, except the conflict state.
2
 Civil conflicts are drawn from the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Each 
observation is a pair of actual or potential intervener and conflict state. Intervener-
conflict state dyads are observed from the year the civil conflict starts until the year it 
ends. Thus, the data format is time-series cross-sectional which captures the changes 
in variables on a yearly basis. 
                                                 
2
 Micro states that have a population of less than 500,000 people are also excluded from the 
group of potential interveners in the international system. Exclusion of micro states is quite 





The UCDP/PRIO dataset uses a lower threshold of battle deaths to identify 
civil conflicts in the world as opposed to other civil conflict datasets that use much 
higher thresholds and consequently exclude many cases of intrastate disputes. For 
instance, the COW project only covers civil wars and requires a minimum 1000 battle 
deaths per year for a conflict to qualify as a case of civil war (Sarkees and Wayman 
2010). Regan requires a total of 200 fatalities in order to include a civil conflict in his 
dataset (Regan 2000). UCDP/PRIO, on the other hand, has a threshold of 25 battle 
deaths per year which makes it possible to analyze the variation in intervention 
behavior of foreign powers in civil conflicts with different levels of violence. Thus, 
the opportunity to test the hypotheses in this study against a larger number of cases 
that vary in conflict intensity is the primary reason for selecting the UCDP/PRIO 
dataset.  
The UCDP/PRIO dataset defines an armed conflict as “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in 
at least 25 battle-related deaths” (UCDP/PRIO Codebook version 4-2010, p. 1). There 
are four types of armed conflicts in the UCDP/PRIO dataset: extra-systemic such as 
anti-colonial wars, interstate, intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts. This 
study includes only the last two categories of conflicts from the UCDP/PRIO dataset 
that began between 1946 and 2002.  
The UCDP/PRIO dataset considers all armed conflicts within one country 
over separate territories as distinct conflicts and all armed conflicts over government 




conflicts over government and over different territories within the same country, the 
termination dates of armed conflicts are still problematic as a result of this coding 
rule. For example, all governmental disputes, such as coups, that are 10 years apart or 
armed conflicts triggered by different rebel groups regarding the same territory that 
occur 20 years apart are treated as part of the same conflict. In order to distinguish 
between conflicts within a country over government or over the same territory which 
are quite apart in time and to be able to treat them as separate cases of civil conflicts 
in the dataset, this dissertation developed several coding rules to identify end dates for 
conflicts within a country.  
The conflict termination criteria developed in this study to deal with the 
problem of recurring conflict in the UCDP/PRIO dataset are based on the following 
rules. If a peace agreement or complete military victory ends the conflict and the 
conflict is inactive for at least three consecutive years, then it is considered 
terminated. If the conflict restarts within three years of the peace agreement or 
military victory, then it is considered as the continuation of the same conflict. If it 
restarts after three years, then it is coded as a new conflict. A conflict can also 
terminate as a result of inactivity despite the lack of a clear outcome. If no peace 
agreement or complete military victory occurs but the conflict becomes inactive 
meaning there are no battle-related deaths taking place for at least five years, then it is 
also considered terminated. If the conflict restarts within a period of five years, then it 
is considered the same conflict. When the conflict restarts after a period of five years 




The choice of three year or five year intervals depending on the conflict 
situation was made for two reasons. First, there are quite a number of civil conflicts in 
the UCDP/PRIO dataset that restart after two years despite the existence of a peace 
agreement or a complete victory by the government. Hence, two years seem to give 
enough time to the same rebel organizations to remobilize after a government victory 
or after a peace agreement they are not satisfied with. Moreover, these rebel groups 
tend to be supported by the same external parties when the conflict restarts in two 
years, which indicates that interveners also view it as a continuation of the same 
conflict. Therefore, the second reason has to do with the perception of potential 
interveners. The data patterns reveal that three or five year intervals are long enough 
periods for potential interveners to perceive it as a new conflict with different 
dynamics and ground conditions instead of continuation of the same conflict that is 
experiencing a lull or remobilization period during which rebels continue to receive 
external military support. Thus, the conflict termination criteria in this study have 
been developed carefully by paying attention to both conflict dynamics and potential 
interveners’ perception of the conflict. Three and five year periods are sufficiently 
cautious guidelines for determining whether or not a civil conflict is terminated as 
well as for deciding whether an intervention occurs in a new conflict or during the 
same conflict. As a result of applying the conflict termination criteria developed in 
this study to the UCDP/PRIO dataset, 232 civil conflicts are identified between 1946 
and 2002. Appendix A provides a complete list of these civil conflicts.  
In order to identify the instances of biased military interventions in these 232 




were incompatible with each other as a result of having different formats and 
operationalization rules, a number of coding and merging procedures were developed 
in order to compile the intervention cases. This study defines military intervention as 
“convention-breaking” military activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country 
directed at “changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target 
state” which are finite and transitory (Rosenau 1969, pp. 161-162). Military 
interventions are operationalized as the supply of troops, military equipment, 
intelligence and logistical support, air or naval support to one of the sides in a civil 
conflict. The cases of military interventions that fit the definitional criteria of this 
study were identified from six different datasets that provide information on 
interventions. Depending on the time period and the types of conflicts covered in each 
dataset, intervention cases were cross-checked in at least two of these data sources. 
Whenever there was an inconsistency between two datasets or when an intervention 
instance was included only in one dataset, additional sources were checked to decide 
if a case qualifies for inclusion according to the definitional criteria of this study.   
The UCDP/PRIO dataset identifies the states that actively support one of the 
sides in a civil conflict with troops. The information on these biased military 
interventions is provided within the category of internationalized civil conflicts. 
However, the UCDP/PRIO dataset excludes other types of military interventions that 
are included in this study. In order to collect information on all cases and types of 
military interventions, this study also looked at four intervention datasets that are 
frequently used in the literature. These four data sources are Regan’s dataset on 




Tillema’s dataset on foreign overt military interventions between 1945 and 1985 
(Tillema 1989), Pearson and Baumann’s international military intervention (IMI) 
dataset between 1946 and 1988 (Pearson and Baumann 1993), and the updated IMI 
dataset by Kisangani and Pickering which covers international military interventions 
between 1989 and 2005 (Kisangani and Pickering 2008). Finally, external support 
data from the 2001-2003 release of the Minorities at Risk Dataset were also used to 
supplement those four intervention datasets (Minorities at Risk 2009). Thus, the 
military intervention data used in this study is a synthesis of different datasets in the 
literature and can be described as an updated collection of military intervention data 
which have been cross-checked and supplemented by multiple sources to study 
foreign military interventions as thoroughly as possible. 
Table 4.1 shows the number of civil conflicts that experienced foreign military 
interventions while Table 4.2 presents the total number of military interventions in 
the dataset according to their targets. In addition, Appendix B provides a complete list 
of all military interventions in the dataset. A civil conflict can have multiple military 
interventions by different states during a conflict year as shown in Appendix B.  
 
Table 4.1: Trends in Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts 
 
Total # of civil conflicts between 1946-2002 232 100% 
Civil conflicts with military intervention  142 61% 







Table 4.2: Military Interventions according to their Targets in Civil Conflicts 
 
Total # of military interventions between 1946-2002 2,285 100% 
Military interventions on government side 1,056 46% 
Military interventions on rebel side 1,229 54% 
 
As mentioned above, the dataset used in this study includes both the actual 
and the potential interveners in the 232 civil conflicts between 1946 and 2002. 
Potential interveners are included in the dataset to avoid the selection bias problem 
some quantitative studies in the literature suffer from. Examining causes of third 
party interventions by testing hypotheses against cases of interventions is 
methodologically flawed due to selecting on the dependent variable. A research 
design that tests hypotheses against cases of intervention by actual interveners as well 
as cases of non-intervention by potential interveners solves this selection bias 
problem and provides more accurate results. Given that each pair of actual/potential 
intervener and conflict state is observed from the year the civil conflict starts until the 
year it ends, the total number of observations in the dataset is 209,685.  
Dependent Variables 
Since this dissertation examines the factors that affect external states’ 
decisions regarding whether and on whose side to intervene militarily in civil 
conflicts, there are two dependent variables in this study and both of them are 
dichotomous. The first dependent variable, intervention, measures whether or not the 
external state intervened militarily at a given year during the life of the civil conflict. 
If a potential intervener carried out a military intervention in a conflict state in that 




intervenes in multiple years while the conflict is continuing, each of those dyad years 
receives a coding of 1. Table 4.2 shows that 2285 observations received a coding of 1 
for the first dependent variable among the 209,685 dyad years in the dataset.  
The second dependent variable, intervention side, measures whether the 
external state intervened on the side of the government or rebels. If the first 
dependent variable equals 1 indicating that military intervention took place in that 
particular dyad year, then the second dependent variable is coded as well. 
Interventions on the government side are coded as 1 while interventions on the rebel 
side are coded as 0. According to Table 4.2, 1056 military interventions were on the 
side of the government out of the 2285 military interventions in the entire dataset.  
Appendix C provides detailed descriptions, coding rules and sources for both 
the dependent variables and the independent variables which are discussed briefly in 
the following section.  
Independent Variables 
Independent variables that are used in this study are discussed in four separate 
subsections. 
International Sources of Intervention 
This subsection covers the independent variables which are used to test the 
hypotheses on the international sources of military intervention. 
Three different variables are constructed to examine the role of interstate 
rivalry between an external state and a conflict state as well as between interveners 




between the external state and the conflict state in a given dyad year to test 
hypotheses 1a and 1b. Rival intervention, on the other hand, indicates whether a rival 
of the external state intervened militarily in the conflict state during that particular 
year. A third variable also examines whether the rival intervention took place on the 
rebel side or not. These two variables are used to test hypotheses 10a and 10b. The 
source for rivalry data is the New Rivalry Dataset, 1816-2001 (Klein, Goertz and 
Diehl 2006). Hypotheses 2a and 2b are examined by another dichotomous variable 
that measures whether a militarized interstate dispute exists between the external state 
and conflict state in a given dyad year. The data source for this variable is the COW 
Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset v4.01 (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).  
Similar to rivalry, hypotheses on alliance ties are tested with three different 
variables. Alliance is a dichotomous variable indicating whether there is a formal 
alliance between the external state and the conflict state in a dyad year. Defense pacts, 
neutrality pacts, non-aggression pacts and ententes are considered as alliances. Ally 
intervention measures whether an ally of the external state intervenes militarily in the 
conflict state in that year. Finally, a third variable looks at whether the ally intervenes 
militarily on the government side or not. The last two variables are used to test 
hypotheses 11a and 11b. The source for alliance data is the COW Formal Alliances 
Dataset v4.1 (Gibler 2009). Hypotheses 4a and 4b on the historical ties between the 
external state and the conflict state are tested with a dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if the conflict state was a former colony of the external state. However, it can also 




source used to code this variable is the ICOW Colonial History Dataset v0.4 (Hensel 
2009).  
Two different variables are employed to test hypotheses 5 and 6 which 
examine the impact of geographic proximity on the probability of military 
intervention. The first one, contiguous, is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the 
potential intervener and the conflict state are separated by land or river border 
according to the COW Direct Contiguity Data v3.1 (Stinnett et al. 2002). The second 
variable, same region, indicates whether the potential intervener and the conflict state 
are in the same geographical region as defined by the COW Project. These five 
geographical regions are Africa, Asia, Americas, Europe and Mideast.  
Lootable and non-lootable resources in the conflict state are measured by two 
proxy variables that are used for testing hypotheses 7 and 8. The existence of 
secondary diamonds is used as a proxy for lootable resources in the conflict state and 
these data are taken from the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) Diamond 
Dataset (Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala and Rod 2005). The existence of petroleum 
deposits, on the other hand, is used as a proxy for non-lootable resources in a conflict 
state. Both oil and gas deposits are considered as petroleum deposits according to the 
PRIO Petroleum Dataset v1.2 (Lujala, Rod and Thieme 2007).  
Finally, to examine the impact of trade ties on military intervention, a 
continuous variable measuring the amount of trade per dyad year between the 
potential intervener and the conflict state is constructed from the available data in the 
COW Dyadic Trade Dataset v2.01 (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009). Variables 




state B and the imports of state B from state A respectively. The sum of those two 
variables gives the total amount of trade between a potential intervener and a conflict 
state per dyad year in current U.S. millions of dollars.  
Control Variables 
This study also controls for several important international factors that are 
likely to influence the intervention behavior of states. The first control variable 
measures whether or not a potential intervener is involved in an interstate war in a 
given dyad year. The data source for this variable is the COW Militarized Interstate 
Dispute Dataset v4.01. Power status is a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the 
potential intervener is identified as a major power by the COW Project. This variable 
is generated by the EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000). Capabilities of the 
external state relative to the conflict state are measured by a continuous variable that 
is generated by calculating the ratio of potential intervener’s CINC (Composite Index 
of National Capability) score to the conflict state’s CINC score for each dyad year. 
The CINC scores of countries are taken from the COW National Material Capabilities 
Dataset v4.0 (Singer 1987). Finally, Cold War is a dichotomous variable coded as 0 
after 1989.  
Domestic Sources of Intervention 
This subsection discusses the independent variables which are used to test the 
hypotheses on the domestic sources of military intervention. 
Regime types of potential interveners are measured using the Polity IV Project 




polity2 score of seven or higher. Two different variables are used to test the 
hypotheses on regime similarity. Joint democracy equals 1 when both the potential 
intervener and the conflict state in the dyad have a polity2 score of seven or higher. 
Joint autocracy, on the other hand, is coded as 1 when both the potential intervener 
and the conflict state in the dyad have a polity2 score of six or less.  
Two dichotomous variables are employed to test hypotheses 18a and 18b 
which examine the impact of ethnic ties on the probability of military intervention. If 
the external state and the conflict state have the same dominant ethnic group, then the 
first ethnic ties variable is coded as 1. The second ethnic ties variable equals 1 when 
the dominant ethnic group in the external state is the second largest ethnic group in 
the conflict state and the dominant ethnic group in the conflict state is the second 
largest ethnic group in the external state. Both of these variables are constructed from 
Gartzke and Gleditsch replication data (2006).  
Finally, two variables that are used to test the hypotheses regarding domestic 
unrest are composed from the Domestic Conflict Event Data section of the Cross-
National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks 2008). Elite unrest consists of government 
crises and/or purges while mass unrest includes general strikes, riots, anti-government 
demonstrations, and/or civil conflicts. Both variables are measured dichotomously 
where 1 indicates that some type of domestic unrest which qualifies as elite or mass 
unrest took place in the potential intervener state in that dyad year.  
Contextual Sources of Intervention 
The last subsection discusses the independent variables which are employed to 




A conflict state is considered democratic if it has a polity2 score of seven or 
higher according to the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011). The type 
of civil conflict is also a dichotomous variable which is coded as 1 when it is 
governmental and as 0 when it is a territorial conflict based on the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset (version 4, 2010). Battle deaths measure the number of 
battle-related fatalities in the conflict state per dyad year and the data source for this 
variable is the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset v3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). 
Refugees, another discrete variable, indicate the number of refugees originating from 
the conflict state per conflict year. These data are generated from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees Statistical Online Population Database. The last 
contextual variable related to the civil conflict conditions is the fighting capacity of 
rebels relative to the government in the conflict state. This is an ordinal variable with 
three categories identified as low, moderate or high fighting capacity rated relative to 
government forces in the conflict state. These data are taken from the Non-State 
Actor Data v3.3 (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2012). Table 4.3 presents 











Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Dependent Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Intervention 209,685 .011 .104 0 1 
Intervention side 209,685 .005 .0708 0 1 
Independent Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
International      
Rivalry 209,685 .014 .115 0 1 
Rival intervention 209,199 .040 .195 0 1 
Rival intervention on rebel side 209,199 .018 .132 0 1 
Militarized dispute 206,085 .010 .099 0 1 
Alliance 209,685 .047 .211 0 1 
Ally intervention 209,685 .086 .280 0 1 
Ally intervention on govt. side 209,685 .072 .258 0 1 
Historical ties 209,685 .006 .075 0 1 
Contiguous 209,685 .031 .172 0 1 
Same region 209,685 .202 .402 0 1 
Secondary diamonds 209,685 .379 .485 0 1 
Petroleum 209,685 .799 .401 0 1 
Trade  209,685 134.889     930.722    .0005 148,503 
Domestic      
Democratic intervener 206,047 .316     .465           0 1 
Joint democracy 205,235 .085     .279          0 1 
Joint autocracy 205,235 .507     .499           0 1 
Ethnic ties 1 209,653 .023     .151           0 1 
Ethnic ties 2 209,653 .019     .136           0 1 
Elite unrest  205,942 .181      .385           0 1 
Mass unrest 209,685 .397     .489           0 1 
Contextual      
Democratic target  208,863 .261     .439           0 1 
Conflict type 209,685 .285     .451           0 1 
Battle deaths 209,685 2,977         13,019   13 350,000 
Refugees 209,685    198,897     601,026           1 6,339,096 
Rebel fighting capacity 209,685 1.252     .472           1 3 
Control Variables      
War involvement 209,685 .038     .192           0 1 
Major power 209,685 .040     .197           0 1 
CINC ratio   209,685 -.777     2.330   -9.08    8.637 







The goal of this dissertation is to understand the rationale behind military 
interventions by examining the factors that affect states’ decisions regarding whether 
and on whose side to intervene in civil conflicts. As discussed in the theory chapter, 
some of the factors that are hypothesized to influence leaders’ decision making on 
whether or not to intervene are also expected to affect their decision on whose side to 
intervene. In other words, this study argues that these two decisions are closely linked 
and examining their interdependence is important from a theoretical standpoint. Since 
choosing the right method to test all aspects of theory is critical for empirical 
research, this study applies a statistical model that can examine the relationship 
between these two decisions while also testing the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical framework.  
The relationship between the two outcomes of interest in this study can be 
examined by a selection model which can simultaneously estimate the two equations 
on the decision to intervene and on whose side to intervene. If the selection model 
finds a systematic linkage between the two dependent variables, then it provides 
correct estimates for the second equation by taking this relationship into account 
(Reed 2000, Lemke and Reed 2001).  
Given that both dependent variables are dichotomous, the appropriate 
statistical technique for this study is censored probit. Censored probit is the 
equivalent of a Heckman selection model but in a censored probit model, there is a 
probit model in the selection equation and a probit model in the outcome equation. 




and to provide unbiased estimates for the outcome equation if selection bias exists. It 
is important to clarify what the cause of selection bias actually is. In studies that use 
selection models, such as this one, observations are not randomly selected into the 
second equation since the second dependent variable is only observed if the first 
dependent variable is observed. In other words, there is a selected or censored sample 
for the second equation. The “nonrandom aspect of the sample is what is commonly 
misunderstood” as the selection bias problem (Sartori 2003, p. 114). Sartori argues 
that this nonrandom aspect of the sample does not on its own bias the estimation of 
the outcome equation (2003, p. 114). The most important selection bias problem has 
to do with the correlation between the error terms of the outcome and selection 
equations. When the error term of the outcome equation is correlated with the error 
term of the selection equation, it means there is a systematic relationship between the 
two dependent variables and hence the two equations have to be estimated 
simultaneously in a selection model. If the outcome equation is estimated separately 
from the selection equation, it produces biased and inconsistent results (Heckman 
1979, Sartori 2003). In short, correlation between the errors of two equations is the 
major cause of selection bias problems because it indicates that the selection process 
and the outcome process are not independent of each other.  
By using a selection model, one can simultaneously analyze two equations 
and estimate the rho which is the correlation between the errors of two equations. If 
rho is not statistically significant, then errors are uncorrelated and the two dependent 
variables can be analyzed in two separate equations. However, if errors are correlated 




model necessary. In other words, a statistically significant rho indicates that the 
factors that influence the first outcome are correlated with those that influence the 
second outcome and estimating the second equation separately would lead to biased 
results. Selection model corrects for this correlation while estimating the outcome 
equation (Greene 2003, pp. 781-785). Reed notes that estimating the statistical link 
between the two error terms allows one to correct for the direct and indirect influence 
of the selection process on the outcome process (Reed 2000). Therefore, analyzing on 
whose side third parties intervene separately may lead to biased results and inaccurate 
inferences if there is a statistical link between the error terms of the selection and 
outcome equations. To the degree that common factors influence both decisions, 
studying them separately will lead to biased results (Clark and Reed 2003, p. 82). 
This study already posits that the decisions on whether and on whose side to intervene 
are linked. Thus, estimating the correlation between the error terms of two equations 
will clarify this relationship and “hint at the strength of the actual link between” the 
two dependent variables (Reed 2000, p. 86).  
In light of the theoretical arguments made in this study as well as the 
methodological issues discussed above, the most appropriate statistical technique for 
modeling the probability of intervention and the side on which intervention occurs is 
censored probit. The first equation of the censored probit analysis, which is called the 
selection stage, will test the hypotheses related to the probability of intervention. The 
second equation of the censored probit analysis, which is called the outcome stage, 
will test the hypotheses related to the target of intervention. Censored probit will 




dependent variables and will also report a rho parameter indicating the correlation 
across the dependent variables’ disturbance terms. If the rho parameter is statistically 
significant, censored probit is clearly the most suitable method to estimate the direct 
effects the variables have on the dependent variable in each equation, but also the 
indirect effects they may have on the second dependent variable by affecting the 
probability of intervention.  
A censored probit model makes this research design fully equipped to analyze 
both the decision to intervene and on whose side to intervene while also examining 
the interdependence between these two outcomes of interest. Since it is reasonable to 
suspect that the two decisions are not independent of each other, the rare utilization of 
selection models in the intervention literature is surprising. The use of a censored 
probit model is one of the strengths of this research design compared to other studies 
on interventions. 
Censored probit analysis will be used to test the hypotheses regarding the 
decision to intervene and on whose side to intervene against all third parties in the 
dataset. After testing hypotheses against all observations, this study will also employ 
censored probit analyses to examine different subsamples in the dataset. These 
additional analyses will be used to check the robustness of results and to understand 
the relative importance of critical factors on the intervention behavior of major 
powers, democracies and autocracies.  
Other Methodological Issues related to the Research Design 
The research design of this study has several advantages over the majority of 




cross-sectional data format enables one to analyze the impact of changing conditions 
over time. Second, the censored probit model is useful for examining the 
interdependence between the two dependent variables. However, there are some 
additional methodological issues that need to be addressed since the data structure is 
time-series cross-sectional with a binary dependent variable which Beck et al. refer to 
as BTSCS data (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). 
BTSCS data tend to suffer from heteroskedasticity and temporal dependence 
which threaten proper inference (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). 
In order the deal with the problem of heteroskedasticity, this study uses Huber-White 
robust standard errors clustered on potential intervener-conflict state dyads. Using 
robust standard errors clustered over dyads addresses the problem of 
heteroskedasticity and the fact that observations for the same potential intervener-
conflict state dyad may not be independent. As Doyle and Sambanis note, “clustering 
allows one to relax the assumption of independence among” same dyad observations 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000, p. 786).  
Observations in BTSCS data are also likely to be temporally dependent which 
violates the independence assumption and leads to biased results as Beck et al. 
demonstrate (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). Therefore, it is necessary to control for 
time dependence in BTSCS analysis. This study uses the correction method 
developed by Beck et al. (1998) to control for time dependence. All analyses include 
spell years and cubic splines as functional forms for the baseline duration 
dependency. Spell years variable counts how many years have passed since the 




account of the fact that the probability of intervention depends both on whether or not 
there was a previous intervention by the same third party state and on how many 
years have passed since the previous intervention. Spell years and cubic splines in the 
dataset are created by the BTSCS software program provided by Tucker (1999).  
Another statistical concern involves missing data. Data collected for the 
majority of the independent variables were available for all 209,685 dyad years while 
data collected for the remaining variables, except two of them, were available for 
almost 98 percent of the observations. The two variables with a lot of missing data 
were trade and refugees. Data on trade were available for 165,981 dyad years which 
is approximately 80 percent of the dataset. Since trade is a critical variable in the 
model, list-wise deletion would cause losing 20 percent of the data in the empirical 
analysis. Furthermore, list-wise deletion would also introduce sample selection bias 
and produce biased estimates because trade data were not available for a particular 
group of countries and were not missing randomly. Therefore, this study used the 
mean substitution method to replace the missing trade data for 20 percent of the 
observations. In the case of refugees, only 67 percent of the observations were 
available. In order to avoid list-wise deletion, this study also replaced the missing 
values for refugee data with the mean value for 33 percent of the observations. 
However, given that one third of the refugee data is substituted with the mean value, 
this study uses the refugees variable in only one model to examine its impact. The 
number of refugees is used as an indicator of conflict intensity for civilian population. 
Since the number of battle deaths is another important indicator of conflict intensity, 




variable that evaluates the impact of economic relations between a potential 
intervener and a conflict state in the theoretical model. Therefore, trade is included in 
all models while the refugees variable is only included in one model to examine its 
impact.  
Attention has also been paid to avoiding multicollinearity in the models. Two 
separate models assess the impact of regime type and regime similarity on the 
dependent variables because the high correlation between the two prevents them to be 
included in the same model. The first model includes regime type of the potential 
intervener and regime type of the conflict state. The second model examines the 
impact of regime similarity by including joint democracy and joint autocracy as two 
separate variables in the analysis. Finally, some of the independent variables are 
lagged one year to ensure temporal order in all empirical analyses. In addition to 
Appendix C, results tables in Chapters 5 and 6 also provide information on which 
variables are lagged in the analyses.  
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the hypotheses by listing the independent 
variables and their hypothesized relationship with dependent variables which will be 
analyzed in the next two chapters. Chapter 5 will test these hypotheses in the entire 
dataset as well as in the sub-sample of major powers. Chapter 6 will present a 
comparative analysis and test these hypotheses against democratic and autocratic 
states. After presenting the results from statistical analyses, both chapters will discuss 
the significance of empirical findings with respect to the theoretical arguments made 





Table 4.4: Independent variables and their hypothesized relationship with 
dependent variables  
 
Hyp. Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 International Intervention Government side 
H1a, 1b Rivalry + - 
H10a Rival intervention + na 
H10b Rival intervention on rebel side na + 
H2a, 2b Militarized dispute + - 
H3a, 3b Alliance + + 
H11a Ally intervention + na 
H11b Ally intervention on govt. side na + 
H4a, 4b Historical ties + + 
H5 Contiguous + na 
H6 Same region + na 
H7a, 7b Secondary diamonds + - 
H8a, 8b Petroleum + + 
H9a, 9b Trade  + + 
 Domestic   
H16a, 16b Democratic intervener - + 
H17a, 17b Joint democracy + + 
H17a, 17b Joint autocracy + + 
H18a Ethnic ties 1 + na 
H18b Ethnic ties 2 + na 
H19 Elite unrest  - na 
H20 Mass unrest - na 
 Contextual   
H21a, 21b Democratic target  - - 
H22a, 22b Government conflict + + 
H23 Battle deaths + na 
H24 Refugees + na 
H25 Rebel fighting capacity + na 
 Control Variables   
H12 War involvement - na 
H13 Major power + na 
H14 CINC ratio   + na 












This chapter is divided into three sections. First section presents the results of 
statistical analyses that were performed using the entire dataset while the second 
section reports the results from the statistical analyses conducted in the sub-sample of 
major powers. Results are interpreted in light of the hypotheses postulated in Chapter 
3. The final section concludes with a comparative analysis of the empirical findings 
from the first two sections and discusses their theoretical and substantive significance. 
Empirical Findings from the Full Sample 
This section focuses on the empirical findings from the statistical analyses that 
were conducted using the entire dataset. The following sub-sections present the 
statistical results, interpret their statistical significance and discuss their theoretical 
and substantive implications.  
Statistical Models 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, three different models are used to test the 
hypotheses. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, regime type and regime 
similarity variables are examined in two different models. The first model includes 
the regime type variables for the third party state and the conflict state while the third 
model replaces these variables with the regime similarity variables. Finally, the 
second model adds the refugees variables to the first censored probit model. Since 
one third of the refugees data is substituted with the mean value for missing data, this 




These three censored probit models are presented in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. 
As a result of randomly missing observations, the number of dyad years used in the 
selection equation of each censored probit model is 199,180 which constitute 95% of 
the dataset. The number of uncensored observations, which refer to the number of 
dyad years with intervention, is 2223 in each outcome equation. Hence, 97% of the 
intervention years are used while estimating the outcome equations.  
Examination of the correlation matrix from each analysis shows little reason 
for concern about multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in each censored 
probit model, with the highest absolute level of correlation occurring between the 
variables conflict type (as indicated by government conflict) and battle deaths at 
0.523. Since the rest of the correlations are much smaller, there is no evidence of 
significant multicollinearity among the independent variables.  
In each of the censored probit analyses, the model chi-square rejects the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero. In the first model, the 
correlation between the two equations, rho, is 0.65 which is greater than a zero 
correlation. The hypothesis that rho equals zero is rejected at the 1% level based on 
the Wald test of independent equations. The statistically significant rho in the first 
analysis shows that the two dependent variables are linked and the use of a censored 
probit model is justified. The statistical findings regarding the correlation between the 
two equations are very similar in the other two models. Since the findings show the 
existence of selection bias and indicate that the two decisions are linked, the use of a 
censored probit model is appropriate for this study. In other words, running a separate 




estimated separately from the selection equation that analyzes the decision to 
intervene.  
This study argues that the decisions on whether to intervene and on whose 
side to intervene are closely related and some of the same factors that influence 
foreign leaders’ decisions to intervene also influence which side they support. Given 
that many of the independent variables that are hypothesized to affect the second 
dependent variable also appear in the selection equation, the coefficients of the 
variables in the outcome equation are affected by the presence of the same variables 
in the selection equation. The statistically significant rho in all three models already 
proves the linkage between the two dependent variables but the value of rho is also 
useful for substantive interpretation of the coefficients in the outcome equation. The 
indirect impact of variables in the selection equation must be taken into account while 
interpreting the coefficients of those same variables in the outcome equation. Rho 
facilitates the calculation of this indirect impact and allows one to interpret 
coefficients correctly in the outcome equation. In short, the direct and indirect effect 
of explanatory variables on the second dependent variable can only be estimated in a 
censored probit analysis that takes into account the statistically significant linkage 
between the dependent variables. Hence, the use of censored probit is not only 
appropriate but also necessary to understand the substantive impact of the variables. 
The substantive impact of the variables will be discussed after the results from 






Table 5.1: Model 1 - Censored Probit Results for Full Sample 
 
Selection Equation        Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variables Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ .506**** (.132) -.613*** (.238) 
Militarized dispute ~ .588**** (.130) -.213* (.128) 
Alliance ~ .055 (.085) .457*** (.153) 
Historical ties .796**** (.182) .822**** (.253) 
Contiguous .754**** (.108) - 
Same region .401**** (.078) - 
Secondary diamonds .075 (.066) -.354** (.171) 
Petroleum  .192*** (.064) .411*** (156) 
Trade (logged) ~ .045**** (.013) .207**** (.032) 
Rival intervention ~ .678**** (.078) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .908**** (.167) 
Ally intervention ~ .285**** (.078) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .621*** (.243) 
Democratic intervener ~ -.263**** (.063) .029 (.207) 
Ethnic ties 1 .378**** (.116) - 
Ethnic ties 2 .407*** (.133) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.163**** (.046) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.140**** (.042) - 
Democratic target ~ -.057 (.083) -.581*** (.212) 
Government conflict .051 (.065) -.006 (.161) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .154**** (.015) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.190**** (.047) - 
War involvement ~ -.192*** (.063) - 
Major power .521**** (.088) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .166**** (.016) - 
Cold War  .005 (.046) - 
Spell years -.921****(.045) -.418***(.158) 
Constant -3.014**** (.134) -2.963**** (.465) 
N Total obs. = 199180 Uncensored obs. = 2223 
Wald Chi-square = 361.99**** 
Rho = .648 (.147) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 9.23*** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 





Table 5.2: Model 2 - Censored Probit Results for Full Sample 
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ .493**** (.130) -.613*** (.233) 
Militarized dispute ~ .575**** (.131) -.217* (.128) 
Alliance ~ .068 (.085) .463*** (.152) 
Historical ties .777**** (.183) .810**** (.252) 
Contiguous .741**** (.108) - 
Same region .398**** (.077) - 
Secondary diamonds .085 (.066) -.345** (.171) 
Petroleum  .155** (.064) .378*** (.152) 
Trade (logged) ~ .051**** (.013) .210**** (.032) 
Rival intervention ~ .673**** (.077) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .907**** (.167) 
Ally intervention ~ .268**** (.076) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .605*** (.242) 
Democratic intervener ~ -.265**** (.062) .029 (.205) 
Ethnic ties 1 .378**** (.115) - 
Ethnic ties 2 .428**** (.133) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.161**** (.046) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.136**** (.042) - 
Democratic target ~ -.137 (.084) -.529** (.217) 
Government conflict .013 (.064) -.035 (.165) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .137**** (.016) - 
Refugees (logged) ~ .060**** (.011) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.177**** (.047) - 
War involvement ~ -.189*** (.063) - 
Major power .516**** (.088) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .166**** (.017) - 
Cold War  .020 (.046) - 
Spell years -.928****(.045) -.431***(.156) 
Constant -3.513**** (.168) -3.307**** (.545) 
N Total obs. = 199180 Uncensored obs. = 2223 
Wald Chi-square = 370.52**** 
Rho = .660 (.144) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 9.72*** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 





Table 5.3: Model 3 - Censored Probit Results for Full Sample 
 
Selection Equation        Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ .531**** (.134) -.561*** (.223) 
Militarized dispute ~ .580**** (.130) -.178 (.126) 
Alliance ~ .048 (.085) .345** (.151) 
Historical ties .768**** (.108) .974**** (.202) 
Contiguous .750**** (.182) - 
Same region .424**** (.079) - 
Secondary diamonds .071 (.066) -.351** (.162) 
Petroleum  .191*** (.064) .390*** (.154) 
Trade (logged) ~ .040*** (.013) .225**** (.033) 
Rival intervention ~ .705**** (.081) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .817**** (.178) 
Ally intervention ~ .264**** (.077) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .650*** (.227) 
Joint democracy ~ .058 (.149) .584* (.325) 
Joint autocracy ~ .178*** (.065) .519**** (.160) 
Ethnic ties 1 .349*** (.117) - 
Ethnic ties 2 .407*** (.136) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.150**** (.046) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.149**** (.042) - 
Government conflict .048 (.064) -.011 (.161) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .148**** (.015) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.201**** (.047) - 
War involvement ~ -.173*** (.064) - 
Major power .532**** (.088) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .158**** (.017) - 
Cold War .017 (.045) - 
Spell years -.920****(.045) -.411***(.149) 
Constant -3.130**** (.149) -3.689**** (.412) 
N Total obs. = 199180 Uncensored obs. = 2223 
Wald Chi-square = 365.11**** 
Rho = .653 (.145) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 9.59*** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 






Table 5.4: Summary of Support for Hypotheses  
 
Hyp. Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 International Intervention Government side 
H1a, 1b Rivalry supported supported 
H2a, 2b Militarized dispute supported weakly supported 
H3a, 3b Alliance not supported supported 
H4a, 4b Historical ties supported supported 
H5 Contiguous supported na 
H6 Same region supported na 
H7a, 7b Secondary diamonds not supported supported 
H8a, 8b Petroleum supported supported 
H9a, 9b Trade  supported supported 
H10a Rival intervention supported na 
H10b Rival intervention on rebel side na supported 
H11a Ally intervention supported na 
H11b Ally intervention on govt. side na supported 
 Domestic   
H16a, 16b Democratic intervener supported not supported 
H17a, 17b Joint democracy not supported weakly supported 
H17a, 17b Joint autocracy supported supported 
H18a Ethnic ties 1 supported na 
H18b Ethnic ties 2 supported na 
H19 Elite unrest  supported na 
H20 Mass unrest supported na 
 Contextual   
H21a, 21b Democratic target  not supported supported 
H22a, 22b Government conflict not supported not supported 
H23 Battle deaths supported na 
H24 Refugees supported na 
H25 Rebel fighting capacity opposite found na 
 Control Variables   
H12 War involvement supported na 
H13 Major power supported na 
H14 CINC ratio   supported na 
H15 Cold War not supported na 
 
Table 5.4 summarizes the support the results lend to each hypothesis 
postulated for both dependent variables to make discussion easier. The table presents 
whether or not each hypothesis is supported based on the statistical significance and 




statistically significant but its effect is the opposite of what was hypothesized, then 
Table 5.4 reports that finding as well.  
As shown in Table 5.4, a very large portion of the hypotheses are supported 
for both dependent variables in all of the three censored probit analyses conducted by 
using the full sample. The hypotheses that receive support are the same across all 
three models. The particular findings regarding the hypotheses on regime type, 
refugees and regime similarity reported in the table come from Models 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. Finally, a couple of the hypotheses are categorized as receiving 
relatively weaker support due to the statistical significance of results at the 90% level. 
The rest of the hypotheses are supported at higher significance levels as can be seen 
in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.  
The majority of the hypotheses on the international sources of intervention 
decision receive support. Factors related to the strategic significance of the conflict 
state such as rivalry and disputes with the conflict state, historical ties, geographic 
proximity, trade ties and the existence of petroleum in the conflict state increase the 
probability of military intervention. Foreign powers are also more likely to become 
involved militarily when their rivals or allies intervene in a civil conflict. As 
hypothesized, all of these international factors also influence how third parties choose 
sides in a civil conflict when they intervene. Among the hypotheses that are not 
supported by the results, one of them is the existence of alliance ties between the 
external state and the conflict state. Alliance ties do not seem to influence the 
intervention decision of leaders, but they have a significant effect on the second 




leaders to intervene in a civil conflict, they increase the probability of intervention on 
the government side if an external state decides to intervene, most likely due to other 
international and domestic factors that receive support in the selection equation. 
Similarly, the existence of secondary diamonds in the conflict state does not affect the 
probability of intervention but it does decrease the probability of intervention on the 
government side (and increase the likelihood of pro-rebel intervention) if a third party 
intervenes in the civil conflict.  
Hypotheses regarding the domestic sources of intervention decisions receive 
more support in the selection equation compared to the outcome equation. Ethnic ties 
with the conflict state and domestic unrest influence leaders’ decision on whether or 
not to intervene as hypothesized in Chapter 3. Democracies are also less likely to 
intervene in civil conflicts compared to autocracies as expected. On the other hand, 
regime type does not seem to affect leaders’ decision on whose side to intervene 
because democratic leaders are not more likely to intervene on the government side 
than autocracies. Finally, regime similarity increases the probability of intervention 
for autocratic states but the same cannot be said for democracies since regime 
similarity does not seem to motivate democratic leaders to intervene in civil conflicts. 
However, when democratic leaders decide to intervene in a civil conflict, probably 
due to reasons other than regime similarity, they are more likely to intervene on the 
government side if the conflict state is democratic. Since autocracies are also more 
likely to support the government side when the conflict state is autocratic, it can be 




decision on whose side to intervene. In terms of the decision on whether or not to 
intervene, regime similarity matters only for autocracies. 
Hypotheses related to the contextual sources of intervention receive the least 
amount of support in all three models. Regime type of the conflict state does not 
affect the intervention decision as democracies are not more or less likely to attract 
military intervention compared to autocracies. However, democratic conflict states 
are less likely to experience pro-government intervention than autocratic conflict 
states if intervention does occur. The only exception to this finding seems to happen 
when interveners are democratic because joint democracy increases the likelihood of 
pro-government intervention as mentioned above. The type of civil conflict also does 
not matter for the decision on whether and on whose side to intervene. The results 
show that the impact of rebel fighting capacity on the probability of intervention is 
the opposite of what was expected theoretically. As rebels’ fighting capacity increases 
relative to the government forces, foreign leaders are less likely to intervene in civil 
conflicts. The only contextual variables that affect the intervention probability in the 
hypothesized way are the number of battle deaths and refugees per conflict year. Both 
of these contextual variables have a positive relationship with the probability of 
intervention. 
Finally, all control variables except one have the hypothesized relationship 
with the intervention decision. Involvement in an interstate war constrains military 
intervention behavior of states. As expected, increasing relative capabilities of third 




a statistically significant impact on the probability of intervention according to the 
results from all three models.  
As an additional robustness check, this study also employed rare events logit 
to analyze the first dependent variable. Intervention occurs in less than 2% of the 
observations in the dataset. King and Zeng show that standard logit or probit 
estimation tends to underestimate the probability of rare events (King and Zeng 
2001). Rare events logit is a correction method developed by these scholars for rare 
events data. The differences between the rare events logit results and the results from 
the selection equation of the censored probit analysis are negligible with all variables 
significant at same levels. The results from rare events logit analyses which are 
consistent with the results from the first stage of censored probit analyses provide 
additional confidence in the findings on the hypothesized relationships. Appendix D 
provides the results from relogit models.  
Interpretation of Results 
After reviewing the censored probit results in terms of the support they 
provide to the hypotheses, it is now useful to discuss the substantive impact of the 
statistically significant variables on the two dependent variables. In a linear model, 
the marginal effect of x on y is the same as the effect of a one unit increase in x on y 
which is due to the linearity of the model. However, this is not the case in a binary 
response model due to the non-linearity of the model. A marginal effect in a binary 
response model is the effect of a very small change in x on the probability of y=1. 
This is rarely what one wants to know about. Instead, it is more useful to know how 




Therefore, it makes more sense to calculate first differences in this study because a 
first difference is just the change in the probability that y=1 associated with some unit 
change in x.  
Tables 5.5 presents the changes in the predicted probability of intervention=1 
when the variable of interest increases by one unit or some number of units depending 
on the nature of the variable. The table indicates the unit change for each independent 
variable while calculating the first differences. First differences are only calculated 
for the statistically significant variables from all three models but in order to avoid 
repetition they are only computed once. The changes in the probability of intervention 
reported in Table 5.5 are also calculated by holding all continuous variables at their 
means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their modes in the respective 
model they were computed in. Table 5.6 indicates the changes in the predicted 
probability of pro-government intervention=1 when the variable of interest changes 
by one unit or some number of units as reported in the table. First differences for the 
second stage of censored probit analysis are calculated in the same manner for the 
most part. However, the substantive impact of statistically significant variables in the 
outcome equation is the sum of their direct and indirect effects on the probability of 
observing pro-government intervention if those variables also appear in the selection 
equation. The substantive impact of independent variables reported in Tables 5.5 and 







Table 5.5: Changes in the Predicted Probability of Intervention  
     
When this variable moves  
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of intervention  
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Rivalry   0 → 1 16.46% [8.62%   24.30%] 
Militarized dispute  0 → 1 17.23% [9.59%   24.87%] 
Historical ties    0 → 1 19.64% [10.37%   28.91%] 
Contiguous     0 → 1 19.12% [12.21%   26.03%]  
Same region   0 → 1 14.17% [7.48%   20.86%] 
Petroleum   0 → 1 7.08% [2.64%   11.52%] 
Trade    p25 → p75 
Trade    min → max 
0.83% 
1.45% 
[0.27%   1.39%] 
[0.53%   2.37%] 
Rival intervention    0 → 1 18.31% [10.78%   25.84%] 
Ally intervention     0 → 1  12.44% [5.86%   19.02%] 
Democratic intervener   0 → 1 -10.62% [-16.51%   -4.73%] 
Ethnic ties 1   0 → 1 13.35% [5.26%   21.44%] 
Ethnic ties 2   0 → 1 14.39% [6.31%   22.47%] 
Elite unrest     0 → 1 -5.64% [-9.35%   -1.93%] 
Mass unrest    0 → 1 -4.19% [-7.12%   -1.26%] 
Battle deaths   p25 → p75 
Battle deaths   min → max 
3.47% 
5.02% 
[1.69%   5.25%] 
[2.28%   7.76%] 
Rebel fighting capacity  1 → 2 
Rebel fighting capacity  1 → 3 
-4.68% 
-6.84% 
[-7.53%   -1.83%] 
[-10.19%   -3.49%] 
War involvement    0 → 1 -7.14% [-11.72%   -2.56%] 
Major power   0 → 1 16.73% [7.37%   26.09%] 
CINC ratio   p25 → p75 
CINC ratio   min → max 
4.37% 
6.21% 
[1.95%   6.79%] 
[2.44%   9.98%] 
Model 3:   
Joint autocracy     0 → 1 7.43% [3.19%   11.67%] 
Model 2:   
Refugees    p25 → p75 
Refugees    min → max 
1.18% 
2.14% 
[0.55%  1.81%]  
[1.02%  3.26%]  
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
selection equations in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The probabilities are calculated by holding all 
continuous variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their 
modes. * indicates 90% confidence interval. 
 
Table 5.5 shows that international factors in general have the largest 
substantive impact on the probability of military intervention compared to domestic 




the predicted probability of intervention more than 19 percent. Previous military 
interventions by rival states increase the probability of intervention by 18 percent as a 
result of changing the strategic significance of the civil conflict for third parties, while 
previous military interventions by allies increase the probability of intervention by 12 
percent. Hostile relations with the conflict state also play a critical role in the 
intervention decision of leaders because the existence of militarized disputes and 
rivalry have the next largest effects. In addition, major powers are almost 17 percent 
more likely to intervene than minor powers. On the other hand, international factors 
associated with the economic importance of the conflict state such as trade ties and 
the existence of petroleum have much smaller effects on military intervention 
probability compared to the rest of the international factors. 
Among the domestic factors, ethnic ties have the largest impact on the 
likelihood of intervention compared to regime characteristics of third parties and the 
existence of domestic unrest which might constrain foreign policy decision making. 
Ethnic ties with the dominant or the second largest ethnic group in the conflict state 
increase the probability of military intervention by 13 to 14 percent. Democracies are 
10.6 percent less likely to intervene than autocracies while regime similarity with the 
conflict state increases intervention probability of autocratic third parties by 7.4 
percent. Finally, elite unrest constrains leaders’ intervention decision more than mass 
unrest based on the findings. However, domestic unrest in general has the smallest 
impact, with -4 to -5.6 percent, on the intervention decision of leaders with respect to 




factors among international sources of intervention, increases intervention probability 
by 7 percent. 
Contextual factors related to the changing conditions of the civil conflict have 
a smaller impact than domestic factors on the probability of intervention. As the rebel 
fighting capacity relative to the government forces changes from low to moderate, the 
likelihood of military intervention decreases by 4.7 percent. However, when the rebel 
fighting capacity is high, intervention probability decreases by almost 7 percent. This 
negative relationship is the opposite of what was expected. Number of battle deaths 
and refugees per year are the only two civil conflict attributes that increase the 
probability of intervention among all contextual factors. As the number of battle 
deaths change from minimum to maximum, the probability of intervention increases 
by 5 percent while this change is only 2 percent in the case of refugees.  
Control variables also have a relatively important impact. Involvement in an 
interstate war decreases intervention probability by 7 percent while increasing relative 
capabilities have a positive relationship with the military intervention behavior of 
states. As the ratio of capabilities goes from minimum to maximum, intervention 
likelihood rises by more than 6 percent.  
Table 5.6 indicates that international factors also have the largest substantive 
impact on whose side foreign powers intervene. Intervention by a rival state on the 
rebel side increases pro-government military intervention probability by 40 percent. 
On the other hand, intervention by an ally on the government side increases pro-
government intervention likelihood more than 20 percent. It can be concluded that 




effect on whose side foreign powers intervene. The existence of historical ties also 
has a large impact as it increases pro-government intervention by 34 percent. The last 
international factor with a sizable effect on the side decision is rivalry with the 
conflict state because it decreases pro-government intervention by 23 percent whereas 
alliance ties increases the probability of intervening on the government side by 15 
percent.  
Table 5.6: Changes in the Predicted Probability of Government Intervention 
 
When this variable moves  
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of govt. intervention 
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Rivalry      0 → 1 -23.12% [-36.98%   -9.26%] 
Militarized dispute    0 → 1  -9.34% [-18.02%    -0.66%] * 
Alliance    0 → 1 15.31% [6.42%    24.20%] 
Historical ties    0 → 1 34.28% [16.74%    51.82%] 
Secondary diamonds     0 → 1 -12.62% [-21.96%    -3.28%] 
Petroleum    0 → 1 14.17% [4.49%    23.85%]  
Trade    p25 → p75 
Trade    min → max 
6.83% 
8.76% 
[3.17%    10.49%] 
[4.58%    12.94%] 
Rival intervention rebel side 0 → 1 40.67% [24.80%    56.54%] 
Ally intervention govt. side   0 → 1 23.73% [9.35%    38.11%]  
Democratic target    0 → 1 -20.46% [-31.36%    -9.56%] 
Model 3:   
Joint democracy    0 → 1 19.18% [7.62%   30.74%] * 
Joint autocracy    0 → 1 16.72% [9.88%   23.56%] 
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
outcome equations in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The probabilities are calculated by holding all 
continuous variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their 
modes. * indicates 90% confidence interval.   
 
Domestic factors related to regime characteristics have the second largest 
effect on the intervention side decision. Regime similarity with the conflict state 
increases pro-government intervention by 17 percent for autocracies and by 19 




likely to experience pro-government interventions during civil conflicts and are more 
likely to experience pro-rebel interventions.  
Resource wealth of the conflict state does not seem to have a critical impact 
on the decision to intervene. However, lootable and non-lootable resources clearly 
matter in terms of which side to support once leaders decide to intervene in a civil 
conflict. The existence of secondary diamonds decreases the probability of pro-
government intervention by more than 12 percent while petroleum in the conflict state 
increases the likelihood of pro-government intervention by 14 percent. Therefore, the 
type of resources in a conflict state have a significant impact on the side decision 
even though resource wealth itself may not motivate third parties to intervene in a 
civil conflict. Finally, trade ties have the smallest substantive impact on the 
probability of intervention as reported in Table 5.5, but increasing trade ties with the 
conflict state has a bigger impact on the probability of supporting the government 
side once a military intervention decision is taken.  
Discussion of Findings from the Full Sample 
The findings from the censored probit analyses show strong support for a 
majority of the hypotheses on the international and domestic sources of intervention 
derived from the modified realist framework. The findings from the full sample are 
important theoretically and empirically because some of these international and 
domestic factors have not been adequately analyzed before in quantitative studies of 
intervention. This is one of the few quantitative studies that extensively examines the 
role of critical international and domestic factors on the intervention decision as a 




modified realist framework. While the analyses provide an improved understanding 
of the particular international and domestic factors that motivate leaders to intervene 
militarily in civil conflicts, they also provide novel findings on others. Finally, by 
using a combination approach this study is able to show how contextual factors 
related to civil conflict attributes matter for potential interveners in comparison to the 
international and domestic sources of foreign policy decision making.  
The findings show significant support for most of the hypotheses on the 
international sources of intervention and some of these have not been tested before. 
According to Tables 5.5 and 5.6, international factors related to the strategic 
significance of the conflict state such as historical ties, contiguity and hostile relations 
with the conflict state are quite critical for the intervention decision. While several 
previous studies have found that historical ties and contiguity increase the probability 
of intervention, only one previous study analyzed the impact of rivalry on 
intervention probability (Findley and Teo 2006). The findings here show that both 
rivalry and other hostile relations with the conflict state, such as the existence of 
militarized disputes, can increase the likelihood of intervention dramatically.  
Quantitative studies also have not analyzed the strategic nature of intervention 
decisions sufficiently. In comparison, the strategic environment of civil conflicts has 
been explored extensively in case studies. Findley and Teo’s study (2006) is one of 
the few quantitative studies that analyzes how interventions can occur as reactive 
responses to previous interventions. This study also shows that interventions by rivals 
and allies have a substantial impact on the intervention decision of foreign leaders by 




related to the strategic significance of the conflict state and the strategic reactions of 
interveners to each other make this analysis quite critical.  
Moreover, by analyzing the decisions on whether and on whose side to 
intervene in a selection model, this study is able to show how the relative effects of 
certain international factors differ for each outcome. One of the striking examples 
from Tables 5.5 and 5.6 is alliance ties. Two previous studies have found that alliance 
ties increase the probability of intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004, Findley and Teo 
2006). This study, on the other hand, finds that while alliance ties are important for 
choosing sides in a civil conflict, they do not necessarily increase the probability of 
intervention. In other words, alliance ties do not seem to motivate states to intervene 
in a civil conflict. The use of a selection model to examine the relationship between 
the decisions on whether and on whose side to intervene offers a more nuanced 
understanding of how alliance ties affect intervention behavior. Similarly, the 
economic significance of the conflict state has a greater impact on how third parties 
choose sides than on their probability of intervention. As Table 5.6 indicates, the type 
of resources in a conflict state can affect a third party’s decision on whose side to 
intervene. Both the findings on trade ties and resource wealth of the conflict state 
contribute to the current literature by examining the economic significance of the 
conflict state for potential interveners which have not been addressed adequately in 
previous studies. This study shows that while economic factors are not as critical as 
the other international factors when states are deciding to intervene, they can have a 




Domestic factors have the next largest effect after international factors 
according to the censored probit analyses from the full sample. Ethnic ties with the 
conflict state population seem to motivate foreign leaders more than other domestic 
factors while deciding to intervene militarily. While confirming the previous findings 
in the ethnic conflict literature on the role of ethnic ties in intervention decisions, this 
finding also shows that leaders seeking support at home take into account the ethnic 
composition of the population and their constituents’ ethnic ties when formulating 
foreign policies as modified realism expects.  
Although it has a smaller substantial effect than ethnic politics, regime type of 
a country also proves to be quite significant for understanding intervention behavior. 
As hypothesized, democracies are less likely to intervene in civil conflicts than 
autocracies; but when they do intervene, democracies are more likely to intervene on 
behalf of democratic governments instead of against them. This is one of the first 
studies which finds that democracies are less likely to intervene in civil conflicts. 
Lemke and Regan (2004) find that regime type has no significant impact on 
intervention behavior whereas according to Kathman (2011) democracies are more 
likely to intervene in civil conflicts.  
Additionally, this is also one of the few studies that shows how regime 
similarity can play a crucial role when third parties choose sides in a civil conflict. 
For instance, similar to Lemke and Regan (2004), this dissertation finds that joint 
democracy does not affect the probability of military intervention. However, this 
study demonstrates that joint democracy increases the probability of intervening on 




about the impact of regime similarity on choosing sides in a civil conflict. Moreover, 
this study also contributes to the literature by showing that joint autocracy increases 
both the probability of intervention and the probability of intervening on the 
government side.  
Finally, Lemke and Regan (2004) find that democracies involved in civil 
conflicts are more likely to experience foreign intervention while Kathman (2011) 
argues that democracies are less likely to attract military interventions. The censored 
probit analyses from the full sample lead to a different conclusion about the 
relationship between the regime type of the conflict state and the probability of 
intervention. This study shows that democratic conflict states are no more or less 
likely to experience military interventions than autocracies. However, the findings 
from both the outcome and selection equations suggest that foreign powers are less 
likely to intervene on the side of the government when the conflict state is democratic 
unless the intervener is democratic itself. In other words, regime similarity appears to 
motivate democracies to intervene on the side of government. In short, the censored 
probit analyses from the full sample make important contributions to the nascent 
debate between regime type and intervention behavior in civil conflicts by offering 
new as well as nuanced findings.  
Contextual factors related to civil conflict attributes have a much smaller 
substantive impact on the probability of intervention compared to international and 
domestic factors which also indicate that an actor-oriented approach is more useful 
for understanding the rationale behind foreign military interventions. The only two 




are conflict intensity indicators. The results show that increasing number of battle 
deaths and refugees also increase the probability of intervention confirming previous 
findings by Lemke and Regan (2004) and Findley and Teo (2006). However, the 
substantive impact of these changing attributes of the civil conflict is less than almost 
all of the other factors in the model. The most important contextual factor turns out to 
be the fighting capacity of rebels relative to government forces, but the results 
demonstrate the opposite of Hypothesis 25 which was formulated based on Gent’s 
argument (2008). Foreign powers are less likely to intervene when rebels’ fighting 
capacity starts to balance or surpass government’s fighting capacity. This is a 
surprising finding which might indicate that foreign powers perceive military 
interventions to be more costly when the civil conflict has the potential to experience 
a stalemate situation.  
The findings from the full sample demonstrate that control variables such as 
power status, ratio of capabilities, or involvement in another interstate war also 
influence leaders’ decision making on intervention. However, bipolarity of the Cold 
War period does not have an impact on the intervention behavior of states which is an 
unexpected finding. In general, control variables have a bigger substantive impact on 
the decision to intervene than contextual variables which are derived from the 
conflict-oriented approach in the literature. 
The censored probit analyses conducted by using the entire dataset provide 
important results which lend support to many of the hypotheses in this study. 
Although these are important findings about the factors that motivate states to 




results in various sub-samples of the dataset. Moreover, while it is desirable to arrive 
at some generalizations regarding the rationale behind foreign military interventions, 
it is useful to analyze whether or not the same factors influence the intervention 
behavior of different types of states similarly. In other words, testing these hypotheses 
against different sub-samples of the dataset and comparing the substantive effect of 
variables on intervention behavior of different types of states facilitates a better 
understanding of this foreign policy behavior. As mentioned before, the robustness of 
findings from the entire dataset will be checked in three sub-samples. The following 
section tests the hypotheses of this study against major powers and the last section 
concludes this chapter by comparing the findings. 
Empirical Findings for Major Powers 
This section focuses on the empirical findings from the statistical analyses that 
were conducted within the sub-sample of major powers. The following sub-sections 
present the statistical results and interpret their statistical significance as well as 
substantive implications.  
Major powers consist of the United States, U.S.S.R/Russia, United Kingdom, 
France and China. The total number of observations for major powers in the dataset is 
7468 and as a group, they are responsible for 35% of the military interventions 
according to Table 5.7. The number of interventions by each major power is shown in 









Table 5.7: Military interventions according to power status of interveners 
 
 
Table 5.8: Military interventions by each major power 
 
 
Major Power # of interventions % 
United States 371 45.9% 
U.S.S.R./Russia 183 22.6% 
United Kingdom 39 4.8% 
France 86 10.6% 
China 130 16.1% 




The same three models are also used to test the hypotheses against major 
powers. These three censored probit models are presented in Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 
5.11. As a result of randomly missing observations, the number of dyad years used in 
the selection equation of each censored probit model is 7317 which constitute 98% of 
the major power sub-sample. The number of uncensored observations, which refers to 
the number of dyad years with intervention, is 799 in each outcome equation. Thus, 
almost 99% of the major power interventions are used while estimating the outcome 
equations. Finally, examination of the correlation matrix shows no evidence of 
significant multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in each censored probit 
model.  
Total # of military interventions between 1946-2002 2285 100% 
Military interventions by major powers 809 35% 




Table 5.9: Model 1 - Censored Probit Results for Major Powers 
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ -.065 (.166) -.874* (.524) 
Militarized dispute ~ .592**** (.172) .062 (.286) 
Alliance ~ .599**** (.134) .805*** (.302) 
Historical ties .649**** (.189) .966**** (.236) 
Contiguous .566* (.316) - 
Same region .115 (.150) - 
Secondary diamonds .109 (.114) -.440 (.301) 
Petroleum  .207* (.120) .513** (.226) 
Trade (logged) ~ .123**** (.031) .276**** (.058) 
Rival intervention ~ .607**** (.106) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .636**** (.174) 
Ally intervention ~ .363**** (.111) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .398* (.227) 
Democratic intervener ~ .080 (.121) -.243 (.215) 
Ethnic ties 1 -.440 (.387) - 
Ethnic ties 2 -.049 (.232) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.072 (.076) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.158*** (.060) - 
Democratic target ~ -.081 (.169) .038 (.241) 
Government conflict .067 (.112) -.088 (.207) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .147**** (.029) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.238*** (.092) - 
War involvement ~ -.011 (.083) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .305**** (.042) - 
Cold War  .173** (.089) - 
Spell years -1.326****(.099) -1.199****(.187) 
Constant -3.261**** (.416) -3.885**** (.859) 
N Total obs. = 7317 Uncensored obs. = 799 
Wald Chi-square = 354.40**** 
Rho = .831 (.067) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 11.83**** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 







Table 5.10: Model 2 - Censored Probit Results for Major Powers 
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ -.065 (.162) -.891* (.510) 
Militarized dispute ~ .593**** (.172) .053 (.291) 
Alliance ~ .601**** (.132) .815*** (.298) 
Historical ties .642**** (.189) .954**** (.236) 
Contiguous .558* (.316) - 
Same region .108 (.149) - 
Secondary diamonds .114 (.114) -.441 (.301) 
Petroleum  .181 (.119) .485** (.224) 
Trade (logged) ~ .126**** (.032) .278**** (.058) 
Rival intervention ~ .597**** (.105) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .632**** (.174) 
Ally intervention ~ .356**** (.110) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .386* (.231) 
Democratic intervener ~ .091 (.119) -.242 (.215) 
Ethnic ties 1 -.456 (.386) - 
Ethnic ties 2 -.013 (.233) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.072 (.075) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.159*** (.060) - 
Democratic target ~ -.040 (.173) .067 (.243) 
Government conflict .049 (.114) -.105 (.209) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .138**** (.028) - 
Refugees (logged) ~ .030* (.018) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.233*** (.092) - 
War involvement ~ -.011 (.083) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .303**** (.042) - 
Cold War  .180** (.088) - 
Spell years -1.325****(.098) -1.193****(.187) 
Constant -3.486**** (.485) -4.086**** (.950) 
N Total obs. = 7317 Uncensored obs. = 799 
Wald Chi-square = 352.84**** 
Rho = .822 (.067) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 11.76**** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 





Table 5.11: Model 3 - Censored Probit Results for Major Powers 
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ -.064 (.165) -.918* (.527) 
Militarized dispute ~ .605**** (.176) .130 (.292) 
Alliance ~ .579**** (.133) .779*** (.294) 
Historical ties .664**** (.187) 1.036**** (.226) 
Contiguous .535* (.302) - 
Same region .124 (.148) - 
Secondary diamonds .109 (.114) -.461 (.299) 
Petroleum  .204* (.120) .501** (.222) 
Trade (logged) ~ .129**** (.033) .297**** (.059) 
Rival intervention ~ .597**** (.104) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .629**** (.180) 
Ally intervention ~ .371**** (.110) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .436* (.233) 
Joint democracy ~ .004 (.178) .279 (.255) 
Joint autocracy ~ .209* (.124) .497** (.239) 
Ethnic ties 1 -.424 (.383) - 
Ethnic ties 2 -.041 (.230) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.081 (.076) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.149*** (.060) - 
Government conflict .067 (.111) -.079 (.212) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .148**** (.029) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.229*** (.091) - 
War involvement ~ -.009 (.084) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .305**** (.042) - 
Cold War .171** (.088) - 
Spell years -1.320****(.098) -1.194****(.185) 
Constant -3.433**** (.409) -4.433**** (.826) 
N Total obs. = 7317 Uncensored obs. = 799 
Wald Chi-square = 358.48**** 
Rho = .837 (.059) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 11.92**** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 






In each of the censored probit analyses, the model chi-square rejects the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero. In the first model, the 
correlation between the two equations, rho, is 0.83 which is far greater than a zero 
correlation. The hypothesis that rho equals zero is rejected at the 0.1% level based on 
the Wald test of independent equations. The statistical findings regarding the 
correlation between the two equations are very similar in the other two models. The 
statistically significant rho across all three models show that the two dependent 
variables are linked and the use of a censored probit model is necessary in the case of 
the major power sub-sample as well.  
In order to make discussion easier, Table 5.12 summarizes the support the 
results lend to each hypothesis postulated for both dependent variables. The table 
presents whether or not each hypothesis is supported based on the statistical 
significance and direction of independent variables across all three models. Some of 
the hypotheses are also categorized as receiving relatively weaker support due to the 
statistical significance of results at the 90% level. The rest of the hypotheses are 
supported at higher significance levels which can be seen in Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 
5.11.  
As shown in Table 5.12, a smaller number of hypotheses receive support in 
the major power sub-sample compared to the full sample. However, some of the 
statistical findings which support or reject the hypotheses for major powers are 
actually consistent with the results from the full sample. In other words, even though 




fewer hypotheses are supported in the case of major powers, results from the major 
power sub-sample share some important similarities with the full sample as well.  
 
Table 5.12: Summary of Support for Hypotheses  
 
Hyp. Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 International Intervention Government side 
H1a, 1b Rivalry not supported weakly supported 
H2a, 2b Militarized dispute supported not supported 
H3a, 3b Alliance supported supported 
H4a, 4b Historical ties supported supported 
H5 Contiguous weakly supported na 
H6 Same region not supported na 
H7a, 7b Secondary diamonds not supported not supported 
H8a, 8b Petroleum weakly supported supported 
H9a, 9b Trade  supported supported 
H10a Rival intervention supported na 
H10b Rival intervention on reb. side na supported 
H11a Ally intervention supported na 
H11b Ally intervention on govt. side na weakly supported 
 Domestic   
H16a, 16b Democratic intervener not supported not supported 
H17a, 17b Joint democracy not supported not supported 
H17a, 17b Joint autocracy weakly supported supported 
H18a Ethnic ties 1 not supported na 
H18b Ethnic ties 2 not supported na 
H19 Elite unrest  supported na 
H20 Mass unrest not supported na 
 Contextual   
H21a, 21b Democratic target  not supported not supported 
H22a, 22b Government conflict not supported not supported 
H23 Battle deaths supported na 
H24 Refugees weakly supported na 
H25 Rebel fighting capacity opposite found na 
 Control Variables   
H12 War involvement not supported na 
H14 CINC ratio   supported na 








There are remarkable similarities between the major power sub-sample and 
the full sample in the case of hypotheses on international sources of intervention 
while the most significant differences between the two samples are in the case of 
domestic sources of intervention. Almost all of the same hypotheses on the 
international sources of intervention receive support in the major power sub-sample 
and in the full sample. The major differences between the two sets of findings are 
related to rivalry-alliance relations and geographic proximity with the conflict state. 
While rivalry with the conflict state increases the probability of intervention in the 
full sample as hypothesized, it is not a significant factor motivating major powers to 
intervene in a civil conflict. Instead, alliance with the conflict state seems to be more 
important for major powers than rivalry. Even though alliance and rivalry relations 
have different impacts in the full sample and in the major power sub-sample, these 
factors affect the decision on whose side to intervene similarly in both samples as 
indicated by Tables 5.4 and 5.12. The second major difference in the major power 
sub-sample has to do with geographic proximity. Being in the same region with the 
conflict state does not affect the probability of major power intervention while this is 
a statistically significant factor in the full sample. Given that major powers have the 
capacity to intervene in civil conflicts taking place in different parts of the world, this 
is not a surprising finding. Finally, the hypothesis on secondary diamonds is not 
supported in both samples, but the existence of secondary diamonds is also not 
important when major powers choose sides in a civil conflict whereas in the full 




There are also important similarities between the two sets of findings with 
respect to the contextual and control variables. The only two contextual variables that 
seem to increase the probability of major power intervention are the number of battle 
deaths and refugees per conflict year which is consistent with the findings from the 
full sample. Although the hypothesis on rebel fighting capacity is not supported in the 
major power sample, the results are still consistent with the full sample because 
increasing rebel fighting capacity decreases the likelihood of major power 
intervention as well. The hypothesis on the ratio of capabilities is supported in both 
sets of analyses, but involvement in an interstate war does not have a statistically 
significant impact on the intervention behavior of major powers probably due to their 
greater ability compared to minor powers to become militarily involved in more than 
one conflict. The most important difference between the major power sub-sample and 
the full sample has to do with the impact of Cold War on intervention probability. 
Cold War increases the probability of military intervention in the case of major 
powers whereas Cold War does not have a statistically discernible effect in the full 
sample. Thus, the results from the major power sub-sample show that the bipolar 
structure of international system influenced the intervention behavior of major powers 
more than the rest of the countries.  
The role of domestic variables in the intervention decision of major powers 
seems to be very different. In the full sample, all of the domestic explanatory 
variables except joint democracy had a statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of military intervention whereas in the case of major powers only two 




probability of major power intervention while mass unrest decreases it. In terms of 
the second dependent variable, joint autocracy also has a positive relationship with 
pro-government intervention. Since none of the other explanatory factors receive 
support aside from these two domestic variables, it appears that domestic sources of 
foreign policy behavior are less critical for the intervention decision of major powers 
compared to international factors. However, it is still necessary to compare the 
substantive impact of these variables before arriving at such a conclusion.  
Interpretation of Results 
After reviewing the censored probit results from the major power sub-sample 
in terms of the support they provide to the hypotheses, it is now useful to discuss the 
substantive impact of statistically significant variables on the two dependent 
variables. Table 5.13 presents the changes in the predicted probability of 
intervention=1 when the variable of interest increases by one unit or some number of 
units as indicated in the table. First differences are calculated for the statistically 
significant variables from all three models, but in order to avoid repetition they are 
only computed once. Similarly, Table 5.14 presents the first differences for 
statistically significant variables from the outcome equations.  
As in the full sample, most of the same international factors have the largest 
substantive effect on the intervention decision of major powers according to Table 
5.13. Historical ties increase the probability of major power intervention by 
approximately 24 percent while intervention by a rival state raises it by almost 22 
percent. Both of these findings are consistent with the findings from the full sample 




Alliance with the conflict state increases the likelihood of military intervention by 21 
percent which is an important finding in the case of major powers because alliance 
does not have a statistically significant effect in the full sample. Militarized dispute 
with a conflict state and contiguity have the next largest substantive impact as can be 
seen in Table 5.13. However, even though militarized dispute with the conflict state 
increases the probability of intervention by 20 percent, it does not have a discernible 
effect on major powers’ decision on whose side to intervene in a civil conflict as 
indicated by Table 5.12. Finally, interventions by allies have a smaller impact, less 
than 10 percent, on the intervention decision of major powers than interventions by 
rivals. 
The two contextual variables, battle deaths and refugees, have the smallest 
substantive effect on the probability of major power intervention along with trade 
ties. On the other hand, the third contextual variable decreases the probability of 
intervention by 6 percent as rebels’ fighting capacity relative to the government 
forces increases. According to Table 5.13, rebel fighting capacity has a greater impact 
on the intervention decision of major powers than domestic variables because joint 
autocracy increases intervention likelihood by less than 6 percent while mass unrest 
decreases it by 3.4 percent. Therefore, compared to the results from the full sample, 
domestic factors have far less impact on the intervention probability of major powers 
in terms of both the number of statistically significant domestic variables as well as 






Table 5.13: Changes in the Predicted Probability of Intervention  
 
When this variable moves 
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of intervention  
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Militarized dispute   0 → 1     20.04% [9.11%   30.97%] 
Alliance    0 → 1      20.78% [9.85%   31.71%] 
Historical ties    0 → 1       23.72% [11.64%  35.80%] 
Contiguous    0 → 1     16.21% [3.56%   28.86%] * 
Petroleum    0 → 1     5.56% [1.39%   9.73%] * 
Trade    p25 → p75    
Trade    min → max 
0.97% 
2.12% 
[0.45%   1.49%] 
[1.08%   3.16%] 
Rival intervention    0 → 1     21.59% [10.72%   32.46%] 
Ally intervention     0 → 1     9.63% [4.84%   14.42%] 
Mass unrest    0 → 1      -3.43% [-5.04%   -1.82%] 
Battle deaths    p25 → p75   
Battle deaths    min → max 
1.49% 
2.77% 
[0.86%   2.12%] 
[1.95%   3.59%] 
Rebel fighting capacity   1 → 2  
Rebel fighting capacity   1 → 3 
-4.41% 
-6.03% 
[-7.76%   -1.06%] 
[-9.67%   -2.39%] 
CINC ratio    p25 → p75       
CINC ratio    min → max 
5.28% 
7.87% 
[2.36%   8.20%] 
[3.22%   12.52%] 
Cold War     0 → 1     4.74% [2.25%   7.23%]  
Model 3:   
Joint autocracy    0 → 1    5.82% [1.68%   9.96%] * 
Model 2:   
Refugees    p25 → p75 
Refugees    min → max     
0.48% 
1.03% 
[0.22%   0.74%] * 
[0.44%   1.62%] * 
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
selection equations in Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11. The probabilities are calculated by holding 
all continuous variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their 
modes. * indicates 90% confidence interval. 
 
 
The ratio of capabilities has a bigger impact on the intervention probability of 
major powers compared to its impact in the full sample. In fact, this control variable 
has the largest substantive effect after the group of international variables with the 
most critical impact on military intervention behavior. Finally, the probability of 
major power intervention is almost 5 percent higher during the Cold War period. 




structure of the international system plays a role in the intervention decision of major 
powers.  
There are some interesting results in terms of the substantive effects of 
variables on choosing sides in a civil conflict. Table 5.14 shows that historical ties 
with the conflict state increase the probability of intervening on the government side 
by more than 42 percent. After historical ties, rivalry and alliance with the conflict 
state have the highest substantive impact on the side decision. Although rivalry does 
not affect the probability of major power intervention, it does decrease the probability 
of intervening on the government side by almost 37 percent once major powers 
decide to intervene in a civil conflict. Alliance with the conflict state, on the other 
hand, increases the likelihood of pro-government intervention by 32 percent.  
 
Table 5.14: Changes in the Predicted Probability of Government Intervention 
 
When this variable moves 
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of govt. intervention  
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Rivalry      0 → 1 -36.62%  [-64.08%   -9.16%] * 
Alliance    0 → 1 32.03%  [17.95%   46.11%] 
Historical ties   0 → 1 42.48%  [22.36%   62.60%] 
Petroleum   0 → 1 13.79% [4.62%   22.96%]  
Trade    p25 → p75 
Trade    min → max 
3.86% 
5.93% 
[1.54%   6.18%] 
[2.87%   8.99%] 
Rival int. rebel side   0 → 1 21.36%  [10.24%   32.48%] 
Ally int. govt. side    0 → 1 9.97%  [1.28%   18.66%] * 
Model 3:   
Joint autocracy    0 → 1 12.84% [4.16%   21.52%] 
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
outcome equations in Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11. The probabilities are calculated by holding 
all continuous variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their 





In addition to the strategic significance of the conflict state, strategic 
interactions with the other interveners also have a critical impact on how major 
powers choose sides in a civil conflict. Previous intervention by a rival state on the 
rebel side increases the probability of intervening on the government side by more 
than 20 percent which is more than twice the size of the substantive impact of pro-
government interventions by allies. Similar to the results from the full sample, 
economic significance of the conflict country has a more crucial impact with respect 
to the decision on whose side to intervene than on the probability of intervention in 
the major power sub-sample. For instance, trade ties have one of the smallest 
substantive impacts on the probability of major power intervention but it increases the 
probability of intervening on the government side by almost 6 percent as the amount 
of trade reaches maximum. However, this is still a smaller substantive effect 
compared to the larger influence of other international factors. Table 5.14 indicates 
that the existence of petroleum in the conflict state can increase the probability of pro-
government intervention by almost 14 percent, which is a quite significant substantive 
effect. 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the only regime related variable 
that has a critical impact on the side decision of major powers is joint autocracy. 
Autocratic major powers are almost 13 percent more likely to support the government 
side when they intervene in a civil conflict taking place in an autocratic state. In fact, 
among the variables related to regime type, joint autocracy is the only one that has an 
impact on major powers’ intervention decisions which is quite different than the 




Discussion of Findings from the Major Power Sub-Sample 
The censored probit analyses conducted in the major power sub-sample 
provide an improved understanding of the factors that influence major powers’ 
decisions on whether and on whose side to intervene in civil conflicts. First and 
foremost, international factors play a more dominant role in the decision making of 
major powers compared to domestic and contextual factors. The strategic importance 
of the conflict state and interventions by rivals or allies which alter the strategic 
significance of the civil conflict as perceived by the major power have the largest 
substantive impact on the intervention probability of major powers. 
There are numerous historical examples where one can notice the impact of 
historical ties, rivalry and alliance relations with other interveners as well as 
economic factors on the intervention behavior of major powers in civil conflicts. For 
instance, France has frequently intervened militarily in the civil conflicts of its former 
colonies including Mauritania, Morocco, Lebanon and Chad. All of these military 
interventions were also on the government side as hypothesized. However, some of 
these examples show that there were other factors at play in addition to historical ties. 
In both Chad and Mauritania, French military interventions also took place in reaction 
to Libya’s military interventions on the rebel side because Libya was an interstate 
rival of France. Moreover, France has important trade ties with some of these 
countries, particularly Chad. Historical ties were also important in Russia’s military 
intervention on the government side in Tajikistan’s civil conflict between 1992 and 
1998. However, Russia’s pro-government intervention was also motivated by its 




also happens to have petroleum. All of these factors predict Russia’s intervention on 
the government side. Another example is Britain’s military intervention on the 
government side in Malaysia during 1963-1966. But in addition to historical ties, pro-
rebel intervention by Indonesia which was an inter-state rival of Britain was another 
motivating factor for this military intervention. Of course, alliance and rivalry 
relations with other interveners had a significant impact on intervention decisions of 
the superpowers during the Cold War as documented in many case studies. 
Contiguity is also important for major powers’ intervention behavior as demonstrated 
by Russia’s interventions in Afghanistan, Georgia and Iran or China’s interventions in 
Laos, Myanmar and India.  
Among the international factors that affect the probability of major power 
intervention, perhaps the more surprising finding is the importance of alliance ties 
with the conflict state which is not a significant factor in the full sample analysis. 
While rivalry with the conflict state does not necessarily motivate major powers to 
intervene, alliance ties play a critical role for major powers while deciding to 
intervene in a civil conflict. Protecting allied governments appears to be a more 
important motivation than removing rival governments. However, as the findings 
from the outcome equation show rivalry can be a deciding factor while choosing sides 
after major powers decide to intervene. This finding also shows the important 
contribution of selection models to the study of interventions because variables which 
may not be critical in the selection equation may have an important impact on how 




Another important finding from the major power sub-sample is the smaller 
effect of domestic factors on intervention probability of major powers. Joint 
autocracy and mass unrest are the only significant domestic variables in this sub-
sample. Thus, international factors, including control variables such as the ratio of 
capabilities and Cold War, are more crucial for understanding intervention decisions 
of major powers. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the findings from the full sample and major power sub-sample show 
significant support for a number of the hypotheses derived from modified realism. 
However, there are both important similarities and differences between the two sets 
of analyses. While the similarities indicate the robustness of some findings, the 
differences show that sub-sample analyses can be quite useful for a nuanced 
understanding of the intervention behavior of different types of states.  
In both sets of analyses, international variables are the most important factors 
motivating states to intervene in civil conflicts compared to domestic, contextual and 
control variables. Historical ties, contiguity, interventions by rivals or allies, 
militarized dispute with the conflict state have the most significant impact on the 
probability of military intervention. However, rivalry and alliance with the conflict 
state appear to have different impacts in the full sample and in the major power sub-
sample. The same group of international factors also influences how states, including 
major powers, choose sides in civil conflicts. Another similarity has to do with the 
role of contextual variables in both sets of analyses. Changing conflict intensity, as 




samples, but its effect is much smaller compared to other variables. The only 
exception is the effect of rebel fighting capacity on intervention probability because 
this variable is even more critical than some domestic considerations of leaders, such 
as mass or elite unrest, for deciding whether or not to intervene in a civil conflict.  
The biggest difference between the two sets of analyses comes from the 
domestic sources of intervention. Ethnic ties, regime related variables and both types 
of domestic unrest influence the probability of intervention in the full sample. In fact, 
ethnic ties have a quite large substantive effect on the intervention decision. There are 
also important findings from the full sample about the intervention propensity of 
democracies compared to autocracies. Moreover, regime characteristics of both the 
intervener and the conflict state are the most crucial group of factors for choosing 
sides in a civil conflict after the international factors. The major power sub-sample 
shows that the only regime related factor that matters for the intervention decision is 
joint autocracy. Autocratic major powers, which are U.S.S.R/Russia and China, are 
more likely to intervene on the side of autocratic governments in civil conflicts while 
joint democracy does not have the same impact for the other three major powers. 
However, ethnic ties and elite unrest do not seem to affect the intervention probability 
of any of the major powers. Thus, analyses from the major power sub-sample 
conclude that domestic factors do not play a critical role in the intervention decision 
of major powers and this finding proves how useful sub-sample analyses can be.  
Additional benefits of analyzing the major power sub-sample include 
discerning the impact of Cold War on major powers’ probability of intervention in 




between the decisions on whether and on whose side to intervene and show how same 
factors can have different substantive impacts on each dependent variable. The use of 
selection models also facilitates a nuanced understanding of certain factors, such as 
the economic significance of the conflict state, for the intervention decision in both 
the full sample and in the major power sub-sample.  
To sum up, the similarities between the full sample and major power sub-
sample indicate the robustness of some findings. The differences, on the other hand, 
provide an improved understanding of some factors that motivate major powers 
particularly. The study also aims to explore the similarities and differences between 
democracies and autocracies which have not been analyzed adequately in the 
literature. Moreover, since categorizing states based on regime type splits the dataset 
into two sub-samples, the analyses in the next chapter will be even more useful for 












This chapter examines the similarities and differences between democratic 
and autocratic third parties regarding their decisions on whether and on whose side to 
intervene in civil conflicts. While the analyses from the full sample indicate that 
regime type and regime similarity influence states’ intervention behavior, they are not 
able to show whether the remaining international, domestic and contextual factors 
affect the intervention decisions of democratic and autocratic leaders differently. The 
motives of potential interveners based on their regime type have not been explored 
sufficiently in the literature. In fact, there are only a small number of quantitative 
studies that specifically examine how democracies and autocracies differ in terms of 
their intervention behavior in civil conflicts (i.e. Hermann and Kegley 2001, Koga 
2011). Therefore, a comparative analysis of the factors that motivate democracies and 
autocracies to intervene militarily in civil conflicts can provide important theoretical 
and empirical insights.  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first purpose is to provide a 
thorough understanding of the factors that affect intervention decisions of democratic 
and autocratic leaders. A comparative analysis will shed light on the use of this 
foreign policy instrument by democracies and autocracies which has not been 
adequately analyzed in the context of civil conflicts yet. The second purpose is to 
check the robustness of findings from the full sample in two sub-samples. Since 




the analyses in this chapter will be particularly useful for checking the robustness of 
findings from the full sample. Split sample analyses are becoming more common in 
the literature for doing a robustness check and for comparing the effect of predictors 
in theoretically important sub-samples of the data (i.e. Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 
Heger and Salehyan 2007, Kathman 2010).  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents the 
results of the statistical analyses that were performed using the sub-sample of 
democratic third parties while the second section reports the results from the 
statistical analyses conducted in the sub-sample of autocratic third parties. Results are 
interpreted in light of the hypotheses postulated in Chapter 3 as well as in terms of 
their substantive effects. The final section of the chapter concludes by discussing the 
theoretical significance of the findings from the first two sections. 
Empirical Findings for Democracies 
This section focuses on the empirical findings from the statistical analyses that 
were conducted within the sub-sample of democracies. The following sub-sections 
present the statistical results, interpret their statistical significance and discuss their 
theoretical and substantive implications.  
Table 6.1 shows the number of observations in the dataset based on the regime 
type of potential interveners while Table 6.2 presents the number of military 
interventions conducted by democratic and autocratic states. 30% of the 2285 military 
interventions were carried out by democracies which make up 32% of the dataset. 
Autocracies, which constitute 68% of the dataset, were responsible for the remaining 




Table 6.1: Observations according to the regime type of potential interveners 
 
 




Two different censored probit models are used to test the hypotheses against 
democracies in the dataset. None of the models include the regime type variable for 
potential interveners since they are all democratic. The first censored probit model 
includes all the remaining explanatory variables in this study except the refugees 
variable. As a result of substituting one third of the refugees data which were missing 
with the mean value, this study takes a cautious approach and runs a separate model 
which adds the refugees variable to the first censored probit model.  
The two censored probit models are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Due to 
randomly missing observations, the number of dyad years used in the selection 
equation of each censored probit model is 62,768 which constitute more than 96% of 
the democratic sub-sample. The number of uncensored observations, which refers to 
the number of dyad years with intervention, is 664 in each outcome equation. Thus, 
98% of the interventions by democracies are used while estimating the outcome 
equations. Finally, examination of the correlation matrix from both analyses shows 
Total # of observations (excluding missing values) 206,047 100% 
Observations by democratic states 65,193 32% 
Observations by autocratic states 140,854 68% 
Total # of military interventions between 1946-2002 2285 100% 
Military interventions by democratic states 675 30% 




little reason for concern about multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in 
each censored probit model. The highest absolute level of correlation is between the 
variables conflict type (as indicated by government conflict) and battle deaths at 
0.494, while the rest of the correlations are much smaller. 
In both of the censored probit analyses, the model chi-square rejects the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero. In the first model, the 
correlation between the two equations, rho, is 0.81 which is far greater than a zero 
correlation. The hypothesis that rho equals zero is rejected at the 5% level based on 
the Wald test of independent equations. The statistical findings regarding the 
correlation between the two equations are very similar in the second model. Since 
both analyses show the existence of selection bias and indicate that the two decisions 
are linked, the use of a censored probit model is appropriate for the sub-sample of 
democracies as well.  
Table 6.5 summarizes the support the results lend to each hypothesis 
postulated for both dependent variables to make discussion easier. The table presents 
whether or not each hypothesis is supported based on the statistical significance and 
direction of the independent variables in both models. If a variable is statistically 
significant but its effect is the opposite of what was hypothesized, then Table 6.5 
reports that finding as well. Some hypotheses are also categorized as receiving 
relatively weaker support due to the statistical significance of results at the 90% level. 
The rest of the hypotheses are supported at higher significance levels as can be seen 





Table 6.3: Model 1 - Censored Probit Results for Democratic states  
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ .598*** (.225) -.014 (.275) 
Militarized dispute ~ .624**** (.190) -.515* (.288) 
Alliance ~ .164 (.141) .145 (.311) 
Historical ties .782**** (.181) .956**** (.216) 
Contiguous .652**** (.164) - 
Same region .355**** (.106) - 
Secondary diamonds -.230 (.239) -.383 (.251) 
Petroleum  .194* (.108) .020 (.196) 
Trade (logged) ~ .112**** (.022) .237**** (.047) 
Rival intervention ~ .570**** (.099) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .858**** (.226) 
Ally intervention ~ .190* (.110) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .405* (.245) 
Ethnic ties 1 .237** (.106) - 
Ethnic ties 2 .334* (.204) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.038 (.062) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.083 (.057) - 
Democratic target ~ .077 (.153) .453** (.216) 
Government conflict .091 (.116) -.514* (.297) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .152**** (.029) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.176** (.083) - 
War involvement ~ -.232** (.098) - 
Major power .571**** (.099) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .240**** (.029) - 
Cold War  -.007 (.074) - 
Spell years -1.031****(.093) -.808****(.168) 
Constant -3.758**** (.219) -3.429**** (.608) 
N Total obs. = 62768 Uncensored obs. = 664 
Wald Chi-square = 260.27**** 
Rho = .814 (.094) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 6.24** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 







Table 6.4: Model 2 - Censored Probit Results for Democratic states  
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ .602*** (.222) -.014 (.286) 
Militarized dispute ~ .609**** (.187) -.508* (.285) 
Alliance ~ .180 (.138) .145 (.317) 
Historical ties .766**** (.180) .951**** (.218) 
Contiguous .656**** (.161) - 
Same region .342**** (.105) - 
Secondary diamonds -.220 (.233) -.391 (.270) 
Petroleum  .156 (.106) .023 (.185) 
Trade (logged) ~ .119**** (.022) .238**** (.048) 
Rival intervention ~ .547**** (.099) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .839**** (.229) 
Ally intervention ~ .182* (.109) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .391 (.258) 
Ethnic ties 1 .243** (.114) - 
Ethnic ties 2 .375* (.209) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.039 (.062) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.075 (.056) - 
Democratic target ~ .149 (.159) .493** (.221) 
Government conflict .064 (.113) -.503* (.297) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .138**** (.031) - 
Refugees (logged) ~ .045** (.018) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.169** (.083) - 
War involvement ~ -.225** (.097) - 
Major power .560**** (.098) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .241**** (.029) - 
Cold War  -.008 (.073) - 
Spell years -1.036****(.092) -.800****(.173) 
Constant -4.135**** (.272) -3.501**** (.745) 
N Total obs. = 62768 Uncensored obs. = 664 
Wald Chi-square = 263.69**** 
Rho = .819 (.091) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 6.37** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 






Table 6.5: Summary of Support for Hypotheses  
 
Hyp. Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 International Intervention Government side 
H1a, 1b Rivalry supported not supported 
H2a, 2b Militarized dispute supported weakly supported 
H3a, 3b Alliance not supported not supported 
H4a, 4b Historical ties supported supported 
H5 Contiguous supported na 
H6 Same region supported na 
H7a, 7b Secondary diamonds not supported not supported 
H8a, 8b Petroleum weakly supported not supported 
H9a, 9b Trade  supported supported 
H10a Rival intervention supported na 
H10b Rival intervention on reb. side na supported 
H11a Ally intervention weakly supported na 
H11b Ally intervention on govt. side na weakly supported 
 Domestic   
H18a Ethnic ties 1 supported na 
H18b Ethnic ties 2 weakly supported na 
H19a Elite unrest  not supported na 
H20 Mass unrest not supported na 
 Contextual   
H17a, 17b Democratic target  not supported supported 
H22a, 22b Government conflict not supported opposite found 
H23 Battle deaths supported na 
H24 Refugees supported na 
H25 Rebel fighting capacity opposite found na 
 Control Variables   
H12 War involvement supported na 
H13 Major power supported na 
H14 CINC ratio   supported na 
H15 Cold War not supported na 
 
Table 6.5 shows that there are a lot of similarities between the democratic sub-
sample and full sample in terms of the hypotheses that receive support in the selection 
equations. On the other hand, more striking differences are observed between the two 
samples with respect to the outcome equation. A smaller number of hypotheses 




of democracies which indicates that some of the factors that are critical in the full 
sample do not play a role when democratic interveners are choosing sides in a civil 
conflict.  
All hypotheses on the international sources of intervention decisions receive 
support in the democratic sub-sample with the exception of alliance ties and the 
existence of secondary diamonds in the conflict state. Factors related to the strategic 
significance of the conflict state which include historical ties, contiguity, geographic 
region, hostile relations with the government, trade ties and the existence of 
petroleum in the conflict state have the hypothesized relationship with intervention 
probability. Interventions by rivals and allies also increase the likelihood of military 
intervention by changing the perceived strategic significance of the civil conflict.  
Similar to the full sample, alliance ties with the conflict state do not affect the 
probability of intervention by democracies. However, while alliance increases the 
probability of intervening on the government side in the full sample, it does not have 
any effect on how democratic interveners choose sides if they become militarily 
involved in the civil conflict. The existence of secondary diamonds in the conflict 
state also does not affect the intervention likelihood of democracies. Moreover, both 
lootable and non-lootable resources do not seem to be critical when democracies are 
choosing sides in a civil conflict whereas in the full sample both resources influence 
the side decision. The only observable effect in terms of the resource wealth of the 
conflict state is petroleum which increases the probability of military intervention by 
democratic third parties. Although the findings from the selection equation regarding 




outcome equation are quite different since neither alliance ties nor types of resources 
in the conflict state appear to be significant for how democracies choose sides when 
they intervene in a civil conflict. Moreover, rivalry with the conflict state also does 
not influence the side decision but it increases the probability of intervention in the 
democratic sub-sample similar to the full sample.  
The hypotheses on contextual variables which are supported in the full sample 
also receive support in the democratic sub-sample. Increasing number of battle deaths 
and refugees increase the probability of intervention by democratic states whereas 
higher rebel fighting capacity decreases it. Similar to the full sample, regime type of 
the conflict state does not affect the likelihood of intervention in the democratic sub-
sample; but if a democratic state intervenes, it is more likely to support the 
government side when the conflict state is democratic. Finally, the type of civil 
conflict also does not have a statistically significant impact on the intervention 
probability of democracies. However, the type of conflict influences the side decision 
in a surprising way when democracies intervene in intrastate disputes. Democracies 
are less likely to intervene on the government side when it is a governmental conflict 
and more likely to support the government if it is a territorial conflict. Although this 
relationship is the opposite of what was hypothesized, it is an interesting finding 
which indicates that democracies are less likely to give military support to rebels 
fighting for territorial autonomy or secession.  
One of the biggest differences between the full sample and the democratic 
sub-sample comes from the domestic sources of intervention. While ethnic ties 




domestic unrest appears to have an impact on democracies’ decision to intervene in a 
civil conflict. Based on the theoretical arguments in the literature discussed in 
Chapter 3, mass unrest was hypothesized to constrain democratic leaders’ 
intervention behavior while elite unrest was expected to compel them to resort to 
diversionary foreign policy behavior. Although neither of these hypotheses is 
supported in the censored probit analysis, the findings are consistent with Kisangani 
and Pickering’s (2007) conclusion that democracies do not resort to biased military 
intervention in civil conflicts as diversionary foreign policy behavior. Kisangani and 
Pickering argue that democracies resort to benevolent missions abroad only when 
they face elite unrest domestically, but decisions on military interventions in civil 
conflicts which the authors categorize as “high politics” related missions are not 
influenced by elite or mass unrest (2007, pp. 281, 284-285, 295). Therefore, this 
study confirms the findings by Kisangani and Pickering (2007) that neither mass nor 
elite unrest has a significant impact on the probability of military intervention by 
democracies. The potential impact of domestic unrest on democratic leaders’ foreign 
policy decision making is more likely to be observed on other types of foreign policy 
behavior as Kisangani and Pickering argue. 
All of the control variables have the hypothesized effect on the probability of 
intervention by democratic third parties except Cold War which is not statistically 
significant in the full sample as well. Involvement in an interstate war constrains 
military intervention behavior of democracies. Democratic major powers are also 




of capabilities increases the likelihood of military intervention in the democratic sub-
sample. 
As an additional robustness check, this study also employed rare events logit 
to analyze the first dependent variable. The results from rare events logit analyses 
conducted in the sub-sample of democracies are consistent with the results from the 
first stage of censored probit analyses which provide additional confidence in the 
findings on the hypothesized relationships. Appendix D provides the results from 
relogit models.  
Interpretation of Results 
After reviewing the censored probit results in terms of the support they 
provide to the hypotheses in the sub-sample of democracies, it is now useful to 
discuss the substantive impact of the statistically significant variables on the two 
dependent variables. Tables 6.6 presents the changes in the predicted probability of 
intervention=1 when the variable of interest increases by one unit or some number of 
units depending on the nature of the variable. First differences are only calculated for 
the statistically significant variables from the first model except for the refugees 
variable which is computed from the second model. Table 6.7 indicates the changes 
in the predicted probability of pro-government intervention=1 when the variable of 
interest changes by one unit or some number of units as reported in the table. The 
substantive impact of independent variables reported in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 will be 







Table 6.6: Changes in the Predicted Probability of Intervention 
 
When this variable moves  
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of intervention  
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Rivalry    0 → 1 17.54% [7.36%   27.72%] 
Militarized dispute   0 → 1 18.09% [8.97%  27.21%] 
Historical ties   0 → 1 19.86% [10.08%   29.64%] 
Contiguous      0 → 1 18.49% [9.41%   27.57%] 
Same region    0 → 1 12.78% [5.14%   20.42%] 
Petroleum   0 → 1 6.52% [1.25%   11.79%] * 
Trade   p25 → p75 
Trade   min → max 
2.24% 
3.17% 
[0.92%   3.56%] 
[1.43%   4.91%] 
Rival intervention    0 → 1 16.94% [7.78%   26.10%] 
Ally intervention     0 → 1  6.29% [1.03%   11.55%] * 
Ethnic ties 1   0 → 1 9.43% [3.84%   15.02%] 
Ethnic ties 2    0 → 1 12.19% [3.57%   20.81%] * 
Battle deaths    p25 → p75 
Battle deaths    min → max 
3.40% 
4.85% 
[1.16%   5.64%] 
[1.98%   7.72%] 
Rebel fighting capacity    1 → 2 
Rebel fighting capacity    1 → 3 
-3.68% 
-5.36% 
[-5.89%   -1.47%] 
[-8.53%   -2.19%]  
War involvement    0 → 1 -8.97% [-13.82%   -4.12%] 
Major power    0 → 1 17.02% [9.58%   24.46%] 
CINC ratio    p25 → p75 
CINC ratio    min → max 
6.77% 
9.90% 
[3.34%   10.20%] 
[4.73%   15.07%] 
Model 2:   
Refugees    p25 → p75 
Refugees    min → max 
0.86% 
1.41% 
[0.39%   1.33%]  
[0.64%   2.18%]  
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
selection equations in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. The probabilities are calculated by holding all 
continuous variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their 
modes. * indicates 90% confidence interval. 
 
Similar to the full sample, international factors have the largest substantive 
impact on the probability of intervention in the sub-sample of democracies. Historical 
ties with the conflict state increase the likelihood of military intervention almost 20 
percent while contiguity raises it 18.5 percent. Democratic states that have a 
militarized interstate dispute with the conflict state are also 18 percent more likely to 




states increase the probability of military intervention by 17.5 percent and 17 percent 
respectively. Finally, major powers are also 17 percent more likely to intervene than 
minor powers in the sub-sample of democracies.  
The substantive effects of international factors in the sub-sample of 
democracies are quite similar to the results from the full sample presented in Table 
5.5. There are only two major differences between the two sets of findings. First, 
previous interventions by allies increase the probability of intervention by 6 percent 
in the sub-sample of democracies as opposed to 12 percent in the full sample. Second, 
the substantive effect of trade ties is twice as much in the sub-sample of democracies 
which indicates that trade plays a bigger role when democracies are deciding to 
intervene in civil conflicts. In the full sample, the impact of trade is 1.5 percent 
whereas in the democratic sub-sample trade ties increase the probability of 
intervention by more than 3 percent as it changes from minimum to maximum. 
Petroleum, another variable measuring the economic significance of the conflict state, 
has similar substantive effects in both samples.  
Ethnic ties with the dominant and second largest ethnic group in the conflict 
state increase the probability of intervention by 9 percent and 12 percent respectively. 
However, compared to the full sample, the substantive effect of ethnic ties is smaller 
in the sub-sample of democracies. On the other hand, control variables have a larger 
impact in the case of democracies. For instance, as the ratio of capabilities changes 
from minimum to maximum, the likelihood of military intervention increases by 




Finally, contextual variables have a smaller substantive effect in the sub-
sample of democracies compared to the full sample. When rebel fighting capacity is 
high, democracies are 5.4 percent less likely to intervene whereas in the full sample 
this substantive effect is almost 7 percent. The difference between the substantive 
impacts of conflict intensity indicators in the two samples is quite minor, but it 
indicates that intervention decisions of democracies are less affected by the number of 
battle deaths and refugees compared to the full sample.  
 
Table 6.7:  Changes in the Predicted Probability of Government Intervention 
   
When this variable moves 
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of govt. intervention 
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Militarized dispute   0 → 1 -24.86% [-40.98%   -8.74%] * 
Historical ties    0 → 1 41.63% [22.39%   60.87%] 
Trade    p25 → p75 
Trade    min → max 
7.39% 
10.08% 
[2.87%   11.91%] 
[4.32%   15.84%] 
Rival int. rebel side   0 → 1 35.34%  [16.62%   54.06%] 
Ally int. govt. side    0 → 1 16.59%  [5.45%   27.73%] * 
Democratic target     0 → 1 17.74% [6.96%   28.52%] 
Government conflict    0 → 1 -19.42% [-32.67%   -6.17%] * 
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
outcome equation in Table 6.3. The probabilities are calculated by holding all continuous 
variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their modes.  
* indicates 90% confidence interval. 
 
Table 6.7 shows that international factors also have the largest substantive 
impact on whose side democracies intervene in civil conflicts. When democratic third 
parties have historical ties to the conflict state, they are almost 42 percent more likely 
to intervene on the government side. Democracies are also 35 percent more likely to 
support the government side militarily when their rivals intervene on the rebel side. 




Having a militarized dispute with the conflict state decreases pro-government 
intervention probability almost 25 percent and has the third largest effect in the sub-
sample of democracies whereas in the full sample it has one of the smallest effects 
with less than 10 percent.  
Contextual variables have the next largest impact in the democratic sub-
sample. When the conflict type is governmental, democracies are 19.4 percent less 
likely to support the government side and more likely to support the rebel side. 
Another way to state this substantive effect is democracies are 19.4 percent less likely 
to intervene on the rebel side in territorial conflicts. Finally, the probability of pro-
government intervention increases by almost 18 percent when the conflict state is 
democratic.  
The remaining two variables with a substantive impact on how democracies 
choose sides in civil conflicts are interventions by allies and trade ties. Democracies 
are 16.6 percent more likely to support the government when their allies intervene on 
the government side. However, as mentioned above, the substantive impact of rival 
interventions on the side decision is twice as much. Trade has the smallest impact on 
pro-government intervention with 10 percent, but trade ties still have a bigger impact 
in the democratic sub-sample compared to the full sample.  
Discussion of Findings for Democracies 
The censored probit analyses conducted in the sub-sample of democratic 
states indicate the robustness of a lot of the findings from the full sample. However, 
they also provide an improved understanding of the specific factors that influence 




in this study have not been tested specifically against democracies before, a few of 
the findings are quite novel whereas others are theoretically and empirically 
consistent with the previous findings in the literature. 
International factors have the most significant impact on intervention decision 
making in the sub-sample of democracies. Similar to the findings from the full 
sample, factors related to the strategic significance of the conflict state, which include 
historical ties, contiguity and hostile relations, motivate democratic leaders to 
intervene in civil conflicts more than others. The findings in this sub-sample show 
once more that rivalry and militarized disputes with the conflict state are crucial for 
intervention decisions of states, including democracies, even though these have not 
been analyzed adequately in quantitative studies of intervention before. Interventions 
by rivals also increase democratic leaders’ willingness to intervene by making civil 
conflicts strategically important whereas interventions by allies have a much less 
critical impact on democracies’ intervention probability compared to the full sample. 
Thus, balancing or restraining a rival’s capacity to affect the dynamics or outcomes of 
civil conflicts motivates democracies more than supporting allies. However, when 
democracies intervene in a civil conflict, they tend to bandwagon on the same side 
with their allies.  
Some of these factors can be observed in the following examples. One of the 
countries that provided military support to the Kurdish rebel group, PKK, during the 
civil conflict in Turkey was Greece which was not only contiguous to Turkey but also 
had rivalry with this country. Similarly, rivalry with Iraq influenced Israel’s decision 




60s and early 70s. Historical ties motivated Italy to intervene militarily on the 
government side in Somalia in 1982 and Belgium to intervene several times in the 
DRC/Zaire in the 1960s. Rival military interventions by the U.S.S.R. and Cuba on the 
government side caused the U.S. to intervene on the rebel side in Nicaragua’s civil 
conflict throughout the 1980s. In addition to these interventions by rivals, geographic 
proximity as well as hostile relations with the government of Nicaragua affected the 
U.S. intervention decision.  
There are some minor but noticeable differences between the full sample and 
the democratic sub-sample with respect to the remaining international factors related 
to the strategic significance of the conflict state. First, trade ties are more critical for 
democracies’ intervention decision making confirming empirical findings on the 
impact of economic interdependence and trade relations on democracies’ behavior 
(Gleditsch 2002). Compared to the full sample, trade ties have more than twice as 
much substantive effect on increasing democracies’ probability of intervention. Trade 
ties with the conflict state also increases democracies’ probability of intervening on 
the government side more. Second, the resource wealth of the conflict state does not 
influence how democracies choose sides in a civil conflict unlike the full sample. 
However, petroleum increases the probability of military intervention by democracies 
as it does in the full sample. Koga’s study, the only study which examines the specific 
impact of resources and ethnic ties on the intervention behavior of democracies and 
autocracies, concludes that resources do not affect democracies’ intervention decision 
in civil conflicts (Koga 2011). By distinguishing between the decisions on whether 




increases democracies’ probability of intervention even though resources do not 
influence democracies’ decision on whose side to intervene. To sum up, the results 
from the censored probit analysis in this sub-sample provide a better understanding of 
the role of economic factors in democracies’ intervention decision making.  
The findings regarding the impact of ethnic ties on intervention probability are 
similar in the full sample and in the sub-sample of democracies. The results also 
confirm Koga’s finding that ethnic ties make it more likely for democracies to 
intervene in civil conflicts (2011). Koga’s study does not examine the impact of other 
domestic factors on intervention behavior whereas this study also examines the 
impact of domestic unrest on intervention behavior of democracies. The findings 
support Kisangani and Pickering’s conclusion that neither elite unrest nor mass unrest 
motivates democratic leaders to intervene militarily in civil conflicts (2007). To put it 
differently, democracies do not seem to use military interventions in intrastate 
disputes as a form of diversionary foreign policy behavior. Finally, this study also 
shows that while regime similarity on its own does not motivate democratic leaders to 
intervene in civil conflicts, democracies are more likely to support the government 
side when they do intervene in civil conflicts taking place in democratic states.  
In addition to the regime type of the conflict state, another contextual factor 
that affects how democracies choose sides is the type of civil conflict. The impact of 
this contextual factor can only be observed in the sub-sample analysis since the type 
of conflict is not a significant variable in the full sample. Democracies are more likely 
to support the government side in territorial conflicts and more likely to support the 




regime type of the conflict state can also influence the side decision. Nonetheless, this 
finding is quite interesting and can be demonstrated by some examples. 
The U.S. intervention on the rebel side in Nicaragua, which was mentioned 
above, can be cited as an example since it occurred in a governmental conflict. 
Between 1963 and 1966, the U.K. intervened militarily on the rebel side in North 
Yemen which was experiencing a governmental conflict, but Britain also had a 
militarized interstate dispute with this country. In 1990, Israel intervened militarily on 
the side of the Ethiopian government in its territorial conflict with the Eritrean 
secessionist group, EPLF. However, it is important to note that EPLF was supported 
militarily by Israel’s rivals Iraq and Syria. Finally, Turkey provided military support 
to the government of Azerbaijan in 1992 and 1993 during its territorial conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition to being contiguous to Azerbaijan, Turkey also has 
ethnic ties with this country. These examples show that while the type of conflict can 
affect the side decision, it does not motivate democratic states to intervene in civil 
conflicts on its own which is also demonstrated by the statistical results from the 
selection equation.  
While the type of conflict affects democracies’ decision on whose side to 
intervene, the rest of the contextual variables such as battle deaths, refugees and rebel 
fighting capacity influence their probability of intervention. However, contextual 
variables seem to have smaller substantive effects in the democratic sub-sample 
compared to the full sample. Control variables, on the other hand, play a more critical 




on democracies’ intervention behavior while relative capabilities increase their 
intervention probability more significantly compared to the full sample.  
Overall, the findings provide a more nuanced understanding of the factors 
behind the intervention decision of democracies. The similarities with the full sample 
prove that the modified realist framework is still useful for examining intervention 
decisions of democracies. The differences, on the other hand, indicate that regime 
type of states has some noticeable impact on their intervention behavior. In order to 
understand more about the relationship between regime type and intervention 
behavior, the next section focuses on autocratic third parties.  
Empirical Findings for Autocracies 
This section focuses on the empirical findings from the statistical analyses that 
were conducted within the sub-sample of autocracies. The following sub-sections 
present the statistical results, interpret their statistical significance and discuss their 
theoretical and substantive implications.  
Statistical Models 
Two different censored probit models are employed to test the hypotheses 
against autocratic states in the dataset. Similar to the analyses in the sub-sample of 
democracies, none of the models include the regime related variables for potential 
interveners since they are all autocratic. The first censored probit model includes all 
the remaining explanatory variables in this study except the refugees variable. The 
second model adds the refugees variable to the first censored probit model. The two 




Table 6.8: Model 1 - Censored Probit Results for Autocratic states  
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ .505**** (.152) -.765*** (.293) 
Militarized dispute ~ .572**** (.147) -.245 (.167) 
Alliance ~ -.045 (.106) .462** (.200) 
Historical ties -.230 (.407) -.051 (.411) 
Contiguous .852**** (.118) - 
Same region .440**** (.093) - 
Secondary diamonds .180 (.178) -.540** (.220) 
Petroleum  .222*** (.079) .704**** (.209) 
Trade (logged) ~ .013 (.016) .214**** (.039) 
Rival intervention ~ .724**** (.097) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - .998**** (.206) 
Ally intervention ~ .337**** (.104) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .891** (.353) 
Ethnic ties 1 .435**** (.128) - 
Ethnic ties 2 .479*** (.173) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.174**** (.051)  
Mass unrest ~ -.145*** (.051) - 
Democratic target ~ -.136** (.55) -1.193**** (.280) 
Government conflict .052 (.076) .262 (.216) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .154**** (.018) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.203**** (.056) - 
War involvement ~ -.073 (.087) - 
Major power .315** (.142) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .171**** (.021) - 
Cold War  .001 (.057) - 
Spell years -1.064****(.059) -.715****(.104) 
Constant -3.002**** (.165) -2.851**** (.650) 
N Total obs. = 136412 Uncensored obs. = 1559 
Wald Chi-square = 309.36****  
Rho = .617 (.112) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 7.22*** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 






Table 6.9: Model 2 - Censored Probit Results for Autocratic states 
 
Selection Equation         Outcome Equation 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention on govt. side 
Independent Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
Rivalry ~ .485**** (.150) -.773*** (.287) 
Militarized dispute ~ .557**** (.148) -.254 (.168) 
Alliance ~ -.038 (.105) .471** (.201) 
Historical ties -.290 (.416) -.106 (.432) 
Contiguous .839**** (.117) - 
Same region .444**** (.092) - 
Secondary diamonds .190 (.184) -.534** (.221) 
Petroleum  .187** (.078) .650*** (.205) 
Trade (logged) ~ .018 (.017) .220**** (.039) 
Rival intervention ~ .729**** (.096) - 
Rival intervention on rebel side ~ - 1.018**** (.205) 
Ally intervention ~ .313*** (.102) - 
Ally intervention on govt. side ~ - .865** (.356) 
Ethnic ties 1 .432**** (.127) - 
Ethnic ties 2 .496*** (.172) - 
Elite unrest ~ -.173**** (.052) - 
Mass unrest ~ -.141*** (.051) - 
Democratic target ~ -.129** (.53) -1.123**** (.289) 
Government conflict .009 (.075) .194 (.224) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .135**** (.018) - 
Refugees (logged) ~ .068**** (.014) - 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.187**** (.056) - 
War involvement ~ -.070 (.087) - 
Major power .321** (.141) - 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .169**** (.021) - 
Cold War  .020 (.058) - 
Spell years -1.073****(.059) -.720****(.108) 
Constant -3.574**** (.218) -3.568**** (.747) 
N Total obs. = 136412 Uncensored obs. = 1559 
Wald Chi-square = 312.44**** 
Rho = .623 (.116) 
Wald test of independent equations (rho = 0), Chi-square = 7.41*** 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 





As indicated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, autocratic third parties make up 68% of the 
entire dataset and they are responsible for 70% of the 2285 military interventions. 
Due to randomly missing observations, the number of dyad years used in the selection 
equation of each censored probit model is 136,412 which constitute almost 97% of 
the autocratic sub-sample. The number of uncensored observations, which refers to 
the number of dyad years with intervention, is 1559 in each outcome equation. Thus, 
96.8% of the interventions by autocracies are used while estimating the outcome 
equations. Finally, examination of the correlation matrix shows no evidence of 
significant multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in each censored probit 
model. The highest absolute level of correlation is between the variables conflict type 
(as indicated by government conflict) and battle deaths at 0.531, while the rest of the 
correlations are much smaller. 
In both of the censored probit analyses, the model chi-square rejects the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero. In the first model, the 
correlation between the two equations, rho, is 0.62 which is greater than a zero 
correlation. The hypothesis that rho equals zero is rejected at the 1% level based on 
the Wald test of independent equations. The statistical findings regarding the 
correlation between the two equations are also similar in the second model. Since 
both analyses show the existence of selection bias, the use of a censored probit model 
is justified for the sub-sample of autocracies as well.  
Table 6.10 summarizes the support the results lend to each hypothesis 
postulated for both dependent variables to make discussion easier. The table presents 




direction of the independent variables in both models. If a variable is statistically 
significant but its effect is the opposite of what was hypothesized, then Table 6.10 
reports that finding as well. Some hypotheses are also categorized as receiving 
relatively weaker support due to the statistical significance of results at the 90% level. 
The rest of the hypotheses are supported at higher significance levels as can be seen 
in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. 
Table 6.10: Summary of Support for Hypotheses  
 
Hyp. Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 International Intervention Government side 
H1a, 1b Rivalry supported supported 
H2a, 2b Militarized dispute supported not supported 
H3a, 3b Alliance not supported supported 
H4a, 4b Historical ties not supported not supported 
H5 Contiguous supported na 
H6 Same region supported na 
H7a, 7b Secondary diamonds not supported supported 
H8a, 8b Petroleum supported supported 
H9a, 9b Trade  not supported supported 
H10a Rival intervention supported na 
H10b Rival intervention on reb. side na supported 
H11a Ally intervention supported na 
H11b Ally intervention on govt. side na supported 
 Domestic   
H18a Ethnic ties 1 supported na 
H18b Ethnic ties 2 supported na 
H19b Elite unrest  supported na 
H20 Mass unrest supported na 
 Contextual   
H17a, 17b Democratic target  supported supported 
H22a, 22b Government conflict not supported not supported 
H23 Battle deaths supported na 
H24 Refugees supported na 
H25 Rebel fighting capacity opposite found na 
 Control Variables   
H12 War involvement not supported na 
H13 Major power supported na 
H14 CINC ratio   supported na 




Table 6.10 shows that international factors affect autocracies’ intervention 
decision making somewhat differently compared to the full sample as well as the 
democratic sub-sample. However, a lot of similarities can also be observed between 
the autocratic and democratic sub-samples. 
Similar to the full sample and democratic sub-sample, international factors 
such as hostile relations with the conflict state, geographic proximity, petroleum and 
interventions by rivals and allies influence the intervention probability of autocracies. 
On the other hand, alliance ties with the conflict state and secondary diamonds do not 
affect the probability of intervention by autocracies, which are also consistent with 
the findings from the full sample and democratic sub-sample. However, historical ties 
and trade relations with the conflict state also do not play a role when autocracies are 
deciding to intervene in a civil conflict whereas these two international factors are 
critical in the other two samples.  
There are also noticeable differences between the samples with respect to the 
outcome equation. Historical ties and the existence of militarized disputes with the 
conflict state are not critical for autocracies when they are choosing sides in a civil 
conflict. In the democratic sub-sample, both of these factors affect the side decision 
while alliance or rivalry with the conflict state and the type of resources do not. 
Similar to the full sample, rivalry and alliance with the conflict state affect how 
autocracies choose sides. The type of resources in the conflict state also influences 
autocracies’ side decision. As hypothesized, autocracies are more likely to intervene 
on the rebel side when there are secondary diamonds in the conflict state but they are 




economic factors in general seem to be more decisive for autocracies when they are 
choosing sides because trade ties also affect their decision making. The sub-sample 
analyses show that while there are some similarities between autocracies and 
democracies, there are also important differences with respect to how certain 
international factors affect the intervention decision of states based on their regime 
type. Since these differences cannot be captured in the full sample analysis, sub-
sample analyses provide an improved understanding of the similarities and 
differences between democracies and autocracies.  
Domestic variables have the hypothesized effect on autocracies as they do in 
the full sample. Ethnic ties with the population of the conflict state increase the 
probability of military intervention by autocracies. Overall the findings confirm the 
ethnic ties argument in the ethnic conflict literature both in the case of democracies 
and autocracies. Moreover, domestic unrest also affects autocratic leaders’ 
intervention decisions. Unlike in the case of democracies, both mass unrest and elite 
unrest decrease the probability of intervention by autocracies. In other words, 
domestic problems seem to force autocratic leaders to concentrate on domestic issues 
in order to eliminate threats to their own political survival. In fact, Kisangani and 
Pickering conclude that autocracies do not “externalize their domestic problems” and 
tend to use domestic solutions in response to domestic crises (2007, p. 295). This 
negative relationship between domestic unrest and the probability of military 
intervention suggests that autocratic leaders focus on suppressing domestic challenges 
through domestic measures instead of resorting to diversionary foreign policy 




The findings regarding the hypotheses on contextual factors in the autocratic 
sub-sample are similar to the full sample. Increasing number of battle deaths and 
refugees increases the probability of intervention by autocracies. On the other hand, 
higher rebel fighting capacity decreases the intervention likelihood. As hypothesized, 
autocracies are less likely to intervene in a democratic conflict state and when they do 
intervene, autocracies are less likely to support the government side in democracies. 
Both of these results from the sub-sample analysis support the findings on joint 
autocracy from the full sample. Finally, similar to the full sample, the type of conflict 
does not play a role in the intervention decisions of autocracies. Thus, the type of 
conflict appears to be critical only for democracies when they intervene in a civil 
conflict.  
Only two of the hypotheses on control variables are supported in the 
autocratic sub-sample. Similar to the democratic sub-sample, as the ratio of 
capabilities increases the probability of intervention also increases in the case of 
autocratic third parties. Major powers are more likely to intervene in the sub-sample 
of autocracies as well. Cold War does not have a statistically significant effect on 
autocratic states similar to democracies. However, involvement in an interstate war 
also does not have a significant impact in the autocratic sub-sample whereas this 
control variable has a constraining effect on democracies’ intervention behavior.  
As an additional robustness check, this study also employed rare events logit 
to analyze the first dependent variable. The results from rare events logit analyses 
conducted in the sub-sample of autocracies are consistent with the results from the 




findings on the hypothesized relationships. Appendix D provides the results from 
relogit models conducted in this sub-sample.  
Interpretation of Results 
After reviewing the censored probit results in terms of the support they 
provide to the hypotheses in the sub-sample of autocracies, it is now useful to discuss 
the substantive impact of statistically significant variables on the two dependent 
variables. Table 6.11 presents the changes in the predicted probability of 
intervention=1 when the variable of interest increases by one unit or some number of 
units depending on the nature of the variable. First differences are only calculated for 
the statistically significant variables from the first model except for the refugees 
variable which is computed from the second model. Table 6.12 indicates the changes 
in the predicted probability of pro-government intervention=1 when the variable of 
interest changes by one unit or some number of units as reported in the table. The 
substantive impact of independent variables reported in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 will be 
discussed separately for each dependent variable. 
Three international factors which have the largest substantive effect on the 
intervention probability of autocracies are contiguity, interventions by rivals and 
militarized dispute with the conflict state. These three are also the most influential 
factors in the full sample after historical ties with the conflict state which is not a 
statistically significant variable in the autocratic sub-sample. Contiguity increases the 
probability of military intervention by 20 percent and interventions by rivals increase 
it by almost 19 percent in the autocratic sub-sample. Hostile relations with the 




similar to the democratic sub-sample. Having a militarized dispute or rivalry with the 
conflict state increases the probability of intervention by 17 percent and 16 percent 
respectively.  
Table 6.11: Changes in the Predicted Probability of Intervention 
 
When this variable moves  
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of intervention  
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Rivalry    0 → 1 16.23% [7.67%   24.79%] 
Militarized dispute   0 → 1 17.11% [9.08%   25.14%] 
Contiguous    0 → 1 20.06% [11.10%   29.02%] 
Same region   0 → 1 14.43% [7.35%   21.51%] 
Petroleum   0 → 1 7.67% [2.96%   12.38%] 
Rival intervention    0 → 1 18.82% [10.43%   27.21%] 
Ally intervention     0 → 1  12.89% [6.26%   19.52%] 
Ethnic ties 1   0 → 1 13.96% [6.72%   21.20%] 
Ethnic ties 2   0 → 1 15.04% [5.86%   24.22%] 
Elite unrest     0 → 1 -6.46% [-9.78%   -3.14%] 
Mass unrest    0 → 1 -4.68% [-7.45%   -1.91%] 
Democratic target  0 → 1 -4.39% [-7.56%   -1.22%] 
Battle deaths    p25 → p75 
Battle deaths    min → max 
3.48% 
5.15% 
[1.69%   5.27%] 
[2.32%   7.98%] 
Rebel fighting capacity   1 → 2 
Rebel fighting capacity   1 → 3 
-5.42% 
-7.28% 
[-8.19%   -2.65%] 
[-10.82%   -3.74%] 
Major power   0 → 1 12.13% [5.70%   18.56%] 
CINC ratio    p25 → p75 
CINC ratio    min → max 
4.62% 
5.87% 
[2.21%   7.03%] 
[2.59%   9.15%] 
Model 2:   
Refugees    p25 → p75 
Refugees    min → max 
1.36% 
2.32% 
[0.71%   2.01%]  
[1.18%   3.46%]  
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
selection equations in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. The probabilities are calculated by holding all 
continuous variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their 
modes. * indicates 90% confidence interval. 
 
After these four international factors, ethnic ties have the most critical impact 
on autocracies’ intervention probability in civil conflicts. While ethnic ties are 




to 15 percent. The remaining statistically significant international factors have the 
next largest effects on autocracies’ intervention behavior. Being in the same region 
with the conflict state increases the probability of intervention by 14.4 percent while 
interventions by allies increase it by almost 13 percent. The substantive effects of 
these two factors are again larger for autocracies than democracies. However, major 
powers are only 12 percent more likely to intervene in the autocratic sub-sample 
compared to 17 percent in the case of democracies. Finally, petroleum in the conflict 
state also has a higher impact, 7.7 percent, on the probability of military intervention 
by autocracies than it has on democracies.  
Contextual factors have a larger effect on autocracies than democracies as 
well. As the fighting capacity of rebels relative to government forces changes from 
low to high, autocracies are 7.2 percent less likely to intervene militarily. Autocracies 
are also 4.4 percent less likely to intervene when the conflict state is a democracy. On 
the other hand, as the number of battle deaths and refugees reach maximum, the 
probability of intervention increases by 5.2 percent and 2.3 percent respectively. 
Although contextual factors have a somewhat bigger impact on autocracies than 
democracies, the ratio of capabilities has a much smaller effect on autocracies which 
indicates that relative capabilities play a less significant role in the decision making of 
autocracies compared to democracies when they intervene in civil conflicts.  
Finally, both types of domestic unrest have a quite significant constraining 
effect on the intervention behavior of autocracies. Elite unrest decreases the 
probability of military intervention by 6.5 percent while mass unrest decreases it by 




most of the contextual factors as well as the ratio of capabilities. In short, domestic 
factors such as ethnic ties or domestic unrest seem to play a critical role when 
autocracies are deciding to intervene in a civil conflict.  
Table 6.12 shows that the regime type of the conflict state is crucial when 
autocracies are choosing sides in a civil conflict. Autocracies are 48 percent less 
likely to intervene on the government side when the conflict state is democratic. 
While this finding again proves the importance of regime similarity when third parties 
choose sides in a civil conflict, it also indicates that domestic factors in general are 
quite critical for autocracies’ foreign policy decisions. The literature has mostly 
analyzed the impact of domestic factors on the foreign policy behavior of 
democracies, but the findings in this study show that foreign policy decision making 
of autocracies is influenced by domestic sources as well.  
Table 6.12: Changes in the Predicted Probability of Government Intervention 
 
When this variable moves  
from … to … in 
Change in probability  
of govt. intervention  
95% Confidence Interval 
(unless indicated by *) 
Model 1:   
Rivalry   0 → 1 -25.46%  [-37.44%   -13.48%] 
Alliance   0 → 1 14.78%  [5.53%   24.03%] 
Secondary diamonds   0 → 1 -18.53% [-28.39%   -8.67%] 
Petroleum  0 → 1 22.27% [10.98%   33.56%] 
Trade   p25 → p75 
Trade   min → max 
4.94% 
7.13% 
[2.57%   7.31%] 
[3.52%   10.74%] 
Rival int. rebel side  0 → 1 42.31%  [22.73%   61.89%] 
Ally int. govt. side   0 → 1 37.68%  [14.81%   60.55%]  
Democratic target   0 → 1 -48.02% [-68.20%   -27.84%] 
 
Notes: This table reports the first differences for statistically significant variables from the 
outcome equation in Table 6.8. The probabilities are calculated by holding all continuous 
variables at their means and all dichotomous and categorical variables at their modes. 





The rest of the factors that affect how autocracies choose sides in civil 
conflicts also demonstrate some of the major differences between autocracies and 
democracies. Autocracies are 42 percent more likely to intervene on the government 
side when their rivals intervene on the rebel side while interventions by allies on the 
government side increase this probability by almost 38 percent. Therefore, 
interventions by rivals and allies have a significantly larger impact on the side 
decision of autocracies than democracies. Rivalry and alliance with the conflict state 
also play an important role when autocracies choose sides in a civil conflict whereas 
neither of these two factors affects how democracies choose sides. Rivalry decreases 
the probability of pro-government intervention by 25 percent while alliance increases 
it by 15 percent.  
Finally, the type of resources in the conflict state also has a critical effect on 
autocracies’ side decision whereas resources do not factor into the decisions of 
democracies when they choose sides. Autocracies are 22 percent more likely to 
intervene on the government side when the conflict state has petroleum and they are 
18 percent less likely to support the government side when there are secondary 
diamonds. Increasing trade ties with the conflict state increases the probability of pro-
government intervention but the impact of trade ties is larger for democracies when 
they are choosing sides in a civil conflict.  
Discussion of Findings for Autocracies 
The censored probit analyses conducted in this sub-sample provide a more 




conflicts and facilitate a comparative analysis of the intervention behavior of 
democracies and autocracies.  
International factors have the largest effect on autocracies’ intervention 
decision making. With the exception of historical ties, the main international factors 
that motivate both democratic and autocratic leaders to intervene in civil conflicts are 
the same. Contiguity, hostile relations with the conflict state as well as rival 
interventions have some of the largest effects on the probability of intervention by 
both autocracies and democracies. On the other hand, power differentials seem to 
play a more important role in the intervention decision making of democracies than 
autocracies. Democratic states are more likely to intervene in weaker conflict states 
than autocracies. Interventions by rivals and allies seem to motivate autocratic leaders 
to intervene in civil conflicts more than power differentials with the conflict state. 
Some of these factors can be observed in the following examples. Rivalry and 
the existence of militarized interstate disputes have caused Pakistan to provide 
military support to various rebel groups in India since the beginning of 90s. Some of 
these rebel groups are involved in territorial conflicts over Kashmir, Nagaland and 
Manipur with the government of India. While others like PWG and MCC are fighting 
for control over the government. Similarly, rivalry and hostile relations led Ethiopia 
to intervene militarily on the rebel side in Sudan as soon the civil conflict between 
SPLM and the Sudanese government started in 1983. Ethiopia provided military 
support to SPLM until the late 1990s. While having a militarized interstate dispute 
with Ethiopia, Eritrea intervened militarily on the side of OLF and ONLF, two rebel 




Eritrea’s military strategy, it only lasted for a year and occurred during its interstate 
military dispute with Ethiopia.  
Another important finding from the sub-sample analysis is the significant 
impact of domestic factors on the intervention decision of autocracies. While ethnic 
ties also motivate democratic leaders to intervene, ethnicity plays a bigger role when 
autocracies decide to intervene. Moreover, both elite and mass unrest have a 
considerable impact on the likelihood of military intervention by autocracies. The 
findings from the sub-sample analyses suggest that although both democratic and 
autocratic leaders do not use military interventions in civil conflicts as a form of 
diversionary foreign policy behavior when they are faced with domestic crises, 
domestic unrest decreases autocracies’ probability of military intervention in civil 
conflicts. On the other hand, domestic unrest does not affect the probability of 
intervention by democracies. These results are consistent with Kisangani and 
Pickering’s study on diversionary behavior of democracies and autocracies (2007).  
Contextual factors, such as rebel fighting capacity and conflict intensity, have 
a substantively larger effect on autocracies than democracies as well. The different 
impact of contextual factors on autocracies and democracies is also noticeable with 
respect to the regime type of the conflict state. While the regime type of the conflict 
state does not seem to affect democracies’ probability of military intervention, 
autocracies are less likely to intervene in democratic conflict states.   
There are even more important differences between democracies and 
autocracies when they are choosing sides in a civil conflict. Historical ties have the 




the conflict state is the most crucial factor for autocracies. Although the regime type 
of the conflict state also influences the side decision of democracies, this contextual 
factor has less substantive impact on democracies compared to other factors. While 
both democracies and autocracies are more likely to intervene on the rebel side if they 
have hostile relations with the conflict state, alliance ties also matter in the case of 
autocracies. Finally, interventions by rivals and allies seem to play a bigger role for 
autocracies than democracies when they are choosing sides. In fact, interventions by 
rivals and allies have the second largest impact on the side decision of autocracies. 
For example, despite its rivalry with El Salvador, Honduras intervened on the 
government side multiple times during the civil conflict in the 1980s. This decision 
was influenced by pro-government interventions by the U.S. and Venezuela which 
were both allies of Honduras and pro-rebel intervention by its rival, Nicaragua. Rival 
intervention by Iran on the government side in the early 1970s also caused Iraq to 
support the rebel side during the civil conflict in Oman despite its alliance with the 
government.  
The existence of petroleum in the conflict state increases the probability of 
intervention by both democracies and autocracies. However, the type of resources in 
the conflict state also plays a decisive role when autocracies choose sides in a civil 
conflict whereas resources do not influence the side decision of democracies. The 
results from the sub-sample analysis confirms Koga’s finding (2011) that autocracies 
are more likely to intervene on the rebel side when there are secondary diamonds in 
the conflict state. In addition, this study finds that autocracies are more likely to 




the conflict state. Even though resources do not affect how democracies choose sides, 
stronger trade ties with the conflict state motivate democracies more to intervene on 
the government side compared to autocracies.  
These findings regarding the different impacts of variables on autocracies 
demonstrate that sub-sample analyses are quite useful for comparative purposes.  
Conclusion 
In order to demonstrate the similarities and differences between democracies 
and autocracies one more time, the following tables rank the substantive effects of 
statistically significant variables in each sub-sample. Table 6.13 compares the 
substantive impact of international, domestic and contextual factors that motivate 
democracies and autocracies to intervene in civil conflicts. Table 6.14 presents the 
factors that are critical for democracies and autocracies when they choose sides.  
As the tables indicate, the sub-sample analyses provide an improved 
understanding of the substantive effects of explanatory variables and demonstrate the 
differences between autocracies and democracies much more effectively than the full 
sample analysis does. However, the sub-sample analyses also show that some of the 
factors have quite similar effects on democracies and autocracies. Therefore, the 
overall findings from the full sample analysis are quite robust and provide important 
insights into the intervention behavior of states even without splitting the dataset into 
democracies and autocracies. Nevertheless, the additional benefits of sub-sample 
analyses are indisputable if one is also interested in comparing the intervention 





Table 6.13: Comparing substantive effects of variables in selection equations 
 
Democratic States Autocratic States 
Independent variables % Independent variables % 
Historical ties 19.86% Contiguous 20.06% 
Contiguous 18.49% Rival intervention 18.82% 
Militarized dispute 18.09% Militarized dispute 17.11% 
Rivalry  17.54% Rivalry  16.23% 
Major power 17.02% Ethnic ties 2 15.04% 
Rival intervention 16.94% Same region 14.43% 
Same region 12.78% Ethnic ties 1 13.96% 
Ethnic ties 2 12.19% Ally intervention  12.89% 
CINC ratio   9.90% Major power 12.13% 
War involvement  -8.97% Petroleum  7.67% 
Ethnic ties 1 9.43% Rebel fighting capacity -7.28% 
Petroleum  6.52% Elite unrest  -6.46% 
Ally intervention  6.29% CINC ratio   5.87% 
Rebel fighting capacity -5.36% Battle deaths  5.15% 
Battle deaths  4.85% Mass unrest   -4.68% 
Trade  3.17% Democratic  target -4.39% 
Refugees  1.41% Refugees  2.32% 
Alliance  - Alliance  - 
Secondary diamonds - Historical ties - 
Elite unrest  - Trade  - 
Mass unrest  - War involvement  - 
Cold War  - Cold War  - 
Democratic target  - Secondary diamonds - 
Government conflict - Government conflict - 
 
Notes: Explanatory variables are ranked according to their substantive effects. 















Table 6.14: Comparing substantive effects of variables in outcome equations 
 
Democratic States Autocratic States 
Independent variables % Independent variables % 
Historical ties 41.63% Democratic target  -48.02% 
Rival int. on rebel side 35.34% Rival int. on rebel side 42.31% 
Militarized dispute -24.86% Ally int. on govt. side 37.68% 
Government conflict -19.42% Rivalry  -25.46% 
Democratic target  17.74% Petroleum  22.27% 
Ally int. on govt. side  16.59% Secondary diamonds -18.53% 
Trade ties 10.08% Alliance  14.78% 
Rivalry  - Trade ties 7.13% 
Alliance  - Militarized dispute - 
Secondary diamonds - Historical ties - 
Petroleum  - Government conflict - 
 
Notes: Explanatory variables are ranked according to their substantive effects. 
- indicates that the variable is not statistically significant. 
 
This chapter has discussed the differences and similarities in the intervention 
behavior of democracies and autocracies in detail. Thus, it is more useful at this point 
to emphasize some of the most striking findings from this comparative analysis that 
are theoretically and empirically important for the literature on interventions in civil 
conflicts.  
First and foremost, many of the hypotheses derived from the modified realist 
approach are supported by the sub-sample analyses which indicate that modified 
realism is an appropriate theoretical framework for identifying the international and 
domestic sources of intervention decision making for both democracies and 
autocracies. Moreover, it is also capable of integrating contextual factors into the 




understanding of the impact of different groups of factors on the intervention 
behavior of democracies and autocracies.  
Second, the findings from sub-sample analyses show that the strategic 
significance of the conflict state plays the most crucial role when foreign leaders 
decide to intervene in a civil conflict. Geographic proximity, hostile relations with the 
conflict state and interventions by rivals or allies are some of the key international 
factors motivating both democratic and autocratic leaders to intervene in civil 
conflicts. The substantive effects of the rest of the international factors seem to differ 
for democracies and autocracies, particularly with respect to how they choose sides in 
a civil conflict. Hence, sub-sample analyses prove extremely useful for observing 
these differences. Nevertheless, international factors in general play the most decisive 
role for both democracies and autocracies. Since some of the hypotheses related to 
rivalry, the strategic impact of other interveners, type of resources and trade have not 
been adequately tested in quantitative studies before, the findings from the sub-
sample analyses provide an improved understanding of the role of these factors in the 
intervention decisions of democratic and autocratic leaders.  
Third, domestic factors tend to have the second most significant impact on the 
intervention decisions of leaders after international factors. The sub-sample analyses 
show that ethnic ties with the conflict state motivate both democratic and autocratic 
leaders to intervene in civil conflicts. Elite and mass unrest also constrains autocratic 
leaders’ intervention behavior whereas intervention decisions of democratic leaders 
are not influenced by domestic unrest. Since regime similarity also affects the 




are quite important when autocratic leaders are deciding to intervene. The literature 
would benefit from analyzing the domestic sources of foreign policy decision making 
not only for democracies but also for autocracies.  
Fourth, contextual factors seem to play a smaller role than international and 
domestic factors when states are deciding to intervene in a civil conflict. Although the 
intensity of the conflict and rebel fighting capacity influence the probability of 
military intervention by democracies and autocracies, their impact is not as critical as 
the other factors related to the international and domestic sources of intervention. 
These findings indicate once more that quantitative intervention studies using a 
conflict-oriented approach cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the motives of 
interveners by focusing on the attributes of the civil conflict. Although contextual 
factors do contribute to the decision making of potential interveners, the findings in 
this study demonstrate that they are not as critical as the strategic international and 
domestic considerations of leaders for the intervention decision. One important 
exception to this is the regime type of the conflict state because it has a much more 
significant impact on the intervention behavior of states than other contextual factors. 
When the conflict state is democratic, autocratic third parties are more likely to 
intervene on the rebel side while democratic interveners are more likely to support the 
government side. Ironically, neither regime type nor regime similarity has been 
studied sufficiently in quantitative intervention studies using a conflict-oriented 
approach. The findings in this study suggest that regime type of the conflict state and 




To sum up, sub-sample analyses provide a thorough understanding of the 
impact of international, domestic and contextual factors on the intervention behavior 
of democracies and autocracies. They also show that analyzing leaders’ international 
and domestic considerations which influence their perception of the strategic 
significance of the conflict state or the civil conflict is more conducive to 
understanding the rationale behind military interventions than just focusing on 
contextual factors. Bringing the much needed foreign policy analysis into the 
quantitative study of interventions leads to important findings in the case of both 




















Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
 
Review of the Study 
Back in 1969, Rosenau argued that “the factors that foster, precipitate, sustain, 
channel, constrain, and curb intervention” had not been explored scientifically (1969, 
p. 150). Since then, the majority of the progress towards a scientific understanding of 
the causes of interventions came from qualitative studies. With regard to foreign 
military interventions, these case studies offered important theoretical insights on 
why some countries decided to use this foreign policy instrument in specific civil 
conflicts, but they fell short on providing generalizations about the rationale behind 
foreign military interventions. In the late 90s, more scholars have adopted 
quantitative techniques to study third party interventions in civil conflicts. While most 
of the recent quantitative studies have examined the impact of foreign military 
interventions on the dynamics and outcomes of civil conflicts, only a small amount of 
quantitative research has been conducted on the causes of military interventions. 
More importantly, the recent quantitative research has neglected the decision making 
calculus of the intervener and focused more on the attributes of the civil conflict that 
attract third party intervention. Foreign policy analysis, the dominant analytical 
framework in earlier qualitative studies, has been minimized in the recent quantitative 
literature as the theoretical emphasis shifted from the intervener to the civil conflict. 
The purpose of this study was to advance the current state of knowledge on 
the causes of biased military interventions by focusing on the foreign policy decision 




study was to identify some of the main factors that motivate foreign powers to 
intervene militarily in civil conflicts, the second major contribution was to bring the 
much needed theoretical framework of foreign policy analysis into the quantitative 
study of military interventions.  By uncovering the empirical patterns in the rationale 
behind military interventions through a more suitable theoretical perspective, this 
study aimed to make theoretical and empirical contributions to the current 
quantitative literature on military interventions. 
In order to identify the factors that motivate state leaders to use military 
intervention as a foreign policy instrument, this dissertation analyzed the international 
and domestic sources of foreign policy decision making through a modified realist 
approach (Huth 1998). There are several reasons which make modified realism an 
appropriate theoretical framework for studying the rationale behind military 
interventions. First, it is able to account for both international and domestic sources of 
foreign policy decisions as well as the systematic linkages between them. Second, 
modified realism can also account for the contextual factors related to the civil 
conflict that affect the decision making calculus of foreign leaders. Thus, the 
modified realist framework used in this study was able to synthesize the actor-
oriented and conflict-oriented approaches while making the potential intervener 
theoretically central and incorporating the attributes of the civil conflict that also 
affect leaders’ foreign policy decision making.  
Hypotheses on the international, domestic and contextual factors that are 
likely to affect foreign leaders’ decisions were derived from modified realism. Since 




a civil conflict are closely related, some of the same factors were hypothesized to 
influence both decisions. These hypotheses were first tested against a dataset that 
included both actual and potential interveners in civil conflicts between 1946 and 
2002. In order to check the robustness of results and to better understand the relative 
importance of critical factors for different types of states, these hypotheses were then 
tested against three important sub-samples: major powers, democracies and 
autocracies.   
The empirical findings from the statistical analyses in the full sample provided 
support for many of the hypotheses derived from modified realism. Some of these 
findings were quite novel while others were consistent with the previous findings in 
the literature. The sub-sample analyses, on the other hand, offered an improved 
understanding of the factors that particularly motivate major powers, democracies and 
autocracies. The similarities between the sub-sample analyses demonstrated the 
robustness of the results from the full sample. However, these additional analyses also 
proved useful for observing the differences between sub-samples that could not be 
captured in the full sample analysis.  
The next section summarizes the key findings on international, domestic and 
contextual factors that “foster” or “curb” the use of military intervention in civil 
conflicts as a foreign policy tool by state leaders (Rosenau 1969, p. 150). The 
theoretical significance and policy implications of these findings are also discussed in 






 Summary Findings and Theoretical Implications 
International Sources of Intervention 
This study argued that foreign leaders pay attention to the strategic importance 
of the conflict state for their country as well as the strategic significance of the 
conflict environment when they are deciding whether and on whose side to intervene 
in a civil conflict. Hence, hypotheses were postulated about the international factors 
which make the conflict state or the civil conflict strategically important for foreign 
leaders. Political, military and economic relations with the conflict state and the 
existence of perceived strategic interests which can also stem from the military 
interventions of allies and rivals in the civil conflict country were among these critical 
international factors.   
The findings from the full sample demonstrate that the most crucial factors 
which prompt foreign leaders to intervene in civil conflicts are historical ties, 
geographic proximity, hostile relations with the conflict state and military 
interventions by rivals and allies. These same factors also have some of the most 
critical impact on whose side foreign leaders decide to intervene in a civil conflict. 
Although these results are mostly confirmed in the sub-sample analyses, some 
differences are also observed between different types of states. Historical ties do not 
influence autocratic leaders’ decisions on whether and on whose side to intervene in 
conflicts. In the case of major powers, alliance ties with the conflict state also 
increase the probability of intervention and the probability of supporting the 
government side significantly. Thus, major powers are the only group of states which 




The impact of contiguity and historical ties on leaders’ intervention decisions 
confirms the previous findings in the literature. However, neither the role of hostile 
relations such as rivalry and militarized disputes with the conflict state nor the 
reactions of foreign powers in response to interventions by their rivals or allies have 
been examined adequately in the recent quantitative literature. In contrast, qualitative 
studies have emphasized such strategic considerations of foreign leaders and argued 
that states can intervene in reaction to a rival intervention or in order to weaken a 
rival government. This is one of the few large-N studies demonstrating that these 
strategic considerations motivate many third party states to intervene in civil 
conflicts.  
The findings show that although international economic factors, such as trade 
ties and resource wealth of the conflict, affect the intervention probability of foreign 
powers, they play a much smaller role compared to the international factors discussed 
above. The existence of petroleum in the conflict state motivates foreign powers to 
intervene in civil conflicts more than trade ties. Secondary diamonds, on the other 
hand, do not affect the intervention likelihood of foreign powers. The sub-sample 
analyses provide a more nuanced understanding of the role of trade relations in the 
intervention decisions of leaders. While stronger trade ties with the conflict state 
increase the probability of intervention by democracies, they have no impact on the 
intervention decisions of autocratic leaders. This is also a novel finding in the 
quantitative literature since trade ties with the conflict state have not been examined 




The sub-sample analyses also demonstrate that economic factors have a more 
critical impact when foreign powers choose sides in a civil conflict. Autocracies are 
more likely to intervene on the rebel side when there are secondary diamonds in the 
conflict state whereas they are more likely to support the government when there is 
petroleum. On the other hand, the type of resources has no effect on which side 
democracies intervene but stronger trade ties increase their likelihood of supporting 
the government. While the relationship between third party intervention and resource 
wealth of the conflict state has been analyzed in recent quantitative studies, the 
different effects of resources on democratic and autocratic third parties have not been 
studied in detail before. Overall, this study offers an improved understanding of how 
the economic significance of the conflict state affects the intervention decision 
making of democracies and autocracies.  
Finally, international factors that were included as control variables in the 
study also have considerable effects on the intervention decision, particularly in the 
case of democracies. Involvement in an interstate war constrains the intervention 
behavior of democracies whereas the intervention decisions of autocracies and major 
powers are not affected by it. Power differentials are much more important for 
democracies than autocracies as well which indicates that democracies are more 
likely to intervene when the conflict state is weaker. In short, control variables have a 
more significant impact on the intervention decision making of democracies than 
autocracies which could only be captured in the sub-sample analyses. However, the 




intervention behavior of democracies and autocracies. The only group of states that 
had a higher probability of intervention during the Cold War was major powers. 
Domestic Sources of Intervention 
This study argued that the regime type of interveners, ethnic ties with the 
conflict state and domestic unrest are likely to have critical impacts on the 
intervention decisions of foreign leaders. Among these three factors, ethnic ties have 
been analyzed the most in the literature and there is more consensus on the role of 
ethnic ties among scholars. On the other hand, the regime type of interveners and the 
domestic unrest in the intervener state have not been studied as extensively and the 
findings from existing studies are mixed.  
The findings from the full sample indicate that the domestic sources of 
intervention decisions are quite crucial. As a group, domestic factors play the most 
significant role in intervention decision making after historical ties, geographic 
proximity, hostile relations with the conflict state and military interventions by rivals 
and allies. However, sub-sample analyses indicate that there are important differences 
between democracies, autocracies and major powers with respect to the substantive 
impact of domestic factors on their intervention decisions. Therefore, the combined 
findings from the full sample and sub-sample analyses facilitate an improved 
understanding of the domestic sources of intervention behavior.  
One of the most important findings in this study has to do with the regime 
type of the intervener. Although the impact of regime type on interventions in civil 
conflicts has not been studied as comprehensively as its effect on interstate conflicts, 




arrived at contradictory results. Some scholars conclude that regime type has no 
significant impact on intervention likelihood (i.e. Lemke and Regan 2004), while 
others argue that democracies are more likely to intervene in civil conflicts (i.e. 
Kathman 2011). The findings from the full sample in this study show that 
democracies are less likely to intervene in civil conflicts than autocracies, which is 
more consistent with the findings from the conflict literature. Scholars analyzing the 
impact of regime type on involvement in interstate wars or military disputes have 
pointed out the cautious and selective attitudes of democratic leaders in initiating 
wars (Reiter and Stam 1998; Reed and Clark 2000; Clark and Reed 2003; Bueno de 
Mesquita et. al. 2004). This study indicates that democratic leaders are also more 
selective than autocratic leaders when they intervene militarily in civil conflicts.  
This dissertation also shows that regime similarity has a crucial impact on the 
intervention behavior of states, particularly in the case of autocracies. Although joint 
democracy does not increase the probability of intervention; when democracies do 
intervene in civil conflicts, they are more likely to intervene on behalf of democratic 
governments instead of against them. This finding is consistent with what Hermann 
and Kegley found in a series of studies on interventions in interstate and intrastate 
conflicts (1995, 1996, 2001). On the other hand, joint autocracy increases both the 
probability of military intervention and the probability of supporting the government 
side. However, the sub-sample analyses also indicate that regime similarity has a 
more dramatic impact on how autocracies choose sides in a civil conflict compared to 




light on the role of regime type and regime similarity in intervention decision making 
than the existing quantitative studies on military interventions in civil conflicts.  
Ethnic ties with the conflict state are quite critical for both democracies and 
autocracies. In fact, ethnic ties have the largest impact among the domestic sources of 
intervention decision. While neither democratic nor autocratic leaders use military 
interventions as a form of diversionary foreign policy behavior when they are faced 
with domestic problems, elite unrest and mass unrest curb the use of military 
intervention in the case of autocracies. These results are consistent with some 
previous findings in the literature but they also indicate that domestic factors in 
general, including regime similarity, are quite important for autocracies. The 
literature has mostly focused on the impact of domestic factors on the foreign policy 
decision making of democracies, but the findings in this study indicate that foreign 
policy decision making of autocracies is influenced by domestic sources as well.  
Finally, the sub-sample analyses show that major powers are quite different 
than the rest of the states in terms of the effect of domestic factors on their 
intervention behavior. The role of domestic factors is quite minimal when major 
powers decide to intervene in civil conflicts. They are the only group of states in 
which ethnic ties do not affect the intervention decision. Regime similarity also has a 
relatively smaller effect on the intervention decisions of major powers compared to 
other states. These findings indicate that strategic international considerations are 





Contextual Sources of Intervention 
As discussed before, existing quantitative studies have analyzed the attributes 
of the civil conflict more frequently than the international and domestic 
considerations of interveners in order to understand the causes of military 
interventions. This study also posited that certain contextual factors are likely to 
affect the intervention decisions of foreign leaders. However, the findings show that 
contextual factors have a much smaller impact on the intervention probability of 
foreign powers compared to international and domestic factors. Foreign powers are 
more likely to intervene in a civil conflict as the number of battle deaths and refugees 
increase, but they are less likely to become involved militarily when rebels’ fighting 
capacity increases relative to government forces. These results indicate that states are 
more likely to avoid civil conflicts that have the potential to experience a stalemate 
whereas the increasing conflict intensity does not have the same impact on potential 
interveners.  
Moreover, the regime type of the conflict state is quite important when third 
parties choose sides in a civil conflict. Autocratic third parties also pay attention to 
the regime type of conflict states when they are deciding to intervene. Despite its 
significance, the regime type of the conflict state is one of the least analyzed 
contextual factors in the conflict-oriented quantitative studies.  
One of the conclusions of this study is that while the contextual factors, which 
have been frequently analyzed in the literature, contribute to the intervention decision 




applying a foreign policy analysis that focuses on the international and domestic 
sources of intervention is more productive for theoretical and empirical purposes.  
Policy Implications 
Foreign military interventions have been a persistent feature of international 
politics and they will continue to occur frequently in civil conflicts if measures to 
prevent them are not taken by the international community. Academic studies on the 
short and long-term impacts of foreign military interventions show that they can have 
devastating effects on conflict states. Biased military interventions tend to increase 
the duration and intensity of civil conflicts significantly according to empirical 
findings in the literature. Scholars examining the long-term political effects of 
interventions argue that even military interventions by democratic third parties do not 
facilitate the process of democratization in conflict states. In fact, they can eventually 
lead to more authoritarian systems in target states (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 
2006). None of these findings are surprising since biased militarily interventions are 
not conflict resolution efforts. Foreign leaders interpret the threats or opportunities 
posed by the civil conflict in terms of their own international and domestic strategic 
considerations when they provide military support to one of the domestic opponents. 
As this study shows, some of the main factors that prompt states to intervene on the 
rebel side are rivalry and militarized disputes with the target state. 
While biased military interventions will continue to occur in civil conflicts, it 
is possible to minimize their negative political and social effects on conflict states by 
reducing their frequency. However, this can only happen if the international 




military interventions make conflicts more intractable. Foreign military interventions, 
even with the best of intentions such as protecting ethnic minorities, have damaging 
effects on societies in the short run as well as in the long run.  
International and regional organizations are involved in different conflict 
resolution efforts in various civil conflicts around the world. While there has been an 
increase in the number of multilateral conflict resolution efforts that are neutral in 
nature, they are not always very effective in resolving civil conflicts. This is partly 
caused by the inability or the reluctance of the international community to intervene 
early in civil conflicts and apply effective mediation strategies to resolve the issues 
between disputants before the conflict escalates. However, it is also caused by the 
reactions of policy makers towards biased military interventions. The international 
community tends to be unresponsive towards biased military interventions. Strong 
reactions to foreign military interventions are quite rare. If the international 
community wants to resolve civil conflicts, then policy makers also have to find ways 
to reduce the occurrence of foreign military interventions. Understanding the motives 
of interveners can be useful for finding effective methods to minimize biased military 
interventions and for preventing their adverse effects on civil conflicts. 
This study shows that rivalry and militarized disputes with the conflict state 
motivate foreign powers to intervene on the rebel side in civil conflicts. If the 
international community focuses on resolving these interstate disputes through 
diplomatic methods including mediation, then the frequency of biased military 
interventions can decrease. Similarly, foreign powers that are likely to intervene due 




participate in neutral peacekeeping efforts. In other words, if the international 
community can predict which external states are likely to intervene in a civil conflict, 
they can attempt to prevent these interventions by mediating between rival states or 
by attempting to persuade potential interveners to participate in neutral conflict 
resolution operations headed by objective third parties.  
While these methods might work for some potential interveners, others may 
not be dissuaded from intervening easily. In such cases, at least three options are 
available to the foreign policy community. One option is to include potential 
interveners in the mediation process along with the domestic party they are 
supporting. Although this might seem unconventional or problematic to other 
domestic parties involved in the civil conflict, excluding them from the mediation 
process can be more damaging in the long run. If mediators prefer to use this option, 
they should pay close attention to the motives of interveners. While interveners with 
certain motives, such as the protection of an ethnic group in a conflict state, might be 
eligible for inclusion in the negotiation process, third party states who want to exploit 
the natural resources of a conflict state would not be eligible. Therefore, the second 
option for the international community is to prevent biased military interventions by 
strengthening the international norms against it and by applying effective diplomatic 
and economic sanctions against interveners. Finally, increasing the quantity and 
quality of multilateral conflict resolution and conflict prevention efforts is one of the 
most effective ways to prevent biased military interventions. If the international 




actions before civil conflicts escalate, then they will be more successful at deterring 
biased military interventions.  
Neither the current international norms nor the intensity of conflict resolution 
efforts are deterring foreign powers from intervening and making civil conflicts more 
intractable. However, the international community is also not benefitting from the 
willingness of some states to intervene militarily to protect victims of civil conflicts 
such as ethnic groups. The resources such third party states want to commit to a civil 
conflict can be effectively utilized in multilateral peacekeeping missions headed by 
neutral states. In other words, knowing the motives of potential interveners can be 
very useful in determining the best method to prevent them from intervening 
militarily on one side and making the conflict eventually more complicated for the 
international community to resolve in the long run.  
Future Research Directions 
The quantitative literature on the causes of foreign military interventions is 
still at a developing stage. The number of empirical studies analyzing the motives of 
interveners is quite small in the literature. More importantly, the existing studies are 
not using theoretical frameworks which are conducive to foreign policy analysis. By 
applying a modified realist framework, this study was able to shed more light on the 
motives of interveners than previous quantitative studies. However, more research 
still needs to be conducted to understand the motives behind third party interventions 
and future works should adopt theoretical frameworks that are more suitable to 




One trajectory for future research is to collect more data on other possible 
causes of biased military interventions and expand the scope of empirical analysis 
which will allow more empirical patterns to emerge. For instance, while this 
dissertation included the regime type of the conflict state in the analysis, it did not 
examine the political ideology of the rebel groups. Currently, data are not available 
about the political ideologies of opposition groups in all civil conflicts but it is 
reasonable to expect that foreign states sharing the same political ideology would be 
more willing to support the opposition militarily.  
Another promising trajectory for further research is to compare the causes of 
biased and neutral military interventions. Although neutral military interventions such 
as peacekeeping missions are conflict resolution efforts, states participating in such 
operations can have strategic international and domestic considerations motivating 
them as well. This type of comparative analysis is particularly important for its policy 
implications. As discussed in the previous section, understanding the motives of 
interveners can help the international community devise more effective measures to 
prevent biased interventions. If there are similarities between the motives of biased 
and neutral interveners, then it might be possible to persuade potential interveners to 
participate in neutral conflict resolution efforts. Thus, analyzing the factors that 
motivate states to resort to biased versus neutral military interventions would be 
fruitful for both theory and policy purposes.  
Examining the causes of foreign military interventions is also critical for 
understanding their impacts on civil conflict dynamics and outcomes. Interventions 




intensity and outcomes of conflicts. Several studies that distinguish between the 
motives of interveners have already showed that there is a close relationship between 
the causes and consequences of interventions (i.e. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 
2005, Gent 2008, Cunningham 2010). Therefore, another trajectory for future 
research is to study the effects of biased military interventions based on the particular 
motives of interveners. This kind of research will provide a more refined 
understanding of the consequences of interventions and help policy makers devise 
better strategies to minimize the occurrence of interventions with the most threatening 
short term and long term effects.  
This study has attempted to contribute to the scientific and systematic study of 
interventions, but there are still more questions to be answered in future research. 
Some of these important questions are outlined above based on their potential 
contribution to both theory and policy. The challenges posed by civil conflicts are 
already great and biased interventions complicate them even further. Theoretically 
driven empirical research on the causes and consequences of biased interventions can 
help policy makers fine-tune their conflict resolution methods and reduce the adverse 





Appendix A: Civil Conflicts 1946-2002 
 
ID Conflict Name Conflict Years 
100 Afghanistan – Mujahideen groups,  UIFSA 1978-2001 
101 Algeria – GIA, MIA/FIS/AIS 1991-2002 
102 Angola – Unita 1975-1995, 1998-2002 
103 Angola – Cabinda 1991, 1994, 1996-1998, 2002 
104 Argentina – Military faction 1955 
105 Argentina – Military faction 1963 
106 Argentina – ERP 1974-1977 
107 Azerbaijan – Nagorno Karabakh 1992-1994 
108 Azerbaijan – Military faction 1993 
109 Azerbaijan – OPON forces 1995 
110 Bangladesh – JSS/SB 1975-1992 
111 Bolivia – Popular Revolutionary Movement 1946 
112 Bolivia – MNR 1952 
113 Bolivia – ELN 1967 
114 Bosnia – Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1992-1995  
115 Bosnia – Western Bosnia 1993-1995 
116 Bosnia – Croatian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1993-1994 
117 Burkina Faso – Popular Front 1987 
118 Burundi – Military faction 1965 
119 Burundi – CNDD, Palipehutu 1991-1992, 1994-2002 
120 Cambodia – KR 1967-1975 
121 Cambodia – KR, KPNLF, FUNCINPEC 1978-1998 
122 Cameroon – UPC 1960-1961 
123 Cameroon – Military faction 1984 
124 Central African Republic – Military faction 2001-2002 
125 Chad – Anti-government groups 1966-1972, 1976-1984, 1986-
1987, 1989-1994, 1997-2002 
126 Chile – Military faction 1973 
127 China – Peoples Liberation Army 1946-1949  
128 China – Taiwanese insurgents 1947 
129 China – Tibet 1950 
130 China – Tibet 1956, 1959 
131 Colombia – FARC, ELN, M-19 1964-2002 




133 Comoros – MPA 1997 
134 Congo – Cobras, Cocoyes, Ninjas, Ntsiloulous 1993-1994, 1997-1999, 2002 
135 Costa Rica – National Liberation Army 1948 
136 Cote d’Ivoire – MJP, MPCI, MPIGO 2002 
137 Croatia – Serbian Republic of Krajina 1992-1993, 1995 
138 Cuba – Cuban Revolution Movement  1953 
139 Cuba – 26th of July Movement 1956-1958  
140 Cuba – Cuban Revolutionary Council 1961 
141 DRC/Zaire – Katanga  1960-1962 
142 DRC/Zaire – South Kasai 1960-1962 
143 DRC/Zaire – CNL 1964-1965 
144 DRC/Zaire – Opposition Militias  1967 
145 DRC/Zaire – FLNC 1977-1978 
146 DRC/Zaire – AFDL, MLC, RCD 1996-2001 
147 South Yemen – Yemenite Socialist Party 1986 
148 Djibouti – FRUD 1991-1994, 1999 
149 Dominican Republic – Military faction 1965 
150 Egypt – al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya 1993-1998 
151 El Salvador – Military faction  1972 
152 El Salvador – FMLN 1979-1991 
153 Equatorial Guinea – Military faction 1979 
154 Eritrea – EIJM-AS 1997, 1999 
155 Ethiopia – Military faction 1960 
156 Ethiopia – ELF (Eritrea)  1964-1991 
157 Ethiopia – ALF 1975-1976  
158 Ethiopia – EPRP, EPDM, TPLF 1976-1991 
159 Ethiopia – WSLF (Ogaden)  1976-1983 
160 Ethiopia – OLF 1977-1978, 1980-1981, 1983-
1985, 1987-1991  
161 Ethiopia – OLF 1999-2002 
162 Ethiopia – ALF 1989-1991, 1996 
163 Ethiopia – ONLF (Ogaden)  1996, 1998-2002 
164 Ethiopia – Somali  1996-1997, 1999 
165 France – OAS 1961-1962  
166 Gabon – Military faction 1964 
167 Gambia – NRC 1981 
168 Georgia – Anti-government alliance 1991-1993  
169 Georgia – Abkhazia  1992-1993  
170 Georgia – South Ossetia  1992 




172 Ghana – Military Faction  1981 
173 Ghana – Military Faction 1983 
174 Greece – DSE 1946-1949 
175 Guatemala – Military faction 1949 
176 Guatemala – Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas 1954 
177 Guatemala – FAR I, FAR II, EGP, URNG 1965-1995 
178 Guinea – RFDG 2000-2001  
179 Guinea-Bissau – Military Junta 1998-1999 
180 Haiti – Military faction 1989 
181 Haiti – Military faction 1991 
182 India – CPI 1948-1951  
183 India – CPI 1969-1971 
184 India – NNC (Nagaland)  1956-1959, 1961-1968  
185 India – MNF  1966-1968 
186 India – TNV (Tripura)  1978-1988  
187 India – PLA (Manipur) 1982-1988, 1992-2000  
188 India – Punjab/Khalistan 1983-1993 
189 India – Kashmir  1989-2002 
190 India – ABSU (Bodoland) 1989-1990, 1993-2002 
191 India – PWG, MCC  1990-1994, 1996-2002 
192 India – ULFA (Assam) 1990-1991, 1994-2002 
193 India – NSCN (Nagaland)  1992-1997, 2000 
194 India – ATTF, NLFT (Tripura) 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-2002 
195 Indonesia – Republic of South Moluccas 1950 
196 Indonesia – Darul Islam Movement 1953, 1958-1961  
197 Indonesia – OPM 1965, 1967-1969 
198 Indonesia – OPM 1976-1978 
199 Indonesia – Fretilin (East Timor)  1975-1989, 1992, 1997-1998 
200 Indonesia – GAM (Aceh)  1990-1991 
201 Indonesia – GAM (Aceh) 1999-2002 
202 Iran – Republic of Kurdistan  1946 
203 Iran – Republic of Azerbaijan  1946 
204 Iran – KDPI 1966-1968  
205 Iran – KDPI  1979-1988, 1990, 1993, 1996  
206 Iran – APCO 1979-1980 
207 Iran – MEK 1979-1982, 1986-1988, 1991-
1993, 1997, 1999-2001 
208 Iraq – Military faction  1958 
209 Iraq – Military faction  1959 




211 Iraq – KDP 1961-1970, 1973-1993, 1995-
1996 
212 Iraq – SCIRI  1982-1984, 1987, 1991-1996  
213 Israel – PLO groups 1949-1996, 2000-2002 
214 Israel – Hezbollah  1990-1999 
215 Kenya – Military faction 1982 
216 Laos – Pathet Lao 1959-1961, 1963-1973 
217 Laos – LRM 1989-1990 
218 Lebanon – Independent Nasserite Movement 1958 
219 Lebanon – LNM/NSF 1975-1976  
220 Lebanon – LNM/NSF, Amal, NUF 1982-1986, 1989-1990 
221 Lesotho – Military faction 1998 
222 Liberia – Military faction 1980 
223 Liberia – INPFL, NPFL 1989-1995 
224 Liberia – LURD 2000-2002 
225 Macedonia – UCK 2001 
226 Madagascar – Monima National Independence 
Movement 
1971 
227 Malaysia – CPM 1958-1960  
228 Malaysia – CPM 1974-1975 
229 Malaysia – CPM 1981 
230 Malaysia – CCO 1963-1966 
231 Mali – MPA, FIAA 1990, 1994 
232 Mauritania – Polisario 1975-1978 
233 Mexico – EZLN 1994 
234 Mexico – EPR 1996 
235 Moldova – Dniestr Republic 1992 
236 Morocco – Military faction 1971 
237 Morocco – Polisario 1975-1989 
238 Mozambique – Renamo 1977-1992 
239 Myanmar – CPB / ABSDF 1948-1988, 1990-1992, 1994 
240 Myanmar – Arakan  1948-1988, 1991-1992, 1994 
241 Myanmar – Karen 1949-1992, 1995, 1997-2002 
242 Myanmar – Mon 1949-1963 
243 Myanmar – Mon 1990 
244 Myanmar – Mon 1996 
245 Myanmar – Kachin  1949-1950 
246 Myanmar – Kachin  1961-1992 
247 Myanmar – Karenni  1957 




249 Myanmar – Shan  1959-1970, 1972-1973, 1976-
1988, 1993-2002 
250 Myanmar – Wa 1997 
251 Nepal – Nepali Congress 1960-1962 
252 Nepal – CPN-M 1996-2002 
253 Nicaragua – Contras/FDN 1978-1979, 1981-1989 
254 Niger – FLAA (Touareg) 1992 
255 Niger – UFRA (Touareg) 1997 
256 Niger – CRA (Air and Azawad) 1994 
257 Niger – FDR, FARS (Toubou) 1996-1997 
258 Nigeria – Military faction 1966 
259 Nigeria – Republic of Biafra 1967-1970 
260 Oman – PFLOAG/PFLO 1972-1975 
261 Pakistan – Mukti Bahini 1971 
262 Pakistan – Baluchi separatists 1974-1977 
263 Pakistan – MQM 1990, 1995-1996 
264 Panama – Military faction 1989 
265 Papua New Guinea – BRA 1989-1990, 1992-1996 
266 Paraguay – Opposition coalition 1947 
267 Paraguay – Military faction 1954 
268 Paraguay – Military faction 1989 
269 Peru – ELN, MIR 1965 
270 Peru – Sendero Luminoso, MRTA 1981-1999 
271 Philippines – HUK 1946-1954  
272 Philippines – CPP 1969-1995, 1997, 1999-2002 
273 Philippines – Mindanao  1970-1990, 1993-2002 
274 Republic of Vietnam – FNL 1955-1964 
275 Romania – National Salvation Front 1989 
276 USSR – Forest Brothers  1946-1948 
277 USSR – LNPA  1946 
278 USSR – BDPS 1946-1948 
279 USSR – UPA 1946-1950 
280 USSR – Republic of Armenia  1990-1991 
281 USSR – Azerbaijani Popular Front 1990 
282 Russia – Parliamentary Forces  1993 
283 Russia – Republic of Chechnya  1994-1996, 1999-2002 
284 Russia – Wahhabi Movement  1999 
285 Rwanda – FPR 1990-1994 
286 Rwanda – PALIR 1997-2002 




288 Senegal – MFDC 1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-
2001 
289 Sierra Leone – RUF, AFRC, Kamajors 1991-2000 
290 Somalia – Military faction 1978 
291 Somalia – SNM, SPM, USC/SNA, SRRC 1982-1984, 1986-1996, 2001-
2002 
292 South Africa – SWAPO 1966-1988 
293 South Africa – ANC 1981-1983, 1985-1988 
294 Spain – ETA 1978-1982, 1985-1987, 1991-
1992 
295 Sri Lanka – JVP 1971 
296 Sri Lanka – JVP 1989-1990 
297 Sri Lanka – LTTE, TELO 1984-2001 
298 Sudan – Anya Nya  1963-1972 
299 Sudan – Sudanese Communist Party 1971 
300 Sudan – Islamic Charter Front 1976 
301 Sudan – SPLM/A, NDA 1983-2002 
302 Surinam – SLA/Jungle Commando 1986-1988 
303 Syria – Military faction 1966 
304 Syria – Muslim Brotherhood 1979-1982 
305 Tajikistan – UTO, Movement for Peace  1992-1996, 1998 
306 Thailand – Military faction 1951 
307 Thailand – CPT 1974-1982 
308 Togo – MTD 1986 
309 Togo – Military faction 1991 
310 Trinidad and Tobago – Jamaat al-Muslimeen 1990 
311 Tunisia – Tunisian Armed Resistance 1980 
312 Turkey – PKK  1984-2002 
313 Turkey – Revolutionary Left 1991-1992 
314 Uganda – Military faction 1971 
315 Uganda – Military faction 1972 
316 Uganda – Military faction 1974 
317 Uganda – UNLF, FUNA, NRA, HSM, UPA 1978-1991 
318 Uganda – UDCA/LRA, ADF 1994-2002 
319 UK – IRA 1971-1991 
320 Uruguay – MLN/Tupamaros 1972 
321 Uzbekistan – IMU 2000 
322 Venezuela – Military faction 1962 
323 Venezuela – Military faction 1992 
324 North Yemen – Opposition coalition 1948 




326 North Yemen – National Democratic Front 1980-1982 
327 Yemen – Democratic Republic of Yemen 1994 
328 Yugoslavia – Republic of Slovenia 1991 
329 Yugoslavia – Republic of Croatia 1991 
330 Yugoslavia – UCK (Kosovo) 1998-1999 
























Appendix B: Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts 
 
ID Year Conflict State Intervener on 
government side 
Intervener on rebel side 
100 1978 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1979 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1980 Afghanistan USSR US, Pakistan, Iran 
100 1981 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1982 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1983 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1984 Afghanistan USSR US 
100 1985 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1986 Afghanistan USSR US 
100 1987 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1988 Afghanistan USSR  
100 1989 Afghanistan  US, Pakistan 
100 1990 Afghanistan  Pakistan 
100 1991 Afghanistan USSR Pakistan 
100 1992 Afghanistan Russia Pakistan 
100 1993 Afghanistan Russia Pakistan 
100 1994 Afghanistan Russia Pakistan 
100 1995 Afghanistan Russia Pakistan 
100 1996 Afghanistan  Pakistan 
100 1997 Afghanistan Pakistan  
100 1998 Afghanistan Pakistan  
100 2001 Afghanistan  US, UK, Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Turkey, Japan, 
Jordan, Netherlands, 
Poland, Russia 
101 1993 Algeria Egypt  
101 1996 Algeria Tunisia  
101 1997 Algeria  Sudan 
101 2000 Algeria Morocco  
101 2002 Algeria US   
102 1975 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, US, Zaire, 
China, North Korea 
102 1976 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, US, France, 
Zaire 
102 1977 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, France, 
Zaire, Morocco 
102 1978 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, France, 
Zaire, Morocco 





102 1980 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa 
102 1981 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa 
102 1982 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa 
102 1983 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa 
102 1984 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, Zaire 
102 1985 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, Zaire, US 
102 1986 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, Zaire, US 
102 1987 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, Zaire, US 
102 1988 Angola USSR, Cuba South Africa, Zaire, US 
102 1989 Angola USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany 
Zaire, US, Morocco 
102 1990 Angola USSR, Cuba Zaire, US, Morocco 
102 1991 Angola USSR, Cuba Zaire, US, Morocco 
102 1992 Angola  Zaire, US, Morocco 
102 1993 Angola US, Israel Zaire, Morocco, Congo, 
Togo 
102 1994 Angola  Zaire, Morocco, Congo, 
Togo 
102 1995 Angola  Zaire, Morocco, Congo, 
Togo 
102 1998 Angola DRC, Congo-Brazzaville Togo, Morocco 
102 1999 Angola DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Namibia    
Togo, Morocco 
102 2000 Angola DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Namibia 
Togo 
102 2001 Angola DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Namibia 
Togo 
103 1991 Angola USSR Zaire 
103 1994 Angola  Congo 
103 1996 Angola  Congo 
103 1998 Angola DRC, Congo-Brazzaville  
106 1975 Argentina Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Brazil, US 
 
106 1976 Argentina Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Brazil, US 
 
106 1977 Argentina Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Brazil, US 
 
107 1992 Azerbaijan Turkey Armenia 
107 1993 Azerbaijan Turkey Armenia 
107 1994 Azerbaijan  Armenia 
110 1975 Bangladesh  India  
110 1976 Bangladesh  India   
110 1977 Bangladesh  India   




114 1992 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
  Yugoslavia (Serbia) 
114 1993 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
  Yugoslavia (Serbia) 
114 1994 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
  Yugoslavia (Serbia)  
114 1995 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
  Yugoslavia (Serbia)  
116 1993 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
  Croatia 
119 1991 Burundi  Rwanda, Tanzania 
119 1995 Burundi France, US    
119 1996 Burundi France  Zaire, Tanzania 
119 1998 Burundi  DRC 
119 1999 Burundi  DRC, Zimbabwe 
119 2000 Burundi  DRC, Zimbabwe 
119 2001 Burundi  DRC 
119 2002 Burundi  DRC 
120 1967 Cambodia  Vietnam 
120 1968 Cambodia  Vietnam 
120 1969 Cambodia  Vietnam 
120 1970 Cambodia US, South Vietnam Vietnam 
120 1971 Cambodia US, South Vietnam Vietnam 
120 1972 Cambodia US, South Vietnam Vietnam 
120 1973 Cambodia US, South Vietnam Vietnam 
120 1974 Cambodia  Vietnam 
120 1975 Cambodia US Vietnam 
121 1978 Cambodia China Vietnam 
121 1979 Cambodia Laos, Vietnam USSR, China  
121 1980 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand 
121 1981 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand 
121 1982 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand, 
Singapore 
121 1983 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand, Malaysia 
121 1984 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand 
121 1985 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand 
121 1986 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand 
121 1987 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand 
121 1988 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand 
121 1989 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, Thailand, US, 
Singapore 
121 1990 Cambodia USSR, Vietnam   China, US 
121 1991 Cambodia USSR China, US 




122 1960 Cameroon France  
124 2001 Central African 
Republic 
Libya, Chad  
124 2002 Central African 
Republic 
Libya Chad 
125 1968 Chad France   
125 1969 Chad France   
125 1970 Chad France  Libya 
125 1971 Chad France  Libya 
125 1972 Chad France  Libya 
125 1976 Chad France   
125 1977 Chad France  Libya 
125 1978 Chad France  Libya 
125 1979 Chad France  US, Sudan, Egypt 
125 1980 Chad Libya    US, France, Sudan, Egypt 
125 1981 Chad Libya  US, France, Sudan, Egypt 
125 1982 Chad  US, France, Sudan, Egypt 
125 1983 Chad US, France, Sudan, Egypt, 
Zaire 
Libya 
125 1984 Chad US, France, Sudan, Egypt, 
Zaire 
Libya 
125 1986 Chad US, France, Zaire Libya 
125 1987 Chad US, France, Zaire Libya 
125 1989 Chad  Libya, Sudan  
125 1990 Chad US, France, Zaire, Iraq    Libya, Sudan  
125 1991 Chad France  
125 1992 Chad France  
125 1993 Chad France  
125 1994 Chad France  
125 1997 Chad France  
125 1998 Chad France  
125 1999 Chad France  
125 2000 Chad France  
125 2001 Chad France  
125 2002 Chad France  
127 1946 China US  
127 1947 China  USSR 
127 1948 China US  
127 1949 China US USSR 
129 1950 China  US 
130 1956 China  US 
130 1959 China  US 




131 1991 Colombia US  
131 1992 Colombia US  
131 1993 Colombia US  
131 1994 Colombia US  
131 1995 Colombia US  
131 1996 Colombia US  
131 1997 Colombia US  
131 1998 Colombia US  
131 1999 Colombia US  
131 2000 Colombia US  
131 2001 Colombia US  
131 2002 Colombia US  
134 1997 Congo  Angola, Chad 
134 1998 Congo Angola, Chad, France  
134 1999 Congo Angola, Chad  
134 2002 Congo Angola  
135 1948 Costa Rica Nicaragua, Honduras Guatemala 
136 2002 Cote d’Ivoire France, Angola Burkina Faso, Liberia 
137 1992 Croatia Slovenia, Hungary Yugoslavia (Serbia) 
137 1993 Croatia  Yugoslavia (Serbia) 
137 1995 Croatia US Serbian Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
140 1961 Cuba  US 
141 1960 DRC (Zaire)   Belgium  
141 1961 DRC (Zaire)   Belgium 
143 1964 DRC (Zaire)  Belgium, USA Burundi  
143 1965 DRC (Zaire)  US Burundi 
145 1977 DRC (Zaire)  US, France, Belgium, 
China, Morocco, Uganda 
Angola  
145 1978 DRC (Zaire)  US, France, Belgium, 
China 
Angola  
146 1996 DRC (Zaire)   Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia 
146 1997 DRC (Zaire)   Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia, 
Angola, Zimbabwe 
146 1998 DRC (Zaire)  Angola, Chad, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Sudan  
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi 
146 1999 DRC (Zaire)  Angola, Chad, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Sudan 
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi 
146 2000 DRC (Zaire)  Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe 
Rwanda, Uganda 
146 2001 DRC (Zaire)  Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe 
Rwanda, Uganda 
148 1991 Djibouti France  




148 1993 Djibouti France  
148 1994 Djibouti France  
148 1999 Djibouti France, Ethiopia Eritrea 
149 1965 Dominican Republic US  
150 1993 Egypt US Iran, Sudan 
150 1994 Egypt US Sudan   
150 1995 Egypt US Sudan   
150 1996 Egypt  Sudan   
150 1997 Egypt US Iran, Sudan 
150 1998 Egypt  Sudan   
152 1980 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1981 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1982 El Salvador US, Venezuela, Honduras Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1983 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1984 El Salvador US, Honduras Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1985 El Salvador US, Honduras Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1986 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1987 El Salvador US, Honduras Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1988 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1989 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1990 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
152 1991 El Salvador US Nicaragua, Cuba, USSR, 
Vietnam 
154 1997 Eritrea  Sudan 
154 1999 Eritrea  Sudan, Ethiopia 
156 1973 Ethiopia  Syria, Iraq, Libya 
156 1974 Ethiopia  Syria, Iraq, Libya 
156 1989 Ethiopia USSR Sudan 
156 1990 Ethiopia USSR, Israel  Syria, Libya, Iraq 
158 1976 Ethiopia US Sudan 
158 1977 Ethiopia USSR, Israel, Libya  Sudan 
158 1978 Ethiopia USSR, Israel, East 
Germany 
Sudan 
158 1979 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany Sudan 




158 1981 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany Sudan 
158 1982 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany Sudan 
158 1983 Ethiopia USSR, Israel, East 
Germany 
Sudan 
158 1984 Ethiopia USSR, Israel, East 
Germany, Cuba     
Sudan 
158 1985 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany, 
Cuba, North Korea    
Sudan 
158 1986 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany, 
North Korea     
Sudan 
158 1987 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany, 
Cuba, North Korea    
Sudan 
158 1988 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany, 
Cuba, North Korea 
Sudan 
158 1989 Ethiopia USSR, East Germany, 
North Korea     
Sudan 
158 1990 Ethiopia USSR, Israel   Sudan 
158 1991 Ethiopia  Sudan 
159 1976 Ethiopia Cuba  
159 1977 Ethiopia Cuba Somalia 
159 1978 Ethiopia Cuba Somalia 
159 1979 Ethiopia Cuba  
159 1980 Ethiopia Cuba  
159 1981 Ethiopia Cuba  
159 1982 Ethiopia Cuba  
159 1983 Ethiopia Cuba  
161 1999 Ethiopia  Eritrea 
163 1999 Ethiopia  Eritrea 
166 1964 Gabon France  
167 1981 Gambia Senegal  
169 1993 Georgia Russia    
174 1947 Greece US Albania, Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia 
174 1948 Greece  Albania, Bulgaria 
174 1949 Greece  Albania 
176 1954 Guatemala  US  
177 1966 Guatemala US   
177 1971 Guatemala US  
177 1975 Guatemala US  
177 1976 Guatemala US  
177 1977 Guatemala US, Israel, Taiwan, 
Argentina 
 
177 1978 Guatemala Israel, Taiwan, Argentina  




177 1980 Guatemala US, Israel, Taiwan, 
Argentina 
 
177 1981 Guatemala US, Israel, Taiwan, 
Argentina 
 




177 1983 Guatemala US, Israel, Taiwan, 
Argentina 
 
177 1984 Guatemala US  
177 1985 Guatemala US  
177 1986 Guatemala US  
177 1987 Guatemala US  
177 1988 Guatemala US  
177 1989 Guatemala US  
177 1990 Guatemala US  
179 1998 Guinea-Bissau Guinea, Senegal  
179 1999 Guinea-Bissau Guinea, Senegal  
186 1983 India  Bangladesh 
186 1984 India  Bangladesh 
187 1992 India  Bangladesh, Pakistan 
187 1993 India  Bangladesh 
189 1989 India  Pakistan 
189 1990 India  Pakistan 
189 1991 India  Pakistan 
190 1994 India  Bhutan 
190 1996 India  Bhutan 
190 2000 India  Bhutan 
190 2001 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
191 1998 India  Pakistan 
191 2000 India  Pakistan 
192 1990 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 1991 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 1994 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 1995 India Myanmar Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 1996 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 1997 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 1998 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 1999 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 
192 2000 India  Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan 
192 2001 India  Bangladesh, Bhutan 




193 1992 India  Bangladesh, Pakistan 
193 1993 India  Pakistan 
193 1996 India  Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Burma 
193 2000 India  China 
194 2001 India  Bangladesh 
194 2002 India  Bangladesh 
196 1953 Indonesia  Malaysia, US  
196 1958 Indonesia US, Czechoslovakia, 
USSR 
 
196 1959 Indonesia US  
198 1976 Indonesia US  
198 1977 Indonesia US  
198 1978 Indonesia US  
199 1976 Indonesia US  
199 1977 Indonesia US  
199 1978 Indonesia US  
199 1979 Indonesia US  
199 1980 Indonesia US  
199 1981 Indonesia US  
199 1982 Indonesia US  
199 1983 Indonesia US  
199 1984 Indonesia US  
199 1985 Indonesia US  
199 1986 Indonesia US  
199 1987 Indonesia US  
199 1988 Indonesia US  
199 1989 Indonesia US  
199 1992 Indonesia US  
199 1997 Indonesia US  
199 1998 Indonesia US  
200 1990 Indonesia US  
200 1991 Indonesia US  
202 1946 Iran  USSR 
203 1946 Iran  USSR 
204 1966 Iran  Iraq 
205 1979 Iran  Iraq 
205 1981 Iran  Iraq 
206 1979 Iran  Iraq 
207 1986 Iran  Iraq 
207 1987 Iran  Iraq 




207 1991 Iran  Iraq 
207 1992 Iran  Iraq 
207 1993 Iran  Iraq 
207 1997 Iran  Iraq 
207 1999 Iran  Iraq 
207 2000 Iran  Iraq 
207 2001 Iran  Iraq 
211 1961 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1962 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1963 Iraq Syria Iran, Israel 
211 1964 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1965 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1966 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1967 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1968 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1969 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1970 Iraq  Iran, Israel 
211 1973 Iraq USSR Iran, Israel 
211 1974 Iraq USSR Iran, Israel 
211 1975 Iraq USSR Iran 
211 1983 Iraq Turkey Iran 
211 1986 Iraq Turkey Iran 
211 1987 Iraq Turkey  
211 1989 Iraq  Syria 
211 1996 Iraq  Iran, US 
212 1982 Iraq  Iran  
212 1983 Iraq  Iran 
212 1984 Iraq  Iran 
212 1987 Iraq  Iran 
212 1991 Iraq  Iran 
212 1992 Iraq  Iran 
212 1993 Iraq  Iran 
212 1994 Iraq  Iran 
212 1995 Iraq  Iran 
212 1996 Iraq  Iran 
213 1949 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1950 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1951 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 





213 1953 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1954 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1955 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1956 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1957 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1958 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1959 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1960 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1961 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1962 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1963 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1964 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1965 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1966 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1967 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1968 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1969 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1970 Israel US Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq 
213 1971 Israel US Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq 
213 1972 Israel US Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq 
213 1973 Israel US Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq 
213 1974 Israel US Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq 
213 1975 Israel US Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 
Algeria, South Yemen 
213 1976 Israel US Egypt, Iraq, Libya 
213 1977 Israel US Syria, Iraq, Libya 
213 1978 Israel US Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, 
South Yemen, USSR, 
Cuba 
213 1979 Israel US Syria, Libya, Yemen, 





213 1980 Israel US Syria, Libya, Algeria, 
USSR 
213 1981 Israel US Libya 
213 1982 Israel US Syria, Libya, Algeria, 
South Yemen, USSR, 
China, North Korea 
213 1983 Israel US Syria, Libya 
213 1984 Israel US Syria 
213 1985 Israel US Syria 
213 1986 Israel US Syria 
213 1987 Israel US Syria 
213 1988 Israel US Syria 
213 1989 Israel US Syria, Lebanon 
213 1990 Israel US  
213 1991 Israel US  
213 1992 Israel US  
213 1993 Israel US Syria, Iran 
213 1994 Israel US Syria, Iran 
213 1995 Israel US Syria 
213 1996 Israel US  
213 2000 Israel US  
213 2001 Israel US Syria, Iran 
213 2002 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1990 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1991 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1992 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1993 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1994 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1995 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1996 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1997 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1998 Israel US Syria, Iran 
214 1999 Israel US Syria, Iran 
216 1959 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
North Vietnam, USSR 
216 1960 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, China, North 
Vietnam 
216 1961 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, China, North 
Vietnam 
216 1963 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1964 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  




216 1965 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1966 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1967 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1968 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1969 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1970 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1971 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1972 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
216 1973 Laos US, Thailand, South 
Vietnam  
USSR, North Vietnam 
217 1989 Laos USSR  
217 1990 Laos USSR  
218 1958 Lebanon US, UK Syria 
219 1975 Lebanon Syria, Israel  
219 1976 Lebanon Syria, Israel Libya 
220 1983 Lebanon Israel, US, France  Syria 
220 1984 Lebanon US, France   
220 1985 Lebanon  Syria 
220 1989 Lebanon Syria Iraq 
220 1990 Lebanon Algeria, Syria   
221 1998 Lesotho Botswana, South Africa  
223 1989 Liberia US Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina 
Faso, Libya 
223 1990 Liberia US, Senegal, Nigeria, 
Ghana 
Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina 
Faso 
224 2000 Liberia  Guinea 
224 2001 Liberia  Guinea 
224 2002 Liberia  Guinea 
225 2001 Macedonia Bulgaria, Ukraine Kosovo 
227 1958 Malaysia UK  
227 1959 Malaysia UK  
227 1960 Malaysia UK  
228 1974 Malaysia UK, Australia, New 
Zealand  
 
229 1981 Malaysia UK, Australia, New 
Zealand 
 
230 1963 Malaysia UK, Australia  Indonesia  




230 1965 Malaysia UK, Australia  Indonesia  
230 1966 Malaysia UK, Australia  Indonesia  
231 1990 Mali  Libya 
231 1994 Mali  Libya 
232 1975 Mauritania Morocco Algeria 
232 1976 Mauritania Morocco, France  Algeria, Libya 
232 1977 Mauritania Morocco, France  Algeria, Libya 
232 1978 Mauritania Morocco, France  Algeria, Libya 
235 1992 Moldova Romania  
237 1975 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Mauritania  
Algeria, Libya 
237 1976 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Mauritania  
Algeria, Libya 
237 1977 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Mauritania  
Algeria, Libya 
237 1978 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Mauritania  
Algeria, Libya 
237 1979 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Mauritania  
Algeria, Libya 
237 1980 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1981 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1982 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1983 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1984 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1985 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1986 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1987 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1988 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
237 1989 Morocco US, France, Saudi Arabia  Algeria, Libya 
238 1977 Mozambique USSR, Cuba  Rhodesia 
238 1978 Mozambique USSR, Cuba  Rhodesia 
238 1979 Mozambique USSR, Cuba  Rhodesia 
238 1980 Mozambique USSR, Cuba  Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 
South Africa 
238 1981 Mozambique USSR, Cuba  South Africa 
238 1982 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania 
South Africa 
238 1983 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe  South Africa 
238 1984 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
UK  
South Africa 
238 1985 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, UK  
South Africa 
238 1986 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, UK, Italy  
South Africa, Malawi 




Tanzania, UK, Italy  
238 1988 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, UK, Italy, 
France, East Germany  
South Africa 
238 1989 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
UK, Italy, France, East 
Germany  
South Africa 
238 1990 Mozambique USSR, Cuba, Zimbabwe, 
UK, Italy, France 
South Africa 
238 1991 Mozambique USSR, UK, Italy, France  South Africa 
238 1992 Mozambique UK, Italy, France   
239 1948 Myanmar  China  
239 1949 Myanmar  China  
239 1950 Myanmar  China  
239 1951 Myanmar  China  
239 1952 Myanmar  China  
239 1953 Myanmar  China  
239 1954 Myanmar  China  
239 1955 Myanmar  China  
239 1956 Myanmar  China  
239 1957 Myanmar  China  
239 1958 Myanmar  China  
239 1959 Myanmar  China  
239 1960 Myanmar  China  
239 1961 Myanmar  China  
239 1962 Myanmar  China  
239 1963 Myanmar  China  
239 1964 Myanmar  China  
239 1965 Myanmar  China  
239 1966 Myanmar  China  
239 1967 Myanmar  China  
239 1968 Myanmar  China  
239 1969 Myanmar  China  
239 1970 Myanmar  China  
239 1971 Myanmar  China  
239 1972 Myanmar  China  
239 1973 Myanmar  China  
239 1974 Myanmar  China  
239 1975 Myanmar  China  
239 1976 Myanmar  China  
239 1977 Myanmar  China  
239 1978 Myanmar  China  




239 1990 Myanmar China   
239 1991 Myanmar China   
239 1992 Myanmar China   
239 1994 Myanmar China   
240 1991 Myanmar China  
240 1992 Myanmar China Libya 
240 1994 Myanmar China  
241 1989 Myanmar China India 
241 1990 Myanmar China  
241 1991 Myanmar China  
241 1992 Myanmar China  
241 1995 Myanmar China  
241 1997 Myanmar China  
241 1998 Myanmar China  
241 2000 Myanmar China, India, Pakistan   
241 2001 Myanmar China  
241 2002 Myanmar China, India   
243 1990 Myanmar China  
244 1996 Myanmar China  
246 1961 Myanmar  China 
246 1962 Myanmar  China 
246 1963 Myanmar  China 
246 1964 Myanmar  China 
246 1965 Myanmar  China 
246 1966 Myanmar  China 
246 1967 Myanmar  China 
246 1968 Myanmar  China 
246 1969 Myanmar  China 
246 1970 Myanmar  China 
246 1971 Myanmar  China 
246 1972 Myanmar  China 
246 1973 Myanmar  China 
246 1974 Myanmar  China 
246 1989 Myanmar China India 
246 1990 Myanmar China  
246 1991 Myanmar China  
246 1992 Myanmar China  
248 1992 Myanmar China  
248 1996 Myanmar China  
249 1993 Myanmar China   




249 1995 Myanmar China   
249 1996 Myanmar China   
249 1997 Myanmar China   
249 1998 Myanmar China   
249 1999 Myanmar China   
249 2000 Myanmar China, India, Pakistan  Thailand 
249 2001 Myanmar China   
249 2002 Myanmar China, India   
250 1997 Myanmar China   
252 1997 Nepal India   
252 2000 Nepal UK  
252 2001 Nepal UK, India   
252 2002 Nepal UK, US, India   
253 1978 Nicaragua  Cuba, Panama, Venezuela 
253 1979 Nicaragua  Cuba, Panama, Venezuela 
253 1981 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba  US, Honduras  
253 1982 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
253 1983 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
253 1984 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
253 1985 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
253 1986 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
253 1987 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
253 1988 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
253 1989 Nicaragua USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany  
US, Honduras  
255 1997 Niger China, Libya  
257 1997 Niger China, Libya  
259 1967 Nigeria USSR, UK, Egypt  
259 1968 Nigeria USSR, UK, Egypt France  
259 1969 Nigeria USSR, UK, Egypt France  
259 1970 Nigeria USSR, UK, Egypt France  
260 1972 Oman UK, Jordan, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia  
South Yemen, China, Iraq 
260 1973 Oman UK, Jordan, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia  
South Yemen, China, Iraq, 
USSR 
260 1974 Oman UK, Jordan, Iran  South Yemen, China, Iraq 
260 1975 Oman UK, Jordan, Iran, US  South Yemen, China, Iraq 




262 1974 Pakistan Iran Afghanistan 
262 1975 Pakistan Iran Afghanistan 
262 1976 Pakistan  Afghanistan 
262 1977 Pakistan  Afghanistan 
264 1989 Panama US  
265 1989 Papua New Guinea Australia  
265 1990 Papua New Guinea Australia  
265 1992 Papua New Guinea Australia  
265 1993 Papua New Guinea Australia  
265 1994 Papua New Guinea Australia  
265 1995 Papua New Guinea Australia  
265 1996 Papua New Guinea Australia  
270 1985 Peru US  
270 1987 Peru US  
270 1990 Peru US  
271 1950 Philippines US  
271 1951 Philippines US  
271 1952 Philippines US  
271 1953 Philippines US  
271 1954 Philippines US  
272 1969 Philippines US  
272 1970 Philippines US  
272 1971 Philippines US  
272 1972 Philippines US  
272 1973 Philippines US  
272 1974 Philippines US  
272 1975 Philippines US  
272 1976 Philippines US  
272 1977 Philippines US  
272 1978 Philippines US  
272 1979 Philippines US  
272 1980 Philippines US  
272 1981 Philippines US  
272 1982 Philippines US  
272 1983 Philippines US  
272 1984 Philippines US  
272 1985 Philippines US  
272 1986 Philippines US  
272 1987 Philippines US  
272 1988 Philippines US  




272 1990 Philippines US  
272 1991 Philippines US  
272 1992 Philippines US  
272 1993 Philippines US  
272 1994 Philippines US  
272 1995 Philippines US  
272 1997 Philippines US  
272 1999 Philippines US  
272 2000 Philippines US  
272 2001 Philippines US  
272 2002 Philippines US  
273 1970 Philippines US Malaysia 
273 1971 Philippines US Malaysia 
273 1972 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1973 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1974 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1975 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1976 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1977 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1978 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1979 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1980 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1981 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1982 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1983 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1984 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1985 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1986 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1987 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1988 Philippines US Malaysia, Libya 
273 1989 Philippines US  
273 1990 Philippines US  
273 1993 Philippines US  
273 1994 Philippines US Libya, Pakistan 
273 1995 Philippines US  
273 1996 Philippines US  
273 1997 Philippines US  
273 1998 Philippines US  
273 1999 Philippines US  
273 2000 Philippines US  




273 2002 Philippines US  
274 1960 Republic of Vietnam  North Vietnam, China, 
USSR 
274 1961 Republic of Vietnam US North Vietnam, China, 
USSR 
274 1962 Republic of Vietnam US North Vietnam, China, 
USSR 
274 1963 Republic of Vietnam US North Vietnam, China, 
USSR 
274 1964 Republic of Vietnam US, New Zealand, 
Australia, South Korea  
North Vietnam, China, 
USSR 
285 1990 Rwanda DRC, France, Belgium  Uganda 
285 1991 Rwanda France, Belgium  Uganda 
285 1992 Rwanda France, Belgium  Uganda 
285 1993 Rwanda France, Belgium  Uganda 
285 1994 Rwanda France Uganda 
286 1998 Rwanda  DRC 
286 1999 Rwanda  DRC 
286 2000 Rwanda Kenya DRC 
286 2001 Rwanda  DRC 
286 2002 Rwanda Burundi DRC 
287 1979 Saudi Arabia US, France   
288 1990 Senegal US Libya, Iraq, Guinea Bissau 
288 1992 Senegal US  
288 1993 Senegal US  
288 1995 Senegal US  
288 1997 Senegal US  
288 1998 Senegal US  
288 1999 Senegal  Guinea Bissau 
288 2000 Senegal US  
288 2001 Senegal US, France   
289 1991 Sierra Leone  Liberia, Libya 
289 1992 Sierra Leone  Liberia 
289 1993 Sierra Leone  Liberia 
289 1994 Sierra Leone  Liberia 
289 1995 Sierra Leone  Liberia 
289 1996 Sierra Leone  Liberia 
289 1997 Sierra Leone  Liberia 
289 1998 Sierra Leone  Liberia, Libya, Burkina 
Faso 
289 1999 Sierra Leone  Liberia, Libya, Burkina 
Faso 
289 2000 Sierra Leone UK Liberia 




291 1983 Somalia US Ethiopia 
291 1984 Somalia US Ethiopia 
291 1986 Somalia US Ethiopia 
291 1987 Somalia US Ethiopia 
291 1988 Somalia US Ethiopia 
291 1989 Somalia US Ethiopia 
291 2002 Somalia Eritrea, Djibouti, Saudi 
Arabia, Libya  
Ethiopia 
292 1966 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1967 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1968 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1969 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1970 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1971 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1972 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1973 South Africa  Zambia, USSR 
292 1974 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, USSR 
292 1975 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, USSR, 
China, North Korea 
292 1976 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, USSR, 
China, Cuba 
292 1977 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, USSR, 
Cuba 
292 1978 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, USSR, 
Cuba 
292 1979 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, Cuba 
292 1980 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
292 1981 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
292 1982 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
292 1983 South Africa  Angola, Cuba, China 
292 1984 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
292 1985 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
292 1986 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
292 1987 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
292 1988 South Africa  Angola, Cuba 
293 1981 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, USSR, 
Cuba, East Germany 
293 1982 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, USSR, 
Cuba, East Germany 
293 1983 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, USSR, 
Cuba, East Germany 




USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany 
293 1986 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, 
USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany 
293 1987 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, 
USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany 
293 1988 South Africa  Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, 
USSR, Cuba, East 
Germany 
294 1987 Spain France  
294 1991 Spain France  
294 1992 Spain France  
295 1971 Sri Lanka  India  
296 1989 Sri Lanka  India  
296 1990 Sri Lanka India  
297 1984 Sri Lanka  Israel India  
297 1985 Sri Lanka  Israel, Pakistan, UK  India 
297 1986 Sri Lanka  Israel, Pakistan  India 
297 1987 Sri Lanka  Israel, Pakistan, India   
297 1988 Sri Lanka  India  
297 1989 Sri Lanka  India  
297 1990 Sri Lanka  India  
297 1999 Sri Lanka  US  
297 2000 Sri Lanka  US, India   
298 1963 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
298 1964 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
298 1965 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
298 1966 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
298 1967 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
298 1968 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
298 1969 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
298 1970 Sudan USSR Israel, Uganda 
298 1971 Sudan USSR Israel, Uganda 
298 1972 Sudan  Israel, Uganda 
300 1976 Sudan  Libya 
301 1983 Sudan US, Egypt  Ethiopia, Libya  
301 1984 Sudan US, Egypt  Ethiopia, Libya  
301 1985 Sudan US, Egypt, Libya, Iraq  Ethiopia 
301 1986 Sudan US, Egypt, Libya, Oman  Ethiopia 
301 1987 Sudan US, Egypt, Libya, Iraq Ethiopia, Israel 




301 1989 Sudan Libya, Iraq, China  Ethiopia, Uganda 
301 1990 Sudan Iraq Ethiopia, Uganda 
301 1991 Sudan Libya, Iran  Ethiopia, Uganda 
301 1992 Sudan Libya, Iran, China Uganda 
301 1993 Sudan Iran, China, Pakistan  Uganda 
301 1994 Sudan Iran, Iraq, South Africa  Uganda, Israel, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia 
301 1995 Sudan Iran, Iraq, South Africa  Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
301 1996 Sudan Iran Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
301 1997 Sudan Iran Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
301 1998 Sudan Iran Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
301 1999 Sudan Iran Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
301 2002 Sudan  Eritrea 
304 1979 Syria USSR   
304 1980 Syria USSR   
304 1981 Syria USSR   
304 1982 Syria USSR   
305 1992 Tajikistan Russia, Uzbekistan  Afghanistan 
305 1993 Tajikistan Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan  
Afghanistan 
305 1994 Tajikistan Russia Afghanistan 
305 1995 Tajikistan Russia Afghanistan 
305 1996 Tajikistan Russia Afghanistan 
305 1998 Tajikistan Russia, Uzbekistan   
307 1974 Thailand US China, North Vietnam 
307 1975 Thailand US China, North Vietnam 
307 1976 Thailand US China, Vietnam, Laos 
307 1977 Thailand US China, Vietnam, Laos 
307 1978 Thailand US China, Vietnam, Laos 
307 1979 Thailand US China 
307 1980 Thailand US  
307 1981 Thailand US  
307 1982 Thailand US  
308 1986 Togo France, Zaire  Ghana 
310 1990 Trinidad and Tobago  Libya  
311 1980 Tunisia France  
312 1984 Turkey US, Iraq Syria 
312 1985 Turkey US Syria 
312 1986 Turkey US Syria, Iran 
312 1987 Turkey US Syria, Iran 
312 1988 Turkey US Syria, Iran 




312 1990 Turkey US Syria 
312 1991 Turkey US Syria 
312 1992 Turkey US Syria 
312 1993 Turkey US Syria, Greece 
312 1994 Turkey US Syria, Greece 
312 1995 Turkey US Syria, Greece 
312 1996 Turkey US Syria, Greece 
312 1997 Turkey US Syria, Greece 
312 1998 Turkey US Syria, Greece 
312 1999 Turkey US Syria, Iran 
312 2000 Turkey US  
312 2001 Turkey US  
312 2002 Turkey US  
313 1991 Turkey US Syria 
313 1992 Turkey US, Syria   
314 1971 Uganda  Tanzania 
315 1972 Uganda Libya Tanzania  
317 1978 Uganda USSR  Tanzania 
317 1979 Uganda Libya Tanzania 
317 1980 Uganda Tanzania Sudan 
317 1981 Uganda Tanzania, North Korea, 
Cuba, Ethiopia  
Libya 
317 1982 Uganda UK, North Korea  Libya 
317 1983 Uganda UK, North Korea   
317 1984 Uganda UK, North Korea   
317 1985 Uganda UK, North Korea, Egypt  Libya 
317 1986 Uganda UK, Tanzania  Sudan 
317 1987 Uganda USSR, Libya   
317 1988 Uganda Libya  
318 1994 Uganda  Sudan 
318 1995 Uganda  Sudan 
318 1996 Uganda US Sudan, Zaire 
318 1997 Uganda US, DRC  Sudan 
318 1998 Uganda US, DRC  Sudan 
318 1999 Uganda US, UK  Sudan 
318 2000 Uganda  Sudan 
318 2001 Uganda  Sudan 
319 1985 United Kingdom  Libya 
319 1986 United Kingdom  Libya 
319 1987 United Kingdom  Libya 
319 1988 United Kingdom  Libya 




321 2000 Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Afghanistan 
325 1962 North Yemen  Egypt Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
325 1963 North Yemen  Egypt UK 
325 1964 North Yemen  Egypt UK 
325 1965 North Yemen  Egypt UK 
325 1966 North Yemen  Egypt UK 
325 1967 North Yemen  Egypt, USSR   
325 1968 North Yemen  Egypt, USSR   
325 1969 North Yemen  Egypt Saudi Arabia 
325 1970 North Yemen  Egypt Saudi Arabia 
326 1980 North Yemen   South Yemen 
326 1981 North Yemen   South Yemen 
326 1982 North Yemen   South Yemen 
327 1994 Yemen  Iraq Saudi Arabia 
330 1998 Yugoslavia   Albania 
330 1999 Yugoslavia   Albania, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
France, German Federal 
Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, UK, US 
331 1967 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) South Africa  USSR, Cuba, Zambia 
331 1968 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) South Africa  USSR, Cuba, Zambia 
331 1973 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) South Africa  USSR, China, Cuba, 
Zambia 
331 1974 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) South Africa  USSR, China, Cuba, 
Zambia 
331 1975 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) South Africa  China, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia 
331 1976 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) South Africa  China, USSR, Cuba, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Botswana 
331 1977 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)  China, USSR, Cuba, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Angola 
331 1978 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)  China, USSR, Cuba, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Angola, Libya 












State A: refers to third party states which include both actual and potential interveners  





Intervention: dichotomous measure of whether or not state A intervenes militarily in 
state B. Intervention consists of military aid and/or the use of military force by a third 
party state in support of either the government or the opposition in a civil conflict. 
Military interventions include the supply of troops, military equipment, intelligence 
and logistical support, air or naval support to one of the sides in civil conflict.  
0 = No military intervention by state A in state B during year t 
1 = Military intervention by state A supporting government or rebels in state B during 
year t 
 
Intervention Side: dichotomous measure of whether military intervention occurs on 
government or rebel side. This variable is only coded for third parties that actually 
intervene in state B.   
0 = Military intervention by state A on rebel side in state B at year t  
1 = Military intervention by state A on government side in state B at year t  
 
Main sources for dependent variables: 
1) Regan’s dataset on military interventions in intrastate conflicts, 1945-1999 
2) Tillema’s dataset on foreign overt military interventions, 1945-1985 
3) Pearson and Baumann’s dataset on international military interventions, 1945-1988 
4) Kisangani and Pickering’s dataset on international military intervention, 1989-
2005 
5) UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2010: Variables ‘sideA2nd’ and 
‘sideB2nd’ identify the states that actively support one of the sides in a conflict with 
troops.   





a) International Variables 
 
Rivalry: dichotomous variable indicating whether rivalry exists between third party 
state and conflict state. 
0 = No rivalry between state A and state B at t-1 





Rival intervention: dichotomous variable indicating whether a rival of state A 
intervenes militarily in state B. 
0 = No military intervention in state B by a rival of state A at t-1 
1 = Military intervention in state B by a rival of state A at t-1 
 
Rival intervention on rebel side: dichotomous variable indicating whether a rival of 
state A intervenes militarily on rebel side in state B. 
0 = No military intervention on rebel side in state B by a rival of state A at t-1 
1 = Military intervention on rebel side in state B by a rival of state A at t-1 
 
Source for rivalry variables: James Klein, Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (2006), “The 
New Rivalry Dataset 1816-2001”. 
 
Alliance: dichotomous variable indicating whether there is a formal alliance between 
third party state and conflict state. Defense pacts, neutrality pacts, non-aggression 
pacts and ententes are considered as alliances.  
0 = No alliance between state A and state B at t-1 
1 = Alliance between state A and state B at t-1 
 
Ally intervention: dichotomous variable indicating whether an ally of state A 
intervenes militarily in state B. 
0 = No military intervention in state B by an ally of state A at t-1 
1 = Military intervention in state B by an ally of state A at t-1 
 
Ally intervention on government side: dichotomous variable indicating whether an 
ally of state A intervenes militarily on government side in state B. 
0 = No military intervention on government side in state B by an ally of state A at t-1 
1 = Military intervention on government side in state B by an ally of state A at t-1 
 
Source for alliance variables: Douglas Gibler (2009), Correlates of War (COW) 
Project - Formal Alliances Dataset v4.1 
 
Militarized dispute: dichotomous variable indicating whether a militarized interstate 
dispute exists between third party state and conflict state. An interstate dispute can 
have five different hostility levels according to MID. The study excludes interstate 
disputes with hostility levels coded as 0 (no hostility) and 1 (no militarized action) 
and includes those that are coded as 2 (threat to use force), 3 (display of force), 4 (use 
of force) and 5 (war) according to MID.  
0 = No militarized dispute between state A and state B at t-1 
1 = Militarized dispute between state A and state B at t-1 
Source: COW Project - Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset v4.01  
 
Historical ties: dichotomous variable indicating whether historical ties exist between 
state A and state B. The existence of historical ties indicates either that state B was a 
former colony of state A or that state B seceded from state A.  




1 = Historical ties between state A and state B  
Source: Paul Hensel (2009), Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project - Colonial 
History Dataset v0.4 
 
Contiguous: dichotomous variable indicating whether ‘type 1’ contiguity relationship 
as determined by the COW Project exists between state A and state B. Type 1 
contiguity means that state A and state B are separated by land or river border.  
0 = state A and state B are not contiguous 
1 = state A and state B are contiguous by land or river 
Source: COW Project – Direct Contiguity Data v3.1 
 
Same region:  dichotomous variable indicating whether state A and state B are in the 
same geographical region as defined by the COW Project. There are five 
geographical regions: Africa, Asia, Americas, Europe and Mideast.  
0 = state A and state B are not in the same region  
1 = state A and state B are in the same region 
Source: This variable was generated by EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000). 
 
Secondary diamonds: dichotomous variable indicating whether state B has secondary 
diamond deposits.  
0 = no secondary diamond deposits in state B 
1 = secondary diamond deposits in state B 
Source: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) – Diamond Dataset 
http://www.prio.no/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-Datasets/Diamond-Resources 
 
Petroleum: dichotomous variable indicating whether state B has petroleum deposits.  
0 = no petroleum deposits in state B 
1 = petroleum deposits in state B 
Source: PRIO – Petroleum Dataset v1.2 
http://www.prio.no/Data/Geographical-and-Resource-Datasets/Petroleum-Dataset 
 
Trade: continuous variable measuring the amount of trade per dyad year between 
state A and state B in current US millions of dollars. Variables ‘flow 1’ and ‘flow 2’ 
in dyadic trade dataset reports the imports of state A from state B and the imports of 
state B from state A respectively. Trade is the sum of those two variables at t-1.  
Source: COW Project – Dyadic Trade Dataset v2.01 
 
 
b) Domestic Variables 
 
Democratic intervener: dichotomous variable indicating whether state A has a 
polity2 score of 7 or higher.  
0 = state A’s polity2 score is less than 7 at t-1 





Joint democracy: dichotomous variable indicating whether both state A and state B 
have a polity2 score of 7 or higher.  
0 = state A and/or state B score less than 7 on polity2 scale at t-1 
1 = state A and state B score 7 or higher on polity2 scale at t-1 
 
Joint autocracy: dichotomous variable indicating whether both state A and state B 
have a polity2 score of 6 or less.  
0 = state A and/or state B score higher than 6 on polity2 scale at t-1 
1 = state A and state B score 6 or less on polity2 scale at t-1 
 
Source for regime type variables: Polity IV Project 
 
Ethnic ties1: dichotomous variable indicating whether state A and state B have the 
same dominant ethnic group. 
0 = state A and state B do not have the same dominant ethnic group  
1 = state A and state B have the same dominant ethnic group  
 
Ethnic ties2: dichotomous variable indicating whether the dominant ethnic group in 
state A is the second largest ethnic group in state B and the dominant ethnic group in 
state B is the second largest ethnic group in state A. 
0 = the dominant ethnic group in State A is not the second largest ethnic group in 
state B and vice versa  
1 = the dominant ethnic group in State A is the second largest ethnic group in state B 
and vice versa 
 
Source for ethnic ties variables: Erik Gartzke and Kristian Gleditsch (2006). “Identity 
and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide” European Journal of 
International Relations 12(1): 53-87.  
Replication data at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg 
 
Elite unrest:  dichotomous variable indicating whether government crises and/or 
purges took place in state A. 
0 = no elite unrest in state A at t-1 
1 = elite unrest in state A at t-1 
 
Mass unrest: dichotomous variable indicating whether general strikes, riots, anti-
government demonstrations and/or civil conflicts took place in state A.  
0 = no mass unrest in state A at t-1 
1 = mass unrest in state A at t-1 
 
Source for domestic unrest variables: Arthur Banks (2008). Cross-National Time-








c) Control Variables 
 
Major power: dichotomous variable indicating whether state A is categorized as 
major power by the COW Project.  
0 = state A is not a major power 
1 = state A is a major power 
Source: This variable was generated by EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000). 
 
CINC ratio: continuous variable measuring relative capabilities of state A to state B 
per dyad year by calculating the ratio of state A’s CINC (Composite Index of 
National Capability) score to state B’s CINC score at t-1. 
Source: COW Project – National Material Capabilities Dataset v4.0  
 
War involvement: dichotomous variable indicating whether state A is involved in an 
interstate war. The highest level of hostility (level 5) in MID dataset is categorized as 
an interstate war.  
0 = state A is not involved in an interstate war at t-1 
1 = state A is involved in an interstate war at t-1 
Source: COW Project - Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset v4.01 
 
Cold War: dichotomous variable indicating whether state A-state B dyad year is 
between 1946 and 1989.  
0 = post-Cold War dyad year 
1 = Cold War dyad year 
 
 
d) Contextual Variables 
 
Democratic target: dichotomous variable indicating whether state B has a polity2 
score of 7 or higher. 
0 = state B’s polity2 score is less than 7 at t-1 
1 = state B’s polity2 score is 7 or higher at t-1 
Source: Polity IV Project 
 
Government conflict: dichotomous variable indicating whether the type of civil 
conflict in state B is governmental or territorial. 
0 = territorial conflict 
1 = governmental conflict 
Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2010 
 
Battle deaths: discrete variable indicating the number of battle deaths in state B per 
conflict year.  






Refugees: discrete variable indicating the number of refugees in state B per conflict 
year.  
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR 
Statistical Online Population Database 
 
Rebel fighting capacity: ordinal variable indicating the fighting capacity of rebels 
rated relative to government forces in state B. 
1 = low 
2 = moderate 
3 = high 
Source: David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan (2012). Non-























Appendix D: Relogit Models 
Table D.1: Relogit Results for Full Sample  
  
 Model 1 Model 3 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention 




Rivalry ~ 1.056**** (.283) 1.113**** (.289) 
Militarized dispute ~ 1.143**** (.288) 1.126**** (.289) 
Alliance ~ .117 (.180) .081 (.181) 
Historical ties 1.662**** (.369) 1.572**** (.367) 
Contiguous 1.533**** (.217) 1.567**** (.216) 
Same region .848**** (.181) .903**** (.181) 
Secondary diamonds .227 (.152) .225 (.151) 
Petroleum  .405*** (.144) .412*** (.143) 
Trade (logged) ~ .106**** (.029) .095**** (.029) 
Rival intervention ~ 1.348**** (.161) 1.390**** (.169) 
Ally intervention ~ .576**** (.171) .538*** (.171) 
Democratic intervener ~ -.573**** (.140) - 
Ethnic ties 1 .742*** (.260) .691*** (.261) 
Ethnic ties 2 .889*** (.310) .906***(.316) 
Elite unrest ~ -.466**** (.096) -.438**** (.097) 
Mass unrest ~ -.274*** (.094) -.282*** (.095) 
Joint autocracy ~ - .434*** (.151) 
Joint democracy ~ - .243 (.318) 
Democratic target ~ -.128 (.193) - 
Government conflict .076 (.148) .074 (.148) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .342**** (.034) .328**** (.034) 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.441**** (.107) -.465**** (.107) 
War involvement ~ -.493**** (.132) -.469**** (.132) 
Major power 1.000**** (.189) 1.008**** (.189) 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .369**** (.035) .357**** (.035) 
Cold War  .039 (.107) .070 (.106) 
Spell years -2.200****(.104) -2.199****(.103) 
Constant -6.017**** (.301) -6.334**** (.339) 
N 199180 199180 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 





Table D.2: Relogit Results for Major Powers  
  
 Model 1 Model 3 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention 




Rivalry ~ -.158 (.336) -.139 (.329) 
Militarized dispute ~ .950*** (.369) .969*** (.379) 
Alliance ~ 1.128**** (.236) 1.078**** (.233) 
Historical ties 1.140*** (.367) 1.177*** (.364) 
Contiguous 1.609* (.878) 1.503* (.814) 
Same region .120 (.307) .111 (.298) 
Secondary diamonds .267 (.220) .274 (.221) 
Petroleum  .306* (.163) .306* (.162) 
Trade (logged) ~ .236**** (.065) .248**** (.067) 
Rival intervention ~ 1.194**** (.205) 1.168**** (.201) 
Ally intervention ~ .520**** (.134) .535**** (.138) 
Democratic intervener ~ .155 (.231) - 
Ethnic ties 1 -1.050 (.895) -.987 (.904) 
Ethnic ties 2 -.057 (.521) -.110 (.517) 
Elite unrest ~ -.276 (.260) -.344 (.336) 
Mass unrest ~ -.219*** (.82) -.182*** (.69) 
Joint autocracy ~ - .466* (.262) 
Joint democracy ~ - .046 (.340) 
Democratic target ~ -.118 (.321) - 
Government conflict .096 (.234) .101 (.230) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .275**** (.056) .274**** (.056) 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.411** (.181) -.396** (.179) 
War involvement ~ -.057 (.185) -.032 (.190) 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .553**** (.084) .550**** (.084) 
Cold War  .308** (.136) .310** (.137) 
Spell years -2.547**** (.208) -2.530**** (.207) 
Constant -5.920**** (.834) -6.267**** (.797) 
N 7317 7317 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 









Table D.3: Relogit Results for Democratic States 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention 




Rivalry ~ 1.350*** (.526) 1.360*** (.517) 
Militarized dispute ~ 1.257*** (.435) 1.250*** (.428) 
Alliance ~ .300 (.284) .345 (.280) 
Historical ties 1.555**** (.359) 1.536**** (.356) 
Contiguous 1.491**** (.373) 1.452**** (.377) 
Same region .528**** (.141) .482**** (.136) 
Secondary diamonds -.392 (.252) -.377 (.256) 
Petroleum  .413* (.242) .337 (.242) 
Trade (logged) ~ .262**** (.052) .278**** (.053) 
Rival intervention ~ 1.117**** (.202) 1.068**** (.205) 
Ally intervention ~ .407* (.245) .398* (.241) 
Ethnic ties 1 .594** (.249) .578** (.252) 
Ethnic ties 2 .721* (.436) .743* (.438) 
Elite unrest ~ -.069 (.151) -.081 (.151) 
Mass unrest ~ -.119 (.134) -.106 (.134) 
Democratic target ~ .227 (.319) .386 (.331) 
Government conflict .172 (.254) .126 (.250) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .311**** (.062) .279**** (.068) 
Refugees (logged) ~ - .101*** (.038) 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.349** (.166) -.330** (.154) 
War involvement ~ -.506** (.216) -.486** (.214) 
Major power 1.228**** (.222) 1.177**** (.226) 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .517**** (.067) .522**** (.067) 
Cold War  -.012 (.191) -.024 (.187) 
Spell years -2.205**** (.194) -2.200**** (.191) 
Constant -7.778**** (.525) -8.606**** (.607) 
N 62768 62768 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 










Table D.4: Relogit Results for Autocratic States 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Intervention Intervention 




Rivalry ~ 1.099**** (.327) 1.066**** (.321) 
Militarized dispute ~ 1.073**** (.320) 1.034**** (.323) 
Alliance ~ -.130 (.240) -.100 (.237) 
Historical ties -.794 (.858) -.893 (.900) 
Contiguous 1.676**** (.239) 1.630**** (.237) 
Same region .993**** (.212) .994**** (.208) 
Secondary diamonds .453 (.399) .458 (.397) 
Petroleum  .487*** (.176) .409** (.174) 
Trade (logged) ~ .027 (.036) .041 (.036) 
Rival intervention ~ 1.464**** (.207) 1.467**** (.204) 
Ally intervention ~ .687*** (.231) .634*** (.223) 
Ethnic ties 1 .864*** (.283) .846*** (.280) 
Ethnic ties 2 1.045*** (.403) 1.070*** (.398) 
Elite unrest ~ -.411**** (.111) -.391**** (.111) 
Mass unrest ~ -.331*** (.115) -.339*** (.115) 
Democratic target ~ -.265** (.108) -.268** (.109) 
Government conflict .100 (.176) .015 (.171) 
Battle deaths (logged) ~ .343**** (.040) .297**** (.040) 
Refugees (logged) ~ - .165**** (.038) 
Rebel fighting capacity ~ -.480**** (.130) -.447**** (.129) 
War involvement ~ -.207 (.184) -.206 (.181) 
Major power .608** (.301) .598** (.299) 
CINC ratio (logged) ~ .380**** (.044) .373**** (.044) 
Cold War  .025 (.131) .088 (.137) 
Spell years -2.575**** (.139) -2.592**** (.139) 
Constant -5.982**** (.368) -7.387**** (.537) 
N 136412 136412 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on dyads are reported in parentheses. 
*p≤ .10 **p≤ .05 ***p≤ .01 ****p≤ .001 (two-tailed tests) 
~ variables are lagged one year. 
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